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Notes and Comment
Carriers: Contract for Exemption from Liability for Negligence
of an Interstate Carrier: Drovers' Passs.-The case of Fish v.
D. L. & W. R. Co., 211 N. Y. 374 (1914), presented an important question which has been the subject of much litigation
in both the state and federal courts. The material facts are as
follows: Fish, the plaintiff, while in the state of Michigan, consigned his household effects and two head of horses to the defendant's connecting carrier to be transported to a destination in the state
of New York. The contract entered into provided that the plaintiff
was to be carried without the payment of any fare for himself, in order
that he might care for the horses while in transitu. In the contract
was a stipulation that the plaintiff should indemnify and hold the
defendant harmless if he should receive any personal injury from the
negligence of the defendant's agents or otherwise while on the journey. Plaintiff likewise signed a separate release exempting the company from liability for any injury to himself caused by its negligence. While on the journey and after entering New York State,
the plaintiff was injured through the negligence of the defendant's
agents, and brought this action for damages. Defendant relied on
the release, and the stipulation in the contract exempting it from
liability, but these were held not to constitute defenses. An appeal
has been taken to the United States Supreme Court. The question
presented is clear cut: where a contract in regard to an interstate
shipment is made in one state to be completed in another,
and the plaintiff is given a "drover's pass", containing stipulations
exempting the carrier from the consequences of its agent's negligence
on the journey, is such exemption from negligence a good and valid
defense, or is it void as against public policy?
Freightshipments. In freight traffic it is generally held that a common carrier may limit its absolute common law liability in any reasonable manner, but it is almost the universal rule in America that
the common carrier may not by any sort of a stipulation, exempt
itself from the consequences of its own negligence.'
"N. J. Steam Navig. Co. v. Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 344 (1848); Michigan Cent.

R. Co. v. Manufacturing Co., x6 Wall. (U. S.) 318 (1872); Bank of Kentucky v.
Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 174 (1876); Insurance Co. v. Transp. Co., 117 U. S.
312 (1885); Inman v. Railway Co., 128 U. S. 128 (1889); Hughes v. Penna.
R. Co., 202 Pa. St. 222 (1902); Tecumseh Mills v. Railroad, io8 Ky. 572 (i9oo);
McFadden v. Railway, 92 Mo. 343 (1887); Moulton v. Railway, 31 Minn. 85
(x883); U. S. Express Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St. I44 (1875); Railroad v.
Hopkins, 4 Ala. 486 (1868); Summerlin v. Railroad, 56 Fla. 687 (19o8); Railroad v. Sherwood, 132 Ind. 129 (1892); Sager v. Railroad, 31 Me. 228 (185o);

Squire v. Railroad, 98 Mass. 239 (1867); Welsh v. Railroad, io Ohio St. 65 (1859);
Transp. Co. v. Bloch, 86 Tenn. 392 (1888); Railroad v. Raiordon, iig Pa. St.
577 (i888); Houtz v. Railroad, 33 Utah 175 (1908); Johnson v. Railway, 69
Miss. Igi (1891); Hawkins v. Railroad, 17 Mich. 56 (1868); Railway v. Bank, 92
Va. 495 (1896); Railroad v. Witty, 32 Neb. 275 (891); McCune v. Railroad,
52 Ia. 600 (1879); Railway v. Rainey, 19 Col. 225 (893); Cooper v. Railroad,
I1o Ga. 659 (I9oo); Railway v. Reynolds, 8 Kan. 623 (x871); Normile v. Navig.
Co., 41 Ore. 177 (1902).
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The New York and English rule is, however, that the common carrier may by express contract based upon consideration, absolve
itself from all liability, loss, or damage resulting from any and every
degree of negligence of itself, its servants, or agents, no matter how
gross, as long as it does not amount to misfeasance or fraud. The
presumption, however, is against such an interpretation of a contract,
and such a stipulation must be stated2 in clear and unequivocal language to overcome this presumption.
A middle view seems to have been taken by some courts to the effect that a contract for exemption from ordinary negligence is valid,
but for gross negligence is against public policy. 3 Making the test
depend upon the degree of negligence seems very unsatisfactory,
and the tendency would be to allow any degree of actual negligence
to be construed as gross negligence.
Limitations of Liability for Injuriesto Passengers. It is almost the
universal rule that any contract purporting to exempt a common
carrier of persons from liability for the negligence of itself or its servants to a4 passenger carried for compensation is void as against public policy. From this it naturally follows that this liability cannot
be contracted away for the consideration of a reduced fare.5
But the New York cases are contra to this general rule, allowing
liability for negligent injuries
to passengers for hire to be contracted
6
away for a consideration.
'Penn v. Railroad, 49 N. Y. 2o4 (1872); Cragin v. Railroad, 51 N.Y. 61 (1872);
Mynard v. Railroad, 71 N. Y. i8o (1877); Spinetti v. Steamship Co., 8o N. Y.
71 (188o); Canfield v. Railroad, 93 N. Y. 532 (1883); Wheeler v. Navig. Co.,
125 N. Y. 155 (1891).
England: Dickson v. Great No. Ry. Co., 18 Q. B. D. 176, 55 L. T. (N. S.)
868 (1886); Peek v. No. Staffordshire Ry. Co., io H. L. C-s. 473 (1862).
gRailway v. Chapman, 133 Ill. 96 (189o); Railway v. Calumet Farms, 194
111. 9 (1oi);
Orndorff v. Adams Express Co., 3 Bush (Ky.) 194 (1867); Black v.
Goodrich Transp. Co., 55 Wis. 319 (1882); Metier v. Railway, 5 S. D. 568 (1894).
Conflict of Laws: Where the contract in state A is to be partially performed
there and in several other states, state B will apply the law of A as to the validity
of the making of the contract, and on the exemption, imposition, or limitation
of liability. Steam Co. v. Insurance Co., 129 U. S. 397 (1889); Hale v. Navig.
Co., i5 Conn. 538 (1843); Penn. Co. v. Fairchild, 69 I11.26o (1873); So. Express
Co. v. Hanaw, 134 Ga 445 (I9IO).
Absolute exemption from liability is invalid in the federal courts being
considered as against the public policy of the United States, no matter where the
contract was made. The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263 (1902); The Hugo, 57
Fed. 403, aff'd 168 U. S. 1O4 (1897).
The decisions of the state courts holding contracts invalid on the grounds
of public policy are not binding on the federal courts. The federal courts
will exercise their own judgment based on the general commercial law where no
state statute is involved. Myrick v. Railroad, 107 U. S. 102 (1882); Delmas v.
Insurance Co., 81 U. S. 661 (1871).
4Railroad v. Lockwood, 17 Wall (U. S.) 357 (1873); Railway v. Stevens,
95 U. S. 655 (1877); Walther v. So. Pac. Co., 159 Cal. 769 (1911); Griswold v.
Railroad, 53 Conn. 371 (1885); Railway v. Lippman, ilo Ga. 665 (I9OO); Checkley v. Railroad, 257 Ill. 491 (1913); Russell v. Railway, 157 Ind. 305 (1901);
Doyle v. Railroad, 166 Mass. 492 (1896); Railroad v. Chenwith, 52 Pa. St.
382 (1866).
6Railway v. Stevens, supra,note 4; Crary v. Railroad, 203 Pa. St. 525 (1902).
6Dorr v. Steam Navig. Co., ii N. Y. 485 (1854); Bissell v. Railroad, 25
N. Y. 442 (1862); Seybolt v. Railroad, 95 N. Y. 562, 573 (1884).
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Passes given by carriers to persons riding on their cars. It is universally held that where no stipulation is made attempting to exempt
the carrier from liability for negligent injury to a person riding on a
pass, the carrier is liable for such injury. But the Supreme Court
of the United States and probably the majority of the state courts
hold that since a carrier is under no obligation to carry free, it may,
as a condition to so doing, stipulate
against liability for injuries re7
sulting from its own negligence.
Many states, however, hold that even in the case of free passes, it
is against public policy to stipulate for exemption from liability for
negligent injury.8
This rule as to the allowance of a stipulation for exemption in the
case of free passes, is held not to apply where in reality the pass is
not a gratuitv, as where it is issued as part of the consideration of a
contract.9
4
According to the Supreme Court decision in Railroadv. Lockwood,
and the great weight of authority, a person traveling on a drover's
pass in charge of a shipment of stock is a passenger for hire and astipulation in such pass or agreement attempting to exonerate the company from a negligent injury of such passenger is void.' 0 But by the
New York rule, a person riding on a drover's pass is a gratuitous passenger, and an exemption of the carrier from liability is held valid.
On another ground the same result is reached in New York by holding that any good consideration for the exemption is sufficient to absolve the carrier from liability, if unequivocally contracted for, even
in the case of a passenger for hire."
'Railway v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440 (1903); Boering v. Railway, 193 U. S.
p(19o3); Walther v. Southern Pacific Co., 159 Cal. 769 (1911); Griswold v.
ilroad, supra, note 4; Railroad v. Beebe, 174 Ill. 13 (1898); Traction Co. v.
Kentschy, 167 Ind. 598 (igo6); Rogers v. Steamboat Co., 86 Me. 261 (1894);

Doyle v. Railroad, supra, note 4; Kinney v. Railroad, 32 N. J. L. 407, 34 N. J. L.
513 (1869); Bissell v. Railroad, 25 N. Y. 442 (1862); Perkins v. Railroad, 24
N. Y. x96 (862); Stinson v. Railroad, 32 N. Y. 333 (1865); Poucher v. Railroad,
49 N. Y. 263 (1872); Ulrich v. Railroad, io8 N. Y. 8o (I888); Brewer v. Railroad, 124 N. Y. 59 (I89I); Hodge Ad'm'r v. Railroad, 112 App. Div. i42,
aff'd 194 N.Y. 570 (909); Gill v. Railroad, 151 App. Div. (N.Y.) 131, 135 (912);
Marshall v. Railway, ii8 Tenn. 254 (i9o6); Muldoon v. Railway, 7 Wash. 528
(1893); Annas v. Railroad, 67 Wis. 46 (1886).
sRailroad v. Hopkins, 4 Ala. 486 (1868); Railway v. Pitcock, 82 Ark. 441
(1907); Jacobus v. Railway, 20 Minn. 125 (I873); Railroad v. Grant, 86 Miss.
565 (1905); Railroad v. Curran, 19 Ohio St. i (1869); Williams v. Railioad,
x8 Utah
210 (1898).
9

See Railway v. Stevens, supra, note 4; Whitney v. Railroad, 1O2 Fed. 85o
(I9oo).
"Railroad v. Lockwood, supra,note 4; Railway v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498 (1899).
Blatcher v. Railroad, 31 App. Cas. (D. C.) 385 (19o8); Railway v. Miles, 40
Ark. 298 (1883); Railroad v. Beebe, supra, note 7; Railway v. Teeters, 166 Ind.
335 (19o6); Weaver v. Railroad, 139 Mich. 590 (I9O5); Otto v. Railway, 87
Neb. 503 (1910); Carroll v. Railway, 88 Mo. 239 (1885); Railroad v. Curran,
supra, note 8; Marshall v. Railway, supra, note 7: Railway v. Ivy, 71 Tex. 409
(1888);
Williams v. Railroad, supra, note 8; Maslin v. Railroad, I4 W. Va. i8o
(1878); Lawson v. Railway, 64 Wis. 447 (1885).
nBissell v. Railroad, supra, note 7; Pouchr v. Railroad, supra, note 7;
Blair v. Railway, 66 N. Y. 313 (1876). Also see Meuer v. Railway, 5 S. D.
568 (894). This is also the English rule; see Robinson v. Railway, 27 Ont.
L. R. 290 (1912).
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The principal case involves such a drover's pass, as, generally and
in the federal courts, has been held not to be a free pass, but which
in the English and New York courts has been held to be gratuitous.
The question presents itself, however, has the character of the drover's pass been changed by section i of the Interstate Commerce
Act as amended. The important part of the section for consideration here is as follows:
"No common carrier . . . . shall, . ...
directly or indirectly,
issue or give any interstate free ticket, free pass, or free transp6rtation for passengers, except to its employees and . . . . to necessary
caretakers of live-stock . . . ." Does this provision declare that
passes issued to the necessary caretakers of live-stock, i. e. drovers,
are to be considered as free and gratuitous passes, and thus bring
them within the federal rule allowing exemption from liability in
the case of gratuitous passage? That is the position of the defendant railroad in this case, and the defendant also contends that the
statute being a regulation in regard to interstate commerce, over
which Congress has absolute and exclusive control, it supercedes all
state rules on the subject in respect to interstate commerce. The
wording of the statute gives much support to the raliroad's contention, which is further strengthened by the fact that the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of the Charleston and Western
Carolina Railway Co. v. Thompson,234 U. S. 576 (r15), has taken
the position with regard to a pass issued to an employee's wife, that
the statute in saying free passes meant gratuitous passes, and such
being the case, a stipulation in such a pass exempting from liability
was valid. The court said, "To most of those enumerated (in the
statute) the free pass would obviously be gratuitous in the strictest
sense, and when all that may receive them are grouped in a single
exception we think it plain that the statute contemplates the pass as
gratuitous in the same sense to all." It would seem that the court
would have difficulty, from the wording of the statute and the quotation from the opinion just given, in making any distinction between the passes of employees and drovers. But the Circuit Court
of Appeals and the U. S. District Court, in two late cases,1 have
confined the Thompson case, supra,to the case of employees and have
held that even under section i of the Interstate Commerce Act,
a drover's pass is still not a gratuitous pass, and a stipulation exempting from negligence is invalid.
Considering these late decisions subsequent to the decision in the
Thompson case, supra, it is a matter of doubt whether the Supreme
Court of the United States will hold that the above quoted language
of the Interstate Commerce Act has changed the federal rule as laid
down in Railroad v. Lockwood,13 to the effect that drover's passes are
not gratuitous and the exemption from liability stipulated for in such
passes is invalid. And it is interesting to note that in the Thompson case, supra,the Supreme Court was not embarrassed by prece12Southern R. Co. v. Chatman, 222 Fed. 802, 807 (1915); Wily v. Railway,
Fed. 127 (i915). Also see, McGregor v. Railway, 154 N. W. (N. D.) 261
(1915);
Martinv. Railway, 148 Pac. (Old.) 711 (1915).
13
Supra, note 4.
227
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dent, for the case of an employee or a member of an employee's family riding on a free pass, on business not connected with the employment by the carrier, such pass containing a stipulation exempting
from liability for negligence, had not been previously passed upon
by the court.
It is submitted that the proper rule is as laid down in the Lockwood case, supra, for a drover's pass is not issued gratuitously in
fact, but is issued in consideration of the drover's assistance in performing work for the company in caring for the stock in shipment.
So, in the principal case the stock had to be cared for and the plaintiff as owner of them accepted the duty to care for them in consideration of the company's agreement not to charge him for his passage.
Therefore, a drover's pass cannot in the strict sense be called a gratuitous pass, and should come within the early federal rule refusing
exemption in such a case unless the Supreme Court, disagreeing with
the lower federal courts, shall hold that the wording of the Interstate Commerce Act has by legislative fiat made drover's passes,
along with the other passes mentioned therein, gratuitous in the strict
sense,-a decision which would be contrary to the previously declared status, and, it is submitted, the actual status of such passes.
H. S. Bareford, 'x6.
Carriers: Liability for Loss of Goods Caught in Floodbecause of Negligent Delayof the Carrier.-Inthe case of SeaboardAir Line Railwayv.
Mullin, 70 So. (Fla.) 467 (i915), we again find discussed the unsettled
question of the carrier's liability for loss of goods due to an act of
God combined with the negligent delay of the carrier. There the
goods were delivered to the defendant carrier at Ocala, Florida, for
transportation to Youngstown, Ohio. After a considerable delay,
due to the carrier's negligence, the goods were destroyed in the state
of Ohio by floods, the most sudden and violent ever known in that

vicinity.
Upon the question raised the courts are irreconcilably divided,
some adopting the view that, when, of two concurring causes, one is
a cause for which the carrier is not responsible and the other is his
negligence, the latter is the proximate cause and he is responsible
for the loss. In other jurisdictions, it is held that the delay is remote
and the cause for which the carrier is not responsible is the proximate
cause, so that the carrier is not liable.
The leading Massachusetts case, Denny v. New York Central
R. Co.,' adopted the now so-called "Massachusetts rule" of exemption from liability, a rule since followed in many of the states of the
union. 2 The Denny case was one in which, owing to negligent delay
li3 Gray (Mass.) 481 (1859).
2Gulf Coast Transportation Co. v. Howell, 70 So. (Fla.) 567 (1915); Rodgers

v. Missouri R. Co., 75 Kan. 222 (1907); Y. M. V. Co. v. Millsaps, 76 Miss. 855
(1899); Grier v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co., io8 Mo. App.
565 (1904); Extinguisher Co. v. Ry., 137 N. C. 278 (1904); Daniels v. Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532 (1872); Armstrong, Byrd & Co. v. Ill. Central R. Co.,
26 Old. 532 (9io); Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. 171 (1852); Lamont v. Nashville,

etc. R. Co., 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 58 (1871): International & G. N. R. Co. v. Bergman,
64 S. W. (Tex.) 999 (19ol); Railroad Co. v. Reeves, io Wall. (U. S.) 176 (1869).
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in transportation, a shipment of wool arrived in Albany six days
late, was delivered and afterwards submerged in a flood. The
wool was intenced to go on to a further point and, but for the delay
would have escaped injury. Apparently upoh the ground that the
duty of the defendant had terminated at the time of the flood, the
court rendered a decision in the company's favor, holding that the
negligent delay was the remote and not the proximate cause of the
loss. This case is often referred to as following the doctrine of the
Pennsylvania court in Morrisonv. Davis," but this is erroneous as
the Pennsylvania decision rests upon the idea that the carrier in
cases of delay, with an extraordinary accident as a concurring cause,
can never be answerable for anything more than the loss of time,
because extraordinary accidents are not within the scope of anticipation. The Massachusetts case could not have followed this case
as it was decided upon an entirely different fact, i.e., that at the
time of the loss there was no contributing negligence on the part of
the carrier. The result reached in the Massachusetts decision may
be similar to that reached in the leading New York case now to be
discussed.
This case, Read v. Spaulding,4 involving much the same question,
was curiously enough consequent upon the same flood involved in
the leading Massachusetts case. The judgment rendered was
exactly the reverse of that in the neighboring jurisdiction, New York
holding the carrier liable, but at the same time distinguishing the
two cases upon the fact that in Read v. Spaulding, the carrier's
liability continued along with his possession and control while in the
Massachusetts case the goods had already been delivered. This
decision led to the establishment of the "New York rule" fixing upon
the carrier the liability for the loss of goods due to the concurring
negligent delay and the act of God. 5 Since that time there has been
a very nearly equal division of the authorities between the New York
and the Massachusetts doctrines.
In the English case of Davis v. Garrett,6 where there was a deviation
from the agency of transportation agreed upon, thereby bringing the
property in transit in contact with a flood, the carrier was held liable.
Whether or not this rule is founded upon the theory that the deviation amounts to a conversion, there is clearly an analogy between
the two cases, as deviation, like delay, involves an increase in the
exposure to risk. Why there should be a different rule in the two
cases is difficult to perceive.
Argument on principle would seem to favor the "New York rule,"
as without the negligent delay of the carrier operating to bring the
goods into a situation such that an act of God effects their loss, the
evil would not have befallen them and they would have reached their
3
Supra, note 2.
6

43o N. Y. 63o (i864).
Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Quarles & Couturie, I45 Ala. 436 (19o6);
Rodgers v. Central Pacific R. Co., 67 Cal. 607 (1885); Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn.
410 (1838); Wald v. Pittsburg C. C. & St. L. R. Co., I62 Ill. 545 (1896); GreenWheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Co., i3o Iowa 123 (19o); Baltimore v.
Keedy, 75 Md. 320 (1892); Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co.,
94 Minn. 269 (905); Condict v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 54 N. Y. 500 (1873).

66 Bing. 716 (i830).
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destination in safety. Moreover, it would seem that the loss should
fall, not upon the innocent shipper, but upon the carrier who, through
his delay, has occasioned this loss, the only instance where there
should be freedom from liability being when it can be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that the loss would have occurred with or
without the negligent delay.
Olive J. Schmidt, '8.
Civil Rights Law: Application to a DramaticCritic.-InWooott v.
212 (I916), the facts were that the plaintiff, a
dramatic critic was excluded from the defendant's theatre because of
adverse criticism written in the course of his profession. Plaintiff
contended that this action by the defendant was contrary to his legal
rights under the Civil Rights Law,' as amended in 1913.2 The court
unanimously held that the defendant had a right to exclude plaintiff
as their act was not within the prohibition of the Civil Rights Act,
and that this right was not changed by the amendment of 1913. The
court, Collin, J., speaking, held that the purpose of the amendment
was "to give greater efficiency to the policy of the original statute-to
forbid the discrimination, barred by the statute, not only by direct
exclusion but also by the indirect means specified." The abuse aimed
at by the amendment was the practice of proprietors to hold out to the
public by advertisements that persons of the class designated in the
statute would be refused accommodation, if they applied. Thus,
they were doing indirectly what they were forbidden to do directly.
The Civil Rights Act now reads: section i.-"AIl persons within
the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns,
restaurants, hotels, eating houses, bath-houses, barber shops, theatres,
music halls, public conveyances on land and water, and all other
places of public accommodation or amusement, subject only to the
conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to
all citizens."
Section 2. "That any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for
reasons applicable alike to all citizens of every race, creed or color,
and regardless of race, creed or color," the enjoyment of the privileges
secured by the first section shall be subject to a penalty. In a limited
number of cases, such conduct is also made a misdemeanor.3
This and similar statutes have been held constitutional as being
within the police power of the state., They do not seek to compel
Shinbert, 217 N. Y.

1

Civil Rights Law, secs. 4o and 41.

3
4Penal

2

Laws of

x913,

chap.

265.

Law, sec. 514.
Substantially similar statutes have been enacted in many jurisdictions.
6People v. King, iIo N. Y. 418 (i888); Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass'n, 140
Cal. 357 (1903); Baylies v. Curry, 128 Ill. 287, 292 (1889)1, Donnell v. Mississippi, 48 Miss. 661, 682 (1873). In 1875 Congress passed an act similar to the
one in question. This was construed in the Civil Rights cases, 109 U. S. 3 by the
Supreme Court and it was declared that under the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments, Congress had no power to enact legislation which made it a crime
for a citizen of a state to do a certain act, but that Congress could make legislation
applicable only to the state on this subject.
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social equality; they do regulate private business to some extent, but
the businesses affected are those to which the police power has been
conceded to apply generally. While the statute "was enacted with
special reference to citizens of African descent," its language is much
broader. Its policy is to prevent arbitrary discrimination in certain
businesses and discrimination on the ground of race, creed, or color
was conceived to be such arbitrary discrimination.
The statute was construed in Grannanv. Westchester Racing Ass'n.6,
where it was held that the purpose of the statute was "to declare that
no person should be deprived of any of the advantages enumerated
upon the ground of race, creed or color and that its prohibition was
intended to apply to cases of that character and none other" * * *
"Any discrimination not based on race, creed or color does not fall
within the condemnation of the statute." A distinction must be
drawn in the businesses enumerated. At common law an innkeeper
and common carrier were under a duty to furnish, to their capacity, at
reasonable rates, the ordinary and usual services which they held
themselves out to the public to give, indiscriminately to all who might
apply.7 An applicant, however, might be refused if he was personally
obnoxious by reason of disease, intoxication or some other offensive
personal condition.8 The operator of such business could not, therefore, discriminate on the ground of color 9 , and, hence, the statute
imposes no new duty as to him, but merely fixes a penalty. The
proprietors of other enumerated businesses were under no such duty
to serve at common law and could discriminate on any ground, as, for
example, race, creed or color.10 The statute is penal and hence is
strictly construed. The test is: was the complainant discriminated
against in an enumerated place on an enumerated ground? If there
was no discrimination, no action lies. This is also true if the ground
of discrimination is one named but not in an enumerated business, or
if the discrimination is in an enumerated business but not on the
ground specified.
It will be noted that the statute says "all other places of public
accommodation or amusement," thus leaving it open for the court to
determine the statute's scope. It has been decided that a drug store
having a soda fountain,' a licensed barber shop 12, a boot blacking
6x53 N. Y. 449, 465 (1897).
73o Fed. Cases, No. 18258 (1875); Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 365 (189o)

(dictum that statute is declaratory of the common law of the state); Westchester
& Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. St. 209 (1867); People v. King, supra,
note 5; In Cornell v. Huber, 102 App. Div. (N. Y.) 293 (i9o5), it was held that
one might waive the statutory penalty and sue on the common law liability in
case of an inn keeper. Bennett v. Dutton, IoN. H. 481 (1893).
8Beale, Law of Innkeepers and Hotels, section 91 et seq.; Hutchinson, Carriers (3d ed.), sec. 966.
gDerby v. Lowry, 6 Phila. 30 (1865).
"0Grace y. Moseley, 112 Ill.App. 1oo (1904); Burks v. Bosso, i8o N. Y.
341 (1905); Collister v. Hayman, 183 N. Y. 250 (1905); People v. King, supra,
note 5; People v. Flynn, i89 N. Y. I8o (1907); Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351,
355 (i9ii).

"Cecil v. Green, 161 Ill.
265 (1896).
nFaulkner v. Solazzi, 79 Conn. 541 (1907); contra, Messenger v. Nebraska,
25 Neb. 674 (1889).
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standI3, a place for dancing where selections of dancers were customarily made 4 and an apartment hotel where suites were leased for
terms,15 are not within the statdte. Or the contrary, a bowling
alley16, a skating rink in which exhibitions were given,17 and a saloon I
have been held to fall within the statute. The courts have laid down
no test as to what constitutes a public as distinguished from a private
amusement, but it appears to depend much on the nature of the entertainment. If it is merely for social purposes, in which, ordinarily,
choice is exercised and there is no holding out to the public, it should
be construed as a place of private entertainment; if there is a holding
out to the public, and no choice is customarily exercised, no discrimination should be allowed on the ground of race, creed, or color and the
place should be construed as one of public amusement. 19
There is some question as to what constitutes discrimination.
Speaking generally, it may be said to be a withholding from one of
privileges given to another or requiring greater rates for equal service.
As the act is penal, if the breach is by a servant, authority must be
proven and the mere fact that the act was done in the scope of the
servant's employment is insufficient.2 0 Discrimination in a social
privilege is not a discrimination within the statute. Neither is a
state law making such discriminatiQn, as for example, in schools,
unconstitutional."
While there may be some foundation for the argument that the
public should be protected by a fair criticism of plays, the remedy, if
one is necessary, should be through the legislature and not by extending a statute purporting to protect civil rights to a purpose never
within its spirit.
As the ground of exclusion in the principal case was not one of the
enumerated grounds and the amendment did not change the statute
in this respect the decision seems to be correct as a matter of principle.
B. F. Sovocool, 'r6.
"Burks
v. Bosso, supra,note io.
14
Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse Elect. R. R.,
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App. Div. (N. Y.)

864

(I915).
15
Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 46 Misc. (N. Y.) 617 (1905).

16Johnson
v. Pop
17
People v. King,
8

Corn Co.,

24

Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 135

(1902).

supra, note 5.
' Babb v. Elsinger, 147 N.Y. Supp. 98 (1914); contra, Kellar v. Koerber, 61

Ohio St. 388 (1899); Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200 (1898). The ground of
difference is the different view of public policy taken, Ohio and Minnesota
apparently taking the view that it is against policy to force one to sell another
liquor, while New York does not recognize such a policy.
Vj'his statement gives meaning to some expressions in some of the cases, e.g.,
in Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse Electric R. R. Co., supra, note 14, it is said

that the case would be brought within the statute, if there was to be given a

public exhibition of dancing; and People v. King, supra, note 5, is relied on
where there was exclusion from a skating exhibition. The court held that the
object being to select people "naturally congenial" the case did not fall within

of the statute.
the prohibition
20 Thomas v. Williams, 48 Misc. (N. Y.) 615
97 Wis. 124 (x897).

(1905);

contra, Bryan v. Adler,

2IPeople v. School Board of Borough of Queens, 161 N. Y. 598 (i9oo); Peoii Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 187 (1882).

ple v. Gallagher,
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Constitutional Law: Are State Compensation Statutes Superseded
by FederalEmployer's Liability Act?-The plaintiff was injured while
employed in interstate commerce, there being no negligence on the
part of the defendant employer. It was contended by the defendant that the Federal Employer's Liability Act applied and that,
therefore, the defendant could be held liable only on proof of negligence. It was held that the plaintiff could obtain compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state where the injury occurred. Under the state act, of course, the negligence of the
defendant was not a prerequisite to recovery. Matter of Winfield v.
N. Y. C. and T. R. R. R. Co., 216 N. Y. 284 (1915).
The Federal Constitution grants to Congress in express terms
jurisdiction over interstate commerce. As to those subjects which
require a general system or uniformity of regulation, the power of
Congress is exclusive.
In other matters admitting of diversity
according to the special requirements of local conditions the states
may act within their respective jurisdictions until Congress sees fit
to act, and when Congress does act the excercise of its authority
overrides all conflicting legislation.' The question in the principal
case is, do the state and federal statutes deal with the same subject
matter so that the Federal Employers Liability Act supersedes the
state Workmen's Compensation Act?
By the act of 19o8, known as the Federal Employers' Liability
Act,2 Congress took possession of the field of employers liability for
injuries sustained by employees in interstate transportation by rail.3
In that statute the method and manner of dealing with such injuries
are prescribed. The Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of
New York deals with the liability of a master for injuries in the course
of any hazardous employment, but a different manner, method aud
procedure are prescribed in dealing with such injuries.
In the case of the Seaboard Air Live v. Horton4 a state statute
imposed liability upon an employer for failing to provide the employee
a safe place~to work. The plaintiff employee was engaged in interstate commerce and the federal act prescribed the grounds of
liability. This latter act rendered the employer liable only when
negligence was shown on the part of the employer in failing to provide
a safe place to work. It was held that the federal statute superseded
the state statute in this respect. The court said, "But plainly
......
it was the intention of Congress to base the action on
negligence only and to exclude responsibility of the carrier to its
employees for defects and insufficiencies not attributable." In the
case of Southern Railway v. Railroad Commission of Indiana,5 Mr.
'Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 299, 319 (1851); Ex Parte
McNeil, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 236., 240 (1871); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275,
280 (1875); County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 697 (188o); Bowman v.
Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 481, 485 (1887); Gulf, Colo.
and Santa Fe v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 104 (1894); North Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370, 378 (1911); So. Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424 (1911).
235
U. S. Stat. 6'5.
3
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I (1911); Seabord Air Line v.
Horton, 233 U. S. 492 (1913); Adams Express v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 (1912);
Michigan
Central v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59 (1912).
4
Supra, note 3. r236 U. S. 439 (1914).
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Justice Lamar said; "For as said, in Priggv. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 'in what it does prescribe, manifestly it indicates that
it does not intend that there shall be any further legislation to act
upon the subject matter. Its silence as to what it does not do, is
as expressive of what its intention is as the direct provisions made by
it ..... .the will of Congress upon the whole subject is as clearly
established by what it had not declared as7by what it has expressed.'"
The courts in California and Illinois have held that Workmen's
Compensation Acts, in so far as they regulate the liability of an
employer for injuries sustained by an employee engaged in interstate transportation by rail, are superseded by the Federal Employer's
Liability Act. The New Jersey courts, however, have held that the
state compensation acts are superseded only when there is negligence upon the part of the employer. It seems that the fundamental
error of both the principal case and the New Jersey decisions is that
they regard a difference in the manner and method of dealing with
injuries to an employee arising in the course of his employment as
tantamount to a difference in subject matter.
There are many practical arguments that may be set forth against
the result reached in the principal case. If there was negligence on
the part of the employer, the employee could maintain an action
under the federal statute or could maintain his action under
the state statute, under which the negligence of the employer is
immaterial. If it were expedient for the employer to have his
action tried under the federal statute, it would seem unreasonable
to compel the employer to prove his own negligence. It might be
advantageous, if the employee was negligent and the employer
was more negligent, not to allege any negligence at all and
recover more damages under the state act. This might be
so, due to the fact that in the provisions of the federal statute is
embodied the doctrine of comparative negligence. Had the New
York court followed the California and the Illinois cases, the result
would have tended to promote uniformity of regulation in regard to
the liability of an employer for injuries sustained to employees engaged in interstate transportation by rail, and thereby brought about
one of the aims of Congress when the Federal Employers' Liability
Act was passed.
Harry Ginsburg, '.x6.
Contracts: Effects of Illegality.-In Dinkelspiel v. O'Day, 151 Pac.
(Utah) 344 (1915), the defendant, in order to prevent a sale of her
property under a mortgage foreclosure, borrowed from the plaintiff,
her tenant in possession of the premises, a sum of money out of which

she paid the judgment and costs and retained a small amount for her
76Smith v.
Staley v.
8

Industrial Acc. Comm., 26 Cal. App. 56o (i915).
I. C. R. R. Co., 268 Ill. 356 (i915).
Rounsaville v. Central R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 371 (1915); Hammill v. PennR. R.,
87 N. J. L. 388 (1915); West Jersey T. Co. v. Phila. & R. Ry., 95 Atl. (N. J.)
753 (1915).
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personal use. Plaintiff took a mortgage on the property to secure
this loan which he made in order that he might not be dispossessed
or disturbed in a gambling business which he was conducting on the
premises. Plaintiff now brings action to foreclose this mortgage.
Defendant claims that at the time of making the loan plaintiff entered
into an oral agreement with her to occupy the premises for three
years, the accruing rent to be applied on the principal and interest
of the mortgage. Defendant further claims the contract of loan
was illegal, alleging it to have been made with a view to enabling
the plaintiff to continue the illegal business.1 It was held that the
plaintiff could maintain his action.
The result is correct on principle. Generally the courts are lenient
with a plaintiff in an action on a contract antecedent to an illegal
transaction, especially where money is advanced and the contract
is not directly hostile to sound public policy. An agreement will
not be presumed to be void as against public policy, if it is possible
so to construe it that it will be consistent with the law and valid.2 A
contract innocent in itself will not be avoided, unless it is made directly to promote an illegal transaction.3 And it has been held that
a contract prima facie lawful, for instance for the sale of goods on
commission, will be enforced, though the sale is effected through
bribery and both parties have full knowledge of the illegitimate
means to be employed.4 To make an agreement illegal as being
against public policy it must be manifestly and directly so. It is
not enough that the contract is indirectly and remotely connected
with some violation of the law.5
But in some cases where the equities seem rather strong on the
side of the plaintiff, he is allowed no remedy.6 For instance, although
a person lending money with mere knowledge that it is to be used for
gambling purposes is generally permitted to recover in the American
states,7 it has been held that an action would not lie for labor
performed in erecting a nine-pin alley appurtenant to a tavern
under a statute forbidding tavernkeepers to maintain such alleys.8
It would seem that the lending of the money was more directly
in furtherance of the gambling than the furnishing of the labor.
The mechanic or carpenter doubtless was as little concerned as
to the use to which his handiwork was to be put as was the lender
with respect to the use of the money lent.
A distinction is made between transactions where money is lent
or goods are sold with "mere knowledge" that they are to be used for
illegal purposes, 9 and where the lender or vendor has made the loan
'9 Cyc. 549: "While it may not always seem an honorable thing to do, yet a
party to an illegal agreement is permitted to set up the illegality as a defense even
though
it may be alleging his own turpitude."
2
Curtis v. Gokey, 68 N. Y. 3oo (1877).
3
4De Groot v. Van Duzer, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 370 (1837).
McDearmott, v. Sedgwick, 140 Mo. 172 (897).
5
Bier v. Dozier, 24 Grat. (Va.) I (1873).
76Myers v. Meinrath, ioi Mass. 366 (1869).
Jackson v. City National Bank of Goshen, 125 Ind. 347 (i89o); Tyler v.
Carlisle, 79 Me. 230 (1887).
8
Spurgeon v. McElwain, 6 Ham. (Ohio) 442 (1834).
OTyler v. Carlisle, supra, note 7; Ware v. Curry, 67 Ala. 274 (I88O); Tracy v.
Talmage, 14 N. Y. 162 (z856).
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or sale with a specific "view to" the objectionable purpose. 10 Applying this test, a player in a gambling game who loans money to an
impecunious co-player in order that the game may not be broken
up by his withdrawal, probably could not maintain an action for the
recovery of the loan, although an action would lie if the money were
lent by a bystander. A few states, especially in early cases, have
held contracts illegal where no more than mere knowledge of a
prospective illegal purpose was attributable to the seller or lender."
Positive knowledge had to be shown, however. Reasonable grounds
for belief or a mere supposition were not sufficient. 2 Along the
same line, a covenant in a lease providing that nothing but a
liquor saloon should be maintained on the premises is not void,
without proof of knowledge on the part of the lessor that such
covenant could not be observed without violating the law."
In the principal case the court held that the alleged three-year
lease never existed. If this lease had been satisfactorily proved, it
would have been more than probable that the defendant gave it as
part consideration for the plaintiff's loan, as he naturally would
have insisted that he be assured uninterrupted possession, inasmuch
as his object in making the loan in question was to guard against
dispossession. The defendant might then have argued with some
degree of plausibility that the lease was illegal as being in furtherance of the maintaining of a gambling house, and, therefore, that
the contract of loan, for which it was part consideration, was illegal.
This would have raised the question as to whether the contract was
divisible into legal and illegal parts, defendant admitting the mortgage to be legal and claiming the promise to lease, illegal. At this
point plaintiff would reply by conceding that he loaned the money
in return for the giving of the mortgage by defendant and also the
promise made by her to lease him the property. He could then
waive the performance of the contract of lease and maintain his case
on the mortgage alone. 14 But if the consideration is not so divisible
the court will not attempt to fix the respective values of the proper
and improper elements and will refuse to enforce the contract. 5
A good statement of the general rule is that a lawful promise
made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an
unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same
consideration. 6 But, in any event, the three-year lease would
prove to be lawful, as the defendant was guilty of no more than
mere knowledge of the prospective illegal use of the property.
To summarize, mere knowledge of an illegal purpose will not
avoid a contract unless such purpose is essentially heinous and
1
"Graves v. Johnson, 156 Mass. 211 (1892); Tracy v. Talmage, supra, note 9;
Fellows v. Van Hyring, 23 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 230 (1857).
"Rucknan v. Bryan, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 34o (1846); Adams v. Coulliard, 102
Mass. 167 (1869).
nAnheuser-Busch Brew. Ass. v. Mason, 44 Minn. 318 (189o); Ely v. Webster,
102 Mass. 304 (1869).
"Shedlinsky v. Budweiser Brew. Co., 163 N. Y. 437 (1900).
4Year Book, 14 Henry VIII, 25,26; Erie Railway Co. v. Union Locomotive
and Express Co., 35 N. J. L. 240 (1871).
5
" Santa Clara Valley Mill and Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387 (x888).
6Leavitt v. Palmer, 3 N. Y. i9 (r849).
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vicious in its nature, as, for example, a sale of firearms or poison,
with knowledge on the part of the seller that the purchaser intends
to use them to commit a felony. If the purpose is not inherently
vicious or heinous there must be in additional element of promotion
of the illegal object on the part of the seller or lender in order that
the contract may be invalidated. The loan or sale must be made
"with a view to", or "with knovxledge and intent"'17 of the ensuing
illegal transaction. 1
Donald H. Hershey, '18.
Contracts: Trade Customs and Usages: Proof as Partof Contract.
-Hart v. Cort, 165 App. Div. (N. Y.) 583 (1iQ4), held, two judges
dissenting, one with opinion, that a trade custom or usage could not
be proved by parol to show that a written license to present a play
was exclusive, where the license was not expressed to be exclusive,
and there was nothing in the instrument itself from which an exclusive
license could be inferred. This question involves the subject of customs and usages and their relation to the parol evidence rule.
Custom is such usage as by common consent and uniform practice
has become the law of the place where itexists or of the subject matter
to which it relates, and binds the parties without regard to their
expressed consent.1 "A general custom is the common law itself or
a part of it. ' ' 2 A usage, on the other hand, refers to an established
method of dealing, adopted in a particular place, or by those engaged
in a particular vocation or trade, which acquires legal force as a part
of a contract only because persons are understood to contract with
reference to it. 3 "We must iot confound custom with usage; usage
is no more than a fact, custom is a law; there may be usage without
custom, but there can be no custom without usage to accompany or
precede it; usage consists in the repetition of acts, and custom arises
out of this repetition. ' 4 Thus, as usages gradually and imperceptibly
acquired universal recognition and acquiescence, they became general
customs and constituted the unwritten law. The existence of a
common custom of such extent warrants its judicial recognition.Perhaps the best illustration of this growth is the judicial recognition
of the customs and usages of merchants which constitute the law
merchant. 6 It is a familiar statement that the law merchant grew;
it was not made. Courts have also, for example, taken judicial notice7
of such customs as to turn to the near hand as the law of the road,
17Graves v. Johnson, supra, note io.

1sErnst v. Crosby, 14o N. Y. 364, (1893).

'Lawson, Usages and Customs, p. IS; 2 Elliott on Contracts, sec. 1672; Byrd
15O Ala. 122 (1907); Morningstar v. Cunningham, IiO Ind. 328 (1886).
v. Beall,
2
Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464 (1872).

3

App. 165 (1902);
Byrd v. Beall, supra, note I; Currie v. Syndicate, 104 Ill.
v. Wiggins, 227 Pa. 564 (1910).
Miller
4
Escriche, Dict. Jurisprudence, quoted in Cutter v. Waddingham, 22 Mo. 2o6,
284 (1855); Pencil Company v. N., C. &St. L. R. R. Co., 124 Tenn. 57 (1910).
Commentaries on the Law of Evidence, sees. 121; 123.
"Jones,
6
Brandao v. Barnett, 12 Cl. & F. (Eng.) 787 (1846); Goodwin v. Roberts,
L. R. io Exch. (Eng.) 337 (1875); aff'd L. R. I App. Cases 476 (1876); Reed v.
Wilson, 41 N. j. L. 29 (1879); Connerv. Robinson, 2 Hill (S. C.) 354 (x834).
'Turley v. Thomas, 8 Car. & P. (Eng.) 103 (1837).
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and the system of checking baggage adopted by common carriers."
But this widely extended judicial recognition of customs as a part of
the common law because of their universal notoriety cannot be
expected to cover particular and purely local customs and usages. 9
Courts often speak of the particular or local customs and trade usages
as synonymous.' 0 When these are relied upon they must be pleaded
and proved."
A feature further distinguishing local or trade usages from the
general custom heretofore considered is that no one is bound by the
former in the absence of knowledge of their existence. 12 This knowledge, however, may be either actual or constructive.13 The law
imposes a duty upon one engaged in a particular trade or business to
inform himself of the customs and usages which obtain in that business
and will presume that he has performed this duty. His knowledge,
therefore, of a custom or usage of that business which is certain,
notorious, uniformly and well established, and has the other requisites
of a valid custom, will be conclusively presumed.14 And so, where
customs and usages are firmly established in a particular trade or
business, parties engaged in the business are presumed to contract
with reference to them, unless they are expressly excluded". Because
of this fact, evidence of the custom or usage is frequently admitted in
the course of litigation, and without violating the inhibition of the
parol evidence rule, to explain an ambiguous contract;16 or to explain
or illustrate a new or unusual work used in a contract; or a word used
in a technical, scientific, or peculiar sense as applicable to any trade, or
branch of business, or to any particular class of people.' 7 It is not
admissible, however, to vary or contradict the definite and unambiguous terms of an express contract, either written or oral, if the
express agreement excludes the usage. 18 The parties are free to adopt
the usage expressly or to reject it expressly. Where it appears, theregIsaacson v. N. Y. Central K. R. Co., 94 N. Y. 278 (1884).
9Lawson, Usages and Customs, p. 96.
"0Richmond v. Union Steamboat Co. ,87 N. Y. 240 (i88i).
"Lindley v. First National Bank, 76 Iowa 629 (1889); Oregon Fisheries Co. v.

Elmore Packing Co., 69 Or. 340 (19141; Horn v. Chicago & North Western Ry.
Co., 38 Wis. 463 (1875).
1212 Cyc. 1041, (43); Stoney v. Farmer's Transportation Company, 17 Hun
(N. Y.) 579 (1879); Walls v. Bailey, supra,note 2; Miller v. Burke, 68 N. Y. 615
(1877).
n 2 Elliott on Contracts, sec. 1696; 12 Cyc. IO42, (4).
142 Elliott on Contracts, sec. x697; 12 Cyc. 1O42, (44).
152 Elliott on Contracts, sec. 171o; Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 35 (1860); U. S.
Life Insurance Co. v. Advance Co., 80 Ill. 549 (1875); Steidtmann v. Joseph Lay
Co., 234 InI. 84 (19o8); Appleman v. Fisher, 34 Md. 540 (1871); Esterly v. Cole,
3 N. Y. 502 (1850); Schipper v. Milton, 51 App. Div. (N. Y.) 522 (1900), affirmed,
no opinion, 169 N. Y. 583; Miller v. Fischer, i App. Div. (N. Y.) 172 (1911);
Holder v. Swift, 147 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 690 (1912); Morningstar v. Cunningham, supra, note I.
"Barlow v. Lambert, 28 Ala. 704 (1856); Lyon v. Lennon, io6 Ind. 567 (1886);
Leiter v. Emmons, 2o Ind. App. 22 (1897); Cole v. Leach, 47 Ind. App. 341 (1911);
Moore v. U. S., 196 U. S. 157 (i9o4); National Bank v. Burkhardt, Ioo U. S. 686

(1879).
172

Elliott on Contracts, sees. 1701, 1707, 1708; Cement Co. v. Hofman, 168
71 (1912); Long v. Davidson, 1oi N. C. 170 (1888); Miller v. Wiggins,

Ill. App.

supra,note 3; Moran v. Prather, 23 Wall (U. S.) 492 (1874).
1829 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.), 433 (8); 2 Elliott on Contracts, sees.
1713, 1715; 12 Cyc. 1O9I, (62); Bradley v. Wheeler, 44 N. Y. 495 (1871).
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fore, that they have fully expressed their intention on a certain point,
this special agreement excludes any usage inconsistent with such
expressed intention. 9
A custom or usage can of course have no effect upon the contract
rights of the parties, unless it is a term in the contract, either expressly
or impliedly. 20 Where the parties expressly adopt or expressly reject
the custom or usage no difficulty is presented. Where, however, the
parties contract and reduce their negotiations to a single written
memorial and neither expressly adopt nor expressly reject a local or
trade usage, the question is presented whether such custom or usage,
with reference to which they contracted, can be impliedly incorporated
into their written contract as a matter of law. It has been held that
there is a well established rule that there may be such implied incorporation.2 ' This rule is spoken of as adding tacitly implied incidents
to the contract in addition to those already expressed. It is to be
noted that there must be a contract existing to which the implied
incident may be added, for the incident added cannot operate to
establish the contract.2' The rule and the reason for it have been
tersely stated as follows: "Where valid usages prevail in respect to
the subject-matter of the contract, and the parties to the contract are
chargeable with knowledge thereof, such usages are presumed to be
tacitly incorporated into the contract, so far as they are not expressly
or impliedly negatived by the expressed terms; and parol evidence
of such usages is admissible to interpret the contract. Experience has
taught that men of affairs, in making contracts, are not generally
careful to express themselves with that completeness and particularity
which a lawyer would probably adopt. Dealing with one another
time after time in regard to the same subject-:matter, they fall into the
habit of doing certain things in certain ways, and in drawing their
contracts they leave part of their intention unexpressed, in silent
reliance on the usages so established and mutually understood to enter
into and form a part of their agreement. Therefore, when such a
contract becomes the subject of litigation, the presumption is indulged
that, as the parties have not expressed a contrary intention, they must
have intended to incorporate a usage known to them to be generally
regarded as a part of such contract; and evidence of the usage is
admitted, not to vary or contradict the terms of the contract, but to
interpret it to the court and jury as it was understood by the parties
at the time is was made." 2'
Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.), 433 (8).
Barlow v. Lambert, supra, note 16; Currie v. Syndicate, supra, note 3.
App. 82 (I9oo);
212 Cyc lO82, (67); Mobile Fruit Co. v. Judy & Son, 91 Ill.
Lupton v. Nichols, 28 Ind. App. 539 (1902); Pickering v. Weld, 159 Mass. 522
(1893); Evans v. Western Brass Co., 1I8 Mo. 548 (1893); San Antonio Hardware
Co. v. Standard Paint Co., 136 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) ii5O (1911); PmpckeLeicht Lumber Co. v. Talley, 153 S. W. (Ark.) 833 (1913); Lillard v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 134 Fed. 168 (1904); I Greenleaf on Evidence
ed.), sec. 294.
(i6th.
12 McSherryv. Blanchfield, 68 Kan. 310 (1904); Oregon Fisheries Co. v. Elmore
Packing Co., supra, note ii; Tilley v. County of Cook, 103 U. S. 155 (I88o);
National Bank v. Burkhardt, supra-, note 16.
229 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.), 421-424; Clarke's Browne on Usages
and Customs, secs. 39, 46, 109, 127; Booth Brothers v. Baird, 87 Hun (N. Y.) 452
(1895); Miller v. Fischer, supra, note 15; Hinton v. Locke, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 437
(1843); Walls v. Bailey, supra, note 2; Newhall v. Appleton, 114 N. Y. i4o
1929
20

(x889).
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While this rule and the rule previously stated, which excludes proof
of custom or usage to vary or contradict the expressed terms of a contract, are two entirely distinct and independent rules and are not to be
confused, it is readily perceived that a court in applying the one may
be brought in dangerous proximity to the other. This difficulty has
been recognized and commented on judicially. Coleridge, J., in
Brown v. Bryne, 3 El. & B. (Eng.) 702 (x854), said, "Again, in all contracts, as to the subject-matter of which known usages prevail, parties
are found to proceed with the tacit assumption of these usages; they
commonly reduce into writing the special particulars of their agreement, but omit to specify these known usages, which are included,
however, as of course, by mutual understanding; evidence, therefore,
of such incidents is receivable. The contract is in truth partly
express and in writing, partly implied and unwritten or understood.
But, in these cases, a restriction is established on the soundest principles, that the evidence received must not be of a particular which is
repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the written contract. Merely,
that it varies the apparent contract is not enough to exclude the evidence, for it is impossible to add any material incident to the written
terms of a contract without altering its effect, more or less."1'
Baron
Parke, in Hutton v. Warren, x M. & W. (Eng.) 466 (1836), said, "It
has long been settled, that in commercial transactions, extrinsic evidence of custom and usage is admissible to annex incidents to written
contracts, in matter with respect to which they are silent.. The same
rule has been applied to contracts in other transactions of life, in which
known usages have been established and prevailed and this has been
done upon the principle of presumption that, in such transactions, the
parties did not mean to express in writing the whole of the contract
by which they intended to be bound, but a contract with reference to
those usages."
It is submitted that these learned judges have suggested the pr6per
solution of the problem. The parties sought to declare and define
their rights by contract. If they contracted with reference to a
not6rious, known, and established usage which was mutually understood and intended by them to be a term in their contract, it is as
much a part of the contract as if expressed orally or in writing. Contract is primarily a matter of intention; it results from a meeting of
the minds. Whether this consensus is brought about by spoken word
or by written words, or whether it results from the "silent understanding" operating between the two minds, mutually understoodand
intended by each to be a term in the contract, is equally unimportant.
The mechanical process of transposing an agreement into writing can
neither add to nor subtract from the contract itself. If the scrivener
errs, equity affords a remedy. But if the parties, in reducing their
agreement to written form, use ordinary and perfectly unambiguous
words or phrases which may have, through long continued, uniform,
and notorious usage, acquired a peculiar, technical, or special meaning
in the business in which the parties deal, the written instrument may
fail utterly to express the contract between the parties unless inter21

Clarke's Browne on Usages and Customs, sec. Io8.
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preted in the light of the usage. Evidence of the usage in such cases
must be admitted, unless it contravenes a rule of law, or contradicts or
varies the expressed terms of the contract, and is admitted without
doing violence to the parol evidence rule.25
It would seem, therefore, that if the evidence which the defendant
attempted to introduce in the principal case went to prove that by
force of usage and custom among theatrical people the "right to present a play" meant the" exclusive right to present the play," it should
have been received. It follows that the written memorial to which
the parties, in the hurry and custom of business life, may reduce the
more special features of their particular agreement, while evidencing a
contract between them, is not the exclusive repository of its terms.
To limit the admission of evidence by the four corners of such memorial is to restrict the rights of the parties and to bind one or the other
against his will to a contract to which he never assented.
'An interesting case involving the principle here discussed was
recently decided in the House of Lords. 6 The written contract there
considered provided that, "All disputes arising out of this contract
shall be referred to arbitration," etc. A dispute arose as to an alleged
custom. The question was thus presented whether a dispute arising
as to the custom was one arising "out of the contract" within the
meaning of the arbitration clause. In other words, was the custom
a part of the contract? The House of Lords held that the arbitrators
had the power, under the submission of the parties, to decide all disputes arising out of the contract, and, therefore, to decide as to the
existence of the custom, i. e., the custom was a part of the contract.
Lord Loreburn said, "When an arbitrator had power, as here, to
decide all disputes arising out of a contract, including questions of
law, surely he must decide what the contract was, and he could not
decide this without introducing the custom." Lord Sumner, in the
course of his opinion, said, "If the bargain was partly expressed in ink
and partly implied by the tacit incorporation of trade customs, the
first function submitted to the arbitrators was to find out what it was;
to read the language, to ascertain the custom, to interpret them both,
and to give effect to the whole. . . . Of course the arbitrators
could not add to the contract, but their admitted power to inquire
into the existence of the custom provisionally was due to the very
fact that in so doing they added nothing to the contract, but were
rightly finding out what the contract was before interpreting and
applying it." Lord Sumner disapproved of the expression that usage
or custom added terms to contracts. "It is more exact," he said,
"to say that the contractual terms, which the custom imported, were
already tacitly incorporated as a part, though an unexpressed part,
of the agreement between the parties." A more apt expression there
could not be.
2

Rastetter v. Reynolds, x6o Ind. 133 (1903); Floyd v. Mann, 146 Mich. 356
(19o6); Snoqualmi Realty Co. v. Moynihan, i79 Mo. 629 (1903); Cream of
Wheat Co. v. Crist Co., 166 App. Div. (N. Y.) 870 (1915); Dana v. Fiedler, 12
N. Y. 40 (1854); Atkinson v. Truesdall, 127 N. Y. 230 (189i); National Bank v.
Burkhardt,
supra,note 16; Steidtmann v. Joseph Lay Co., supra,note 15.
26
Produce Brokers Company (Ltd.) v. Olympia Oil and Cake Company (Ltd.),
32 Times Law Reports (Eng.)
15 (1915).
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It is apparent that the rule which permits parol proof of custom or
usage in addition to the written memorial to determine, not to establish, the contract has its limitation and must be applied with caution.
Lord Campbell announced this limitation in the decision of Humphrey
v. Dale, 7 El. 6 B. (Eng.) 266 (i857); "Whether this evidence be
treated as explaining the language used, or adding a tacitly implied
incident to the contract beyond those which are expressed, is not
material. In either point of view, it will be admissible unless it
labours under the objection of introducing something repugnant to or
inconsistent with the tenor of the written instrument. . . . The
principle on which the evidence is admissible is that the parties have
not set down on paper the whole of their contract in all its terms, but
those only which were necessary to be determined in the particular
case by specific agreement, and which of course might vary infinitely,
leaving to implication and tacit understanding all those general and
unvarying incidents which a uniform usage would annex. To fall
within the exception, therefore, of repugnancy, the incident must be
such as if expressed in the written contract would make it insensible or
inconsistent."
The local or trade usage must be pleaded and proved, and the jury
must determine the facts from which the inference may be properly
drawn that the alleged custom did exist.n And as the local usage
affects the contract rights of the parties only because it is a term in the
contract, and because it cannot be a term in the contract without
mutual consent, and because there cannot be consent without knowledge, the question of knowledge of the usage is also properly left to the
jury, unless the established facts present a case where knowledge on
the part of the parties will be conclusively presumed2 Evidence of
usage must necessarily be parol,2 9 and its exclusion in a proper case
is prejudicial error.10
Applying these principals to the facts of the principal case, it would
seem that the Appellate Division was in error. The parties were
engaged in the theatrical business; among other activities, of renting,
leasing, and selling rights therein. Evidence of the special customs
and usages existing in such business was important for the purpose of
showing the circumstances under' which the parties contracted, and of
ascertaining their intention in making the contract in order to interpret it to the court and jury as they themselves understood it. To
the making of such proof the parol evidence rule has no application.
Leon A. Plumb, 'z6.
2Chicago Packing & Provision Co. v. Tilton, 87 Ill. 547 (1877); Tower Co. v.
Southern Pacific Co., 184 Mass. 472 (1904); Cronan v. Homblower, 211 Mass.
538 (1912); Carr v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 81 N. J. L. 532 (1910); Walls v.
Bailey,
28 supra, note 2.
Tower Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, note 27; Pennell v. The Delta
Co., 94 Mich. 247 (1892); Walls v. Bailey, supra, note 2.
Transportation
29
Browne, Parol Evidence, sec. 58; Clarke's Browne on Usages and Customs,
sec.3 39; Branch, Sons & Co. v. Palmer, 65 Ga. 210 (188o).
Joseph v. Andrews Co., 72 Mo. App. 55i (1897); Hayden v. Frederickson,
55 Neb. 156 (1898); Mangum v. Farrington, i Daly (N. Y.) 236 (1862); Sims v.
U. S. Trust Co., 35 Hun (N. Y.) 533 (1885); Guillon v. Earnshaw, 169 Pa. 463
(1895); Thomas v. O'Hara, i Mill (S. C.) 3o3 (x817).
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Contract: The Element of Time as of the Essence of a Contract.-A
recent case on appeal, Davis v. Godart, 154 N. W. (Minn.) ioz (1915),
deals with a contract for the sale of land, in which was the following
provision: "if the vendee desires to relinquish the land at the end of
one year from the date of this contract, the vendor will return him
the purchase money." The contract was made and dated October 4,
1912, and on October 6, 1913, the plaintiff notified the defendant
that he desired to relinquish the land. The vendor refused to return
the money paid him and the plaintiff brought suit against him at law
to recover that amount, but the action was dismissed and the plaintiff
appealed from an order denying a new trial. The appellate court
held that the vendee had a reasonable time after the expiration of the
year in which to offer back the land, the word "at" being construed as
meaning "after". The court also said that the plaintiff's offer was
made within a reasonable time, and the order was reversed. In this
holding there is presented an interesting question: When is time of the
essence of a contract? If a contract provides that a party thereto
shall do a certain thing on or by a specified day, will failure in that
performance constitute a default?
A contract in which the time for performance is left indeterminate
needs little discussion. In such cases a reasonable time for performance is to be allowed.' What constitutes a reasonable time is dependent upon the facts of the2 particular case and is a question for the
consideration of the jury.
On the other hand it is obvious that time may be made to be of
the essence of the contract. If parties choose to stipulate for a particular thing to be done at a particular time, such stipulation is effectual.
There is no equitable jurisdiction to make a new contract which the
parties themselves have not made. The means by which such
stipulation may be made are not confined to narrow specification. It
may be by express stipulation of the parties or without such express
agreement; by the very nature of the contract itself or of the circumstances under which it was made. 3 The effect of time being of the
essence is to make a failure to perform within that time a breach of a
vital term of the contract, and a repudiation of it is justified. When a
contract is thus made, the intent of the parties must be regarded both
at law and in equity. The rule, when effective, has very close application,4 holding the parties to an hour's time as well as to that of a full
day.
But contracts in which the intent as to time provisions is less evident present difficulties of construction. Where no time is specified,
the rule gives a reasonable time for performance, having regard to the
circumstances of the particular case; but, where stipulations as to
'Holden v. Royal, 86 S. E. (N. C.) 583 (1915); Whiting v. Gray, 27 Fla. 482
(1891); Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Hartman Furniture and Carpet Co., 187
II. App.
426 (914); Sinon v. Etgen, 213 N. Y. 589 (1915).
2
3Wilson v. Roots, 119 Ill. 379 (1887).

Sneed & Cock v. Wiggins and Jones, 3 Ga. 94 (1847); Tyler v. McCardle, 17
Miss. 230 (1848); Grigg v. Landis, ig N. J. Eq. 350 (1868); Morgan v. Herrick,
21 Ili. 481 (1859).
4
Shinn v. Roberts, 20 N. J. L. 435 (1845).
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time were made, the English common law courts formerly construed
them as being of the essence of the contract, even if they were not
expressed to be so, and considered them as conditions precedent.
Both parties were held to the provisions; neither had a right to performance unless he had himself fulfilled his obligations within the
specified time. In equity, however, especially in contracts for the
sale of land, time was held not to be of the essence of the contract
unless so specified, or naturally following from the terms of the contract and the circumstances under which the agreement was made,
and specific performance would be decreed although the plaintiff did
not fulfill the time requirement. In equity, although stipulations as
to time were primafaciepresumed not to be of the essence of the contract, it was a presumption that might be rebutted by a clear indication of contrary intention, and such intention could appear either by
a direct stipulation to that effect or by implication from the nature
of the subject matter of the contract and surrounding circumstances.
The American courts of equity follow the English equity rule. Full
weight is given to the intention of the parties concerned; the construction is liberal, and the intent that time is of the essence has to
be clearly shown, either by specification or necessary implication. 5
The presumption is that the time of performance named in the contract is not essential, though this is rebuttable even by parol evidence,
which is admissible to show that time was intended to be of the
essence of the contract.6 But even this equitable construction that
time is of the essence, if clearly shown to be so intended, has its exceptions. In Cheney v. Libbey,7 it was held not to be, although so
expressed, on the grounds that giving effect to the intention would
contravene public policy.
Comparatively early American cases show that our common law
courts generally adopted the English common law rule, that time was
of the essence of the contract. In Hill v. Fisher,"the court said,
"there are cases in which the time agreed upon for the payment of
money is not of the essence of the contract. In those cases remedy is
to be sought in equity. In law where the time is specified, it must be
lived up to." Cromwell v. Wilkinson,9 holds that "at law time is of
the essence of a contract, and performance is required at the day, or
the consequence of default may follow." However, Pennsylvania
had, even before this, in a common law action held that under a contract to pay money on a certain day, time is not of the essence of the
contract, since the failure to pay on that day may be compensated
by the payment of money in the nature of damages.10 This holding
5
Boldt v. Early, 33 Ind. App. 434 (1904); Ewins v. Gordon, 49 N. H. 444
(1870); Hubbell v. Von Schoening, 49 N. Y. 326 (1872); Mitchell v. Probst, 152
Pac. (Okla.) 597 (1915); Shenners v. Adams, 148 Pac. (Okla.) 1023 (1915);
Virtue v. Stanley, I51 Pac. (Wash.) 270 (1915); Huffman v. Hummer, i7 N. J.

Eq.6 263 (1865).

Thurston v. Arnold, 43 Ia. 43 (1876).

7134 U.S. 68 (i8go).
834 Me. 143 (1852).
918 Ind. 365 (1862).

10Decamp v. Feay, 5 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 323 (1819).
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may, however, have been due to the fact that Pennsylvania had no
court of equity.
The equity doctrine has now been adopted by our common law
courts, and contracts are construed according to the intent of the
parties, with respect to the time element. In Knott v. Stephens,"
it was held that a delay of eight days past the specified time for delivery of lithographing and stationery did not justify a repudiation of the
contract. Time will not be held to be of the essence, unless so specified by the terms of the contract or unless it be shown clearly that
such was the intent of the parties. 2 So it may be said that the present
common law rule is practically the same as the equitable view, except
in mercantile contracts."3 There are, however, various cases with
holdings contrary to this general construction. 14
The present day construction, then, is that both courts of law and
equity apply the same principle in the interpretation of contracts
involving the question of time as being of the essence. The general
rule is to look at the whole scope of the transaction to see whether the
parties really intended the time named to be of the essence of the
contract, and if it appears that, though they named a specific day for
the act to be done, what they really contemplated was only that it
should be done within a reasonable time, then a party, who according
to the letter of the contract is in default, will be allowed to enforce
the contract in accordance with what the court considers its true
meaning.
Wayne C. Selby, 'r8.
Criminal Law: Conspiracy: Plea of Entrapiment.-Inthe case of
State v. Dougherty, 96 At. (N. J.) 56 (ir 5), a detective, representing
himself to be a contractor, but really in the employ of the state, made
a proposition to some of the council of Atlantic City to replace the
present board walk with a reinforced concrete structure. It appeared
from the unrebutted testimony of the state that the first suggestion
of corruption came from one of the councilmen indicted, Phoebus,
the chairman of the board walk committee, who said that "there was
no use undertaking the proposition without I [the detective] was in a
position to handle money with the members of the city council; that
that was the only way that the deal could be put through."' After
considerable negotiation between the detective and the guilty councilmen, including the actual receipt of $5oo as a bribe by some of them,
115 Ore. 235 (1874).

"La Dow v. Bement, r19 Mich. 685 (1899); Lewis v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co.,
84 S. E. (W. Va.) 1O63 (1915); Atkins & Co. v. Kirk, 187 Il. App. 310 (1914);
Virtue v. Stanley, supra,note 5.
'*Globe Brewing Co. v. American Malting Co., 247 Ill.
622 (1910); Jones v.
U. S.,
4 96 U. S. 24 (1877).
1 McQuary and Missouri Land and Development Co. v. Missouri Land Co. of
Scotland, 230 Mo. 342 (1910); Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co. v.
Warwick Co., io9 Fed. 280 (19Ol); Federal Trust Co. v. Coyle, 126 Pac. (Okla.)
8oo (1912); Taylor v. Blair, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 347 (I89i).
'See 86 N. J. L. 525 atp. 531.
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a majority voted for the corrupt ordinance embodying the board walk
proposition and it became law. Four of the councilmen pleaded
guilty of conspiracy to pervert the due administration of the law and
the present defendants were also convicted of that offense by the trial
court, whose judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court.2 In the
Court of Errors and Appeals the case was reversed, the court standing
six to five for acquittal. Two concurring opinions were delivered by
members of the majority of the court, each assigning a different reason
for the acquittal.
The first opinion holds that the crime charged was not made out
because the detective, while a party to the plan, became a party not
to pervert the due administration of the law but to aid in its proper
administration by discovering those who were not faithful. The
judge writing the opinion seemed to think that this fact als6 prevented the conspiring councilmen from being guilty. The judge
cited as analogous to the principal case, Rex v. McDanel,3 and other
cases in which it appeared that4 the person apparently
victimized
7
6
5
consented to the defendant's act. In larceny, burglary, robbery,
8
and rape it seems to be settled law that the crime is not committed
when there is consent by the person injured. On the other hand,
murder and mayhem is committed even when there is consent by the
party killed or hurt. The question of whether consent by the party
injured deprives the act of its criminal character depends entirely on
the nature of the act. A person cannot consent to a breach of the
public peace or to acts endangering the public safety or morals,9 but
only under certain circumstances to an act which would, if unconsented
to, be directly injurious to the consenting individual only. Now, the
conspiracy charged cannot be claimed to be other than an act endangering the public safety and the public morals, since it succeeded in
making the corrupt ordinance a part of the law, and was not an act
injurious to the detective who is claimed to have consented. Consequently the doctrine of consent does not seem applicable to the crime
charged. 0
A better doctrine was expressed in the similar case of Commonwealth v. Wasson", where the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held
that if councilmen and others confederate to procure the passage of
ordinances through councils by the gift or promise of bribes to enough
286 N. J.L. 525 (1915).
TFoster's
Crown Law, 121 (1755).
4
Rexv. Fuller, R. &. R. (Eng.) 408 (1820); R. v. Johnson, C. &. M. (Eng.) 218
(1841); Speiden v. State, 3 Tex. App. 256 (1877); O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. App.
6655 (1879).
Williams v. State, 55 Ga. 391 (1875); Dodge v. Brittain, i Meigs (Tenn.)
84 (1838); Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878); Kemp. v. State, ii Humph.
fTenn.)
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v. Goffney, 157 N. C. 624 (922).
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People v. Clough, 59 Cal. 438 (i881); Rex v. Fuller, supra, note 4.
833 Cyc. 1423 and cases there cited.
9
Clark on Crim. L. (3d ed.), pp. 1O-11.
"See the excellent notes to Connor v. People, 25 L. R. A. 341 (1893); Commonwealth v. Hollister, 25 L. R. A. 349 (1893); State v. Smith, 3o L. R. A. (N. S.) 946
(i92o); and Kemp v. U. S., 51 L. R. A. (N. S.)'825 (1914).
"142 Pa. Super. Ct. 38 (igio).

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
members for that purpose, the bribe money to be furnished by the
outsiders to one of the councilmen to be distributed by him among
those voting for the ordinance, the crime of conspiracy is committed
by the councilmen, although the outsiders secretly intended not to
furnish the bribe money but to frustrate the full execution of the
conspiracy.
The other prevailing opinion in the principal case held that the
entrapment alleged was a sufficient defense. This subject seems to
have bothered the courts whenever it has arisen. It appears that
entrapment is a good defense,'2 but only when the criminality of the
act is shown to be absent by the fact of the inducement. 3 In decoy
letter cases where postal inspectors sent letters under assumed names
to test the honesty of letter carriers or to determine whether the mails
were being used for immoralpurposes, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the plea of entrapment could not be applied. 14 In
the numerous cases where it has been urged as a defense to a prosecution for the illegal sale of liquor that the liquor was purchased for the
very purpose of having the defendant prosecuted for its sale, it has
been almost unanimously held that such fact is no defense. 5 The
weight of authority seems to be that where a criminal is detected by
means of a trap set for him, the entrapment is no defense unless it
appears that he was actually persuaded and induced to commit the
crime by the entrapping parties and not merely furnished an opportunity by them. 1 It has even been asserted that the plea of entrapment, when the accused was a public officer or where he attempted to
corrupt a public officer, will not be allowed even when the first suggestion of corruption comes from the entrapping parties." That the
plea of entrapment is unsuccessful when the first overtures come from
the accused is well illustrated by State v. Dudoussat,'8 where the
accused was a member of the city council of New Orleans who made
"Ford v. City of Denver, io Colo. App. 5oo (5898).
"3People
v. Liphardt, 5O5 Mich. 8o (1895).
"4 Grimm v. U. S., t56 U. S. 604 (1895); Goode v. U. S., 159 U. S. 663 (1895);
Rosen v. U. S., 161 U. S. 29 (1896); Price v. U. S., 165 U. S. 3H5 (5897); Scott v.
U. S., 172 U. S.343 (5899).
In Borckv. State, 39 So. (Ala.) 580 (i9o5), the court said: "If the defendant
sold the whiskey on Sunday, no matter to whom, he violated the statute, which
admits of no exception. The fact that * * * * prosecuting witness was an
officer of the law can make no difference since an officer could not by giving his
consent to the sale, any more justify the act on the part of the defendant than
would be the consent of any private person." See People ex rel. Sterling v.
Chipman, 31 Colo. 90 (1903); Gordon v. State, 7 Ga. App. 695 (igso); Evanston
v. Myers, 172 Ill.
266 (5898); State v. Gibbs, 5O9 Minn. 247 (5909); State v.
O'Brien, 35 Mont. 482 (907); State v. Smith, 152 N. C. 798 (195o); DeGraff v.
State, 2 Okla. Crim. Rep. 519 (5909); Caveness v. State, 3 Okla. Crim. Rep. 729
(I95O).
8

' People v. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 597 (9o5); People v. Hanselman, 76 Cal.
46o (1888); State v. Jansen, 22 Kan. 498 (1879); State v. Stickney, 53 Kan. 308
(1894); People v. Mills, 578 N. Y. 274 (5904); People v. Conrad, 102 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 566 (igo5), aff'd without opinion, 182 N. Y. 529 (1905); Commonwealth
v.Wasson,
supra, note ii.
' TDiegle v. State, 86 Ohio 310 (1912); Path v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 142
(1895); Davis v. State, 7o Tex. Crim. Rep. 524 (913).
5847 La. Ann. 977 (1895).
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a proposal to aid in procuring the passage of an ordinance for pay.
A plan was laid which caught him in the act of accepting the bribe.
The plea of entrapment was held no defense.
Where there was neither persuasion nor active inducement, the
plea of entrapment has so uniformly failed that it seems unnecessary
to add further argument to the weight of authority.
In State v. Dougherty not only were the defendants not persuaded
and induced to do the act charged by the state, but in fact the first
suggestion of bribery came from one of the defendant councilmen.
It is submitted, therefore, that the unanimous opinion of the
Supreme Court approved by the five dissenting justices of the Court
of Errors and Appeals is preferable to the conclusion reached by the
majority of the latter court.
Everett David Walker, 'z8.
Damages: Breach of Warranty on Sale of Seed.-B uckbee v. P.
Hohenadel, Jr., Co., 224 Fed. 14 (1915), presents the rather novel
situation of a retail dealer suing a wholesale dealer for breach of
warranty of seed, where the retailer has not been compelled to pay
damages to the growers to whom he sold the seed. The plaintiff
paid a claim of $3o0 to a grower and liability to this extent is not
contraverted by the defendant. However, this court affirmed the
rule laid down by the lower court, allowing the plaintiff to recover a judgment for $12,921.40, all of which with the exception of the $300 mentioned, is based upon the plaintiff's
liability to growers for the difference in the value of the crops
produced and those which would have been produced had the seed
been of the specified variety, irrespective of the fact that no claims
for such sums had been made against the plaintiff.
This decision is based almost solely upon the case of Randall v.
Roper,1 an early English case where a retail dealer in seeds sued the
wholesale dealer for breach of warranty in sending a variety of barley
seed inferior to that ordered. It would seem that that case is rather
meager authority upon which to set a precedent in this country,
which may result in a rule open to great abuse, especially considering
the fact that of the four judges in the Randall case, one dissented and
one was doubtful. Justice Erle said in that case that he was doubtful because the vendee might put the money in his own pocket. It
can readily be seen that a case might arise where the vendee might,
by the rule adopted in the Randall and Hohenadel cases, recover
immense illegitimate profits. Suppose garlic onion seed had been
sold as pickle onion seed; that the pickles made from the onions produced had been sold to thousands of customers, who became sick
as a result. Suppose that one or two sued and recovered judgments
against the pickle dealer for their doctor bills and the results of their
sickness. According to the rule laid down above, the pickle dealer
would be able to recover for all the losses these thousands of people
sustained, which might amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars,
14 Jur. (N. S.) 662 (1858).
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most of which would be clear profit to the dealer. This surely is not
giving damages commensurate with the injuries. Sutherland in
his splendid work on damages says; "The cardinal rule in relation to
the damages to be compensated on breach of a contract, is that the
plaintiff must establish the quantum of his loss by evidence from
' 2
which the jury will be able to estimate the extent of his injury.
Following this rule, the only evidence which the plaintiff could introduce is that of claims which he has paid and loss of business, and it
is well settled that the courts will not receive the latter item as
evidence of damages. 3
Then, too, the facts in the two cases can be distinguished, because
in the Randall case claims had been made and relief promised, although these claims against the buyer had not been liquidated, while
in the Hohenadel case, claims had not even been made against the
plaintiff.
By the early common law rules the purchaser of chattels took
them caveat emptor as regards their quality. Then the right to
guarantee the quality of goods, and the right to have the quality of
goods guaranteed grew into the law, and were known as warranties
of quality. A warranty is an agreement collateral to the main purpose of a contract, by which one contracts to indemnify another or
defend another in some action which may be instituted against him.
From the very definition of a warranty it is apparent that it is not the
intention that one should pay for claims that have never been made,
or to defend where a defense is unnecessary.
The court states that it is simply carrying out the rule established
by Hadley v. Baxendale,4 that a party is liable for the damages suffered by breach of contract which were within the contemplation of
the parties at the time of making. In this case the defendant knew
that the plaintiff was going to resell the seeds. Does it not appear
unreasonable to suppose that the defendant ever contemplated
paving claims that had never been made against the plaintiff for the
breach, and might never be made? Where a seed broker or wholesale dealer knows that his customer is going to resell the seed, the
only damages that can be said to be contemplated are that if such
customer suffers loss due to the fact that he cannot sell the seeds such
broker or wholesale dealer will compensate him by paying the price,
and that if the customer has innocently sold the seeds, the wholesaler
will indemnify him for any claim which might be made against him as
a result of such breach. In Reggio v. Braggiotti5 opium of a warranted quality was sold and then resold with a like warranty. The
court there held in an action brought by the vendee against the original seller that" Judgiient received against the party was primafacie
evidence of the amount he was to recover." So in this case the
amount to be recovered should be the judgments received against
the plaintiff and the losses paid.
zi Sutherland on Damages (3d ed.) 195.
3
Buffalo Barb Wire Co. v. Phillips, 64 Wis. 338 (1885); Peace River Phosphate

Co. v. Grafflin, 58 Fed. 55o (1893).
49 Ex. (Eng.) 341 (1854).
57 Cush. (Mass.) 166 (1851); Cleveland Linseed Oil Co. v. Buchanan & Sons,
12o Fed. 9o6 (1903); Bierman v. City Mills, 151 N. Y. 482 (1897).
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Wightman, J., in his dissenting opinion in Randall v. Roper,
supra, hits the key note to the objections to the rule there laid down
when he says," On a contract of indemnity it is only the actual loss
that can be recovered." Courts do not seek to give punitive damages
in this class of cases. Thus, in the case of a breach of a contract of warranty which results in profit to the vendee, all that can be recovered is
nominal damages. 6 Here there is just as much breach as in the
Hohenadel case and if the courts were giving damages by some other
rule than compensation for the loss suffered, why should not like
damages be given?
In all rules for determining the damages suffered, all that the court
is trying to do is to give full satisfaction for the actual loss suffered,
and no more, and the buyer is bound to save the seller from any un7
necessary loss.

So where the seeds are sold directly to the grower,

the damages should be the price of the seeds paid, less the value of
the inferior seeds, and the difference in the value of the crop
raised with the inferior seeds and that which would have been
raised had the seeds been as warranted." This is the general
rule although there are a few jurisdictions which limit the liability.9
But where the seeds are sold for resale, and are in fact resold without
knowledge of the breach, the damages, following the rule of giving
full compensation for the loss suffered, ought to be the amount paid
to customers of the vendee, 10 and the judgments recovered by
customers of the vendee against him, n which is the true loss he
sustained.
It would thus seem that the court adopted the view of a single early
precedent, rather than the equitable and reasonable view. Before
extending this rule, courts should consider with care the abuse with
unfair profits to the buyer which such a rule may result in, and should
confine their remedies to the actual loss that has been suffered.
A. A. Atwood, 'r7.
Domestic Relations: Action of Assault between Husband and
Wife.-The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recently decided in
Gillnanv. Gillman, 95 Atl. (N. H.) 657 (1915), that, under a statute'
giving a married woman the right to sue in law or in equity as though
unmarried, a woman might sue her husband in tort for an assault
committed by him upon her.
'Billings v. Vanderbeck, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 546 (1857); Moses v. Rasin, 14
Fed.7 772 ( 8.3).
Rubin v. Sturtevant, 80 Fed. 930 (1897); Moses v. Rasin, supra, note 5.
TPassinger v. Thorburn, 34 N. Y. 634 (1886); Hoopes v. East, i Tex. Civ.

App. 531 (1898).

fButler v. Moore, 68 Ga. 780 (1882); Hurley v. Buch , 1O Lea (Tenn.) 346
(1882).
"OLovegood v. Fisher, 2 F. & F. (Eng.) 128 (i86o); Smith v. Sipe, 25 Weekly
Law Bul. (Ohio) 394 (1891).
"Carleton & Moffat v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., i App. Div. (N. Y.) 297
(1897).
'P. S. (N. H.), chap. 176, sec. 2 (goi), providing that "Every married woman
may sue and be sued, in all matters in law and equity, and upon any contract by
her made, or for any wrong by her done, as if she were unmarried."
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The Supreme Court of Tennessee, under a similar state of facts,
and under a similar statute,2 has recently decided, in Lillienkamp v.
Rippetoe, 179 S.W. (Tenn.) 628 (195), that the wife could not main-

tain such an action against her husband.
An examination will show that the Tennessee decision is supported by the common law cases, and that, even under the statute,
this view is, in most jurisdictions, supposed to be more in accord
with considerations of public policy than is the conclusion reached
by the New Hampshire Court.
4
3
The Gillman case relies on Seaver v. Adams and Poor v. Poor.
In the first of these cases the wife did not sue her husband, but
sued another woman for seduction. The latter was a case for divorce wherein the rule that it was "illegal" for a husband to assault
his wife, does not stand the same test as in a tort action for assault.
Under the common law there were three reasons why the wife could
not sue the husband. In the first place, the procedure of the time
viewed husband and wife as one person,5 and, since a person could
hardly be permitted to sue himself, the husband and wife could not
sue each other. Secondly, since the husband was entitled to his
wife's personal property and to the proceeds of her choses in action,
jur marito,6 the only effect of a victory by the wife would be that
the husband would pay himself the amount that she recovered from
him. And thirdly, when domestic tranquility was interrupted, the
courts deemed it best, for reasons of public policy,7 "to draw the

curtain, to shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget
and forgive." 8 In this way the courts tried to preserve the sanctity
of the domestic circle.
But this rule did not, of course, entirely remove from the wife the
mantle of the protection of the law, for even at a time when it was
declared that "the husband might give his wife moderate correction," I the criminal courts were always ready to punish the acts of
the cowardly husband by making the rule of love supersede the rule
of force.10 But even here the rule Df public policy, which predominated in civil suits, was evidenced in the refusal by some courts
to listen to trivial complaints, and by their explanation that, "while

2
Pub. Acts (Tenn.), chap. 26 (1913). This provides in part "That married
women be, and are, hereby fully emancipated from all disability on account of
coverture;" Shan. Code, sec. 6470 (1896), provides that "if any person commits
assault and battery upon his wife, for any cause whatsoever, he is guilty of misdemeanor, and punishable accordingly."
166 N. H. 142 (1889). 48 N. H. 307 (1836).
5
Philipps v. Barnet, i Q. B. Div. 436 (1876).
OCaffeyv.
Kelly, 45 N. C. 48 (1852).
7
Main v. Main, 46 Ill.
App. lO6 (189i); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (I877)
Sykes v. Speer, 112 S. W. (Tex.) 422 (i9o8); Wilson v. Brown, 154 S. W. (Tex.)

322 (1913).
8

State v. Oliver, 7o N. C. 6o (1874).
91 Black Comm. 444.
Fulgharn v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871); State v. Buckley, 2 Harr. (Del.) 552
(1838); Commonwealth v. McAfee, io8 Mass. 458 (1871); Perry v. Perry, 2
Paige (N. Y.) 5oi, 5o3 (1831).
10
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the husband had not the right to whip his wife,"" they would not
"inflict upon society, the greater evil of raising the curtain upon
domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence."' 2
The passage of married women's acts has in most jurisdictions
left the law settled as it was before in regard to torts by the husband.
These statutes have done away with all the reasons which barred
such actions under the common law, except the reason of public
policy, and so the courts which have followed the New Hampshire
doctrine go on the theory that to permit the wife to sue her husband
is better public policy than to permit her to break the peace by retalliation, 3 or to send him to the penitentiary or into a divorce court.' 4
But the vast majority of the courts have recognized how destructive of conjugal unity and tranquility such a rule would be. They
realize that by closing the law court to personal actions between
husband and wife, many disputes will be settled before they have been
rendered unadjustable by the perpetual controversy and litigation in
which the pair would be embroiled, if these causes of domestic discord were nurtured by a court of law.' 5
6
New York, under a similar statute,"
lays down a rule like that of
Tennessee on grounds of public policy, which has always tried to
protect conjugal unity and tranquility. 17
Of course, as is frequently the case where statutes are involved,
the married women's acts give wide latitude to judicial interpretation. Some courts strictly apply the doctrine that the courts have
no rightful concern in the "mere policy, expediency or justice of
legislation,' 18 but usually the courts make a broader application of
the principle that a court is a "place wherein justice is judicially
administered."19
Courts which follow this principle very naturally apply the test of
public policy as laid down by the Tennessee Court, especially in
view of the rule that "when the legislature intends to make such a
striking innovation of the rules of the common law, and so much
opposed to public policy * * * it should use such language as will
make it20 clearly manifest, and not leave it to the construction of the
court."

Henry Klauber, '17.
"State v. Oliver, supra,note 7.
"Bradley v. State, I Miss. 156 (1824); State v. Rhodes, 61 N. C. 453 (1868).
"Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42 (1914).
'4Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124 (1914).
"5Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (191o); Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa 182
(1875); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80 (1898); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn.
427 (19o6); Rogers v. Rogers, 177 S. W. (Mo.) 382 (1915); Longendyke v.
Longendyke, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 366 (1863); Cooley on.Torts (2d ed.) 268; 21
Cyc. 1519.
16N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law, sec. 57.
"7Longendyke v. Longendyke, supra, note I5; Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb.
(N. Y.) 641 (1865); Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882), reversing 27 Hun
(N. Y.) 26 (1882); Bertlesv. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, 16o (1883); Alwardv. Alward,
2 N. Y. Supp. 42 (1888); Abbe v. Abbe, 22 App. Div. (N. Y.) 483 (1897).
"8Harlan, J., dissenting in Thompson v. Thompson, supra, note 15.
193
Black Comm. 23.
20Freethy v. Freethy, supra, note 17.
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Descent and Distribution: Double Relationship.-The recent case
of Cornell v. Child, 17o App. Div. (N. Y.) 240 (1915), presents a novel
situation in respect to the descent and distribution of property. In
this case a child died partially intestate. One set of claimants to the
property, the defendants in the case, were cousins of the intestate.
The plaintiff was a cousin and also a half brother, by reason of the
fact that the intestate's father had married his deceased wife's sister.
The defendants claimed that the plaintiff took as a cousin, and that,
therefore, they were entitled to their share of the property. The
plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that he took as a half brother of
the intestate, and was entitled to all the property, to the exclusion of
the cousins. The court held that the plaintiff took by the nearer
relationship, that of half brother, and that he was entitled to the
property.
In an early New Jersey case, Den on demise of Delaplaine v. Jones
and Searing,' the plaintiff also occupied the position of a double relationship to the intestate. The court decided that plaintiff inherited
by virtue of the nearer of his two relationships and awarded the
property to him. This case seems to be the only authority in the
reports'on this particular question as to what the action of a court
should be when confronted by such a situation, but the decision seems
to be in line with common sense and justice. The fact that a man
occupies two relationships to an intestate should tend to increase,
rather than decrease his right to the property. In the principal case,
if the plaintiff had been only ahalf brother of theintestate, the property
would have descended to him without dispute, because he would have
been indisputably nearer of kin that the defendants. Then why should
the additional fact that he is a cousin of the intestate diminish his
right to the property? Such a holding would seem to be unreasonable.
If a person, by one relationship, is nearer of kin than another, by
what process can any number of added relationships lessen his degree
of kinship? It would seem, therefore, that the decison in the
principal case, although not supported by much authority, was entirely

just and logical.
W. J. Gilleran, 'i8.
Employer's Liability: Meaning of Total Disability.-A novel
question under the Workmen's Compensation Act' has been presented by the case of Weaver v. Maxwell Motor Co., 152 N. W. (Mich.)
993 (xr95). The plaintiff, Weaver, was in the employment of the
defendant, when the end of a crowbar struck him in the left eye
practically destroying that eye. Seven years before this he had
received an injury destroying the sight of his right eye, so that he
was now almost blind. He contended that he was permanently
and totally incapacitated from work, and was, therefore, eititled
to compensation for total disability.
28 N. J. L. 340 (1826).

'Howell's Michigan Statutes Annotated (2d ed.), ch. 63.
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The court held that it should be viewed as being only a partial
disability, stating: "The loss of the first eye was a partial disability * * * for which disability the present employer was in no degree
the cause. The loss of the second eye standing by itself was also a
partial disability, and of itself, did not occasion the total disability."
A New York case, Matter of Schwab v. Emporium Forestry Co.,2
is in conflict with the Michigan case. Here, the claimant had had his
left hand amputated in 1892, and in 1914, while working for the
defendant, his right hand was severed at the wrist. It was held that
the claimant was entitled to compensation for total disability. As the
compensation is based on the weeklywage, if he is only allowed partial
incapacity for the injury, he would receive less compensation than if
it were for the first hand, for the court presumes that he would be
receiving less wages if he had only one hand.
The court states that this reasoning appears to be in harmony
with sec. 15, subdiv. 6, of the Workmen's Compensation Act,3 waich
provides that, even if an employee has been injured previously, this
shall not preclude him from recovering for a later injury, "but in
determinining compensation for the later injury or death, his average
weekly wages shall be such sum as will reasonably represent his
earning capacity at the time of the later injury."
The only other American case that has been decided on this point4
is State ex. rel. Garwin "v. District Court of Cass County, et. al.
The plaintiff there, before entering the employment of the
defendant, was totally blind in one eye. He suffered another
injury in the defendant's employment, destroying the sight
of the remaining eye. It was held that he was entitled to compensation only for permanent partial disability, the court construing the
following statute:' "If an employee receive an injury which, of
itself would only cause permanent partial disability, but which combined with a previous disability does in fact cause permanent total disability, the employer shall be only liable for the permanent partial
disability caused by the subsequent injury."
Since the decision of Matter of Schwab v. Emporium Forestry Co.,
the New York legislature has amended the section quoted above,
it now being added that 6 "an employee who is suffering from a
previous disability shall not receive compensation for a later injury
in excess of the compensation allowed for such injury when considered by itself and not in conjunction with the previous disability."
It would seem, therefore, that the New York decisions in the future
will be in harmony with the Michigan and the Minnesota cases.
That the plaintiff, in such cases, should be allowed only compensation for a permanent partial disability, seems to be the better rule.
As the Minnesota court in the case above has pointed out, to allow
2167 App. Div. (N. Y.) 614 (1915), aff'd without opinion,
(1915).
3N. Y. Consol. Laws, ch. 67; laws of 1914, ch. 41.
41I20 Minn. iS6 (1915).

Minn. Gen. St., sec.

8209.

OConsol. Laws, ch. 67; laws of 1915, ch. 615.

216 N. Y. 88
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for total permanent disability "would tend only to embarrass partially disabled laborers from securing employment, f6r employers
would be reluctant to engage them if there was a contingent liability
to make compensation for injuries previously suffered by them."
The rule as laid down by the New York court would be manifestly unjust in many instances, for it would make the employer
liable for an injury the employee sustained only partially while in
his employment. This same employee, in many cases, may be
receiving nearly the same wage as another employee who was not
partially disabled; yet for the same injury to both, the employer
would have to pay one for total permanent disability, and the other
only for total partial disability.
Carrying the New York rule still further, this situation might arise.
A and B are employed by C, both receiving the same wages. In
an accident, A loses one eye, B both eyes, A receiving compensation
for permanent partial disability; B for total permanent disability.
Later A resumes employment for another employer at a presumably
lesser wage, and, while thus employed, receives an injury destroying
the sight of his other eye. If the New York case is followed, he would
receive compensation for total permanent disability, and this compensation, coupled with the compensation for the permanent partial
disability, would, in many instances, give him more compensation
than B, who was totally disabled at the one time. Besides enjoying
additional compensation, A would have had the money earned between the time of his partial disability and his total disability.
To allow him more compensation would seem unjust to B. To allow
him compensation for partial disability would be more just, because A,
between the time of losing one eye and then the other, would be
able to earn something; whereas, B would be unable to earn anything.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the disability suffered
by the plaintiff in these cases is really total, and the previous disability shouild be given no consideration. And it may further be
argued that to consider a person, who is really totally disabled, in
the same class as one who is really only partially disabled, would
be unjust, for the one who is partially disabled can work, whereas
the other can never work, and is, therefore, in much greater need of
the compensation. Also, if compensation for a partial disability
is only allowed to the person who practically is totally disabled,
this will be less than the compensation allowed, if he were really
only partially disabled, for, as the New York court says: "his wages
were evidently based on the fact that he was previously partially
disabled, and, therefore, the
compensation to be awarded him will
'7
be based upon such wages.
Frank C. McCarthy, '18.
7

Matter of Schwab v. Emporium Forestry Co., sup ra, note

2.
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Equity: Specific Performance of Parol Contract to make a Will.The recent case of Price v. Wallace, 224 Fed. 576 (igi5), once more
involves the discussion as to what are the necessary elements in order
that an oral agreement to make a will may be specifically enforced.
According to the plaintiff's version of the contract, it was orally agreed
between her and the decedent Smith, with whom she and her husband
had been living, that in consideration of her securing a divorce and
continuing to live with him as a "daughter," maintaining the house
and caring for him in his declining years, he would leave to the plaintiff
and her two children, all the property that he might own at his death.
She further alleges that prior to Smith's marriage to the defendant,
she (the plaintiff) consented to a modification of the agreement whereby she and the children were to receive two-thirds of his estate and
the defendant one-third.
The facts were that on the day of his marriage to the defendant,
Smith executed a will bequeathing $5,000 to the plaintiff and her
children respectively, naming the plaintiff and Smith's wife trustees;
that after plaintiff's marriage to Price, he revoked the former will,
leaving his entire estate to his wife. The latter will was duly probated, no objections being filed by the plaintiff. This neglect, plaintiff
attempts to explain away, however, by proof of defendant's consent
to impress a trust upon two-thirds of the estate for the use and benefit
of herself and children.
The defendant on her part denied the so-called trust agreement and
adduced evidence of mismanagement of the household by the plaintiff
to Smith's dissatisfaction and annoyance; that thereafter plaintiff
left him and went upon the stage and that Smith spent considerable
time and energy endeavoring to locate her children in a suitable place.
Wolverton, J., who delivered the opinion, said, "Such and
kindred agreements (referring to parol contracts to make a will) are
legally sufficient to justify their enforcement, with the qualifications,
first, that they must be reasonably definite and certain; second, they
must be established by clear, full and irrefragable evidence; and third,
they must have been performed to such an extent and in such a
manner that the beneficiary cannot be properly compensated in
damages." The court upon consideration of all the evidence decided
that a contract had not been sufficiently proved. Particular stress
was laid upon the testator's honesty of purpose and character and
upon the evidence of one Jessie Carey Smith to the effect that the
plaintiff, while conversing with her after testator's death, had said
that she thought Smith might have remembered the boys, but never
mentioned any contract.
It appears to be well settled that a man may contract to dispose of
property at his death in a particular way.' As said in the leading case
of Johnsonv. Hubbell,2 "A person may make a valid agreement binding
'Allen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317 (19o6); Black v. Hill, 174 S. W. (Ark.) 526
(I915); Banks v. Howard, 117 Ga. 94 (1902); Whiton v. Whiton, 179 Ill. 32
(1899); Howev. Watson, 179 Mass. 3o (19O1); Teske v. Dittberner, 7o Neb. 544
(19o3); Johnson v. Hubbell, io N. J. Eq. 332 (1855); Jordan v. Abbey, 97 Tex.
296 (1904). That such agreement is not binding see Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass.
454 (189); Morgan v. Tillett, 55 N. C. 39 (1854).
2Supra, note i. See note to the same case in 66 Am. Dec. 773.
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himself legally to make a particular disposition of his property by last
will and testament. The law permits a man to dispose of his own
property at his pleasure and no good reason can be assigned why he
may not make a legal agreement to dispose of his property to a particular individual or for a particular purpose as well by will a§ by a
conveyance to be made at some specified future period or upon the
happening of some future event. It may be unwise for a man in this
way to embarrass himself but he is the disposer, by law, of his own
fortune and the sole and best judge as to the time and manner of
disposing of it."
Strictly speaking, an agreement to dispose of property by will in a
particular manner is one that is not capable of being specifically
executed' but the courts do what is equivalent, namely, impress a
trust upon the property after the death of the promisor in favor of the4
beneficiary against one who holds with notice of the agreement.
However, the expression "specific performance" is commonly used to
denote the result. What, then, are the principles by which courts of
equity are governed in granting or denying this relief?
It is unquestioned that where the contract rests in parol merely, its
terms must be reasonably definite and certain.5 Thus an agreement
by one party to leave all his property at his death to a particular
person was held to be too uncertain.' The amount of property
remaining at his death was necessarily conjectural, since no restraint
was placed upon his power of disposition during life.
Nor is it disputed that such an agreement, to be capable of enforcement, should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.7 Various expressions are used in the cases, such as," clear and convincing evidence;" 8 ,
"evidence so unquestionable in its character, so clear, cogent and
convincing that no reasonable doubt can be entertained of its truth ;"9,
"proof as to the terms of the contract must be clear, definite and
conclusive."' 0
But there is a considerable diversity of opinion" as to whether
rendition of services pursuant to an oral agreement to give land by
will as compensation, constitutes a sufficient part performance to
take the case out of the statute of frauds which requires some written
evidence to charge one upon a contract concerning land. It is elementary that where the services are such as can be adequately compensated for according to their intrinsic value, the relief will not be given,
336 Cyc. 735; Colby v. Colby, 81 Hun (N. Y.) 221 (1894).
436 Cyc. 736; Winne v. Winne, 166 N. Y. 263 (I9OI).
50wens v. McNully, 113 Cal. 444 (1896); Oles v. Wilson, 141 Pac. (Col.) 489
(1914); Brasch v. Reeves, 124 Minn. I I. (1913); Brownlee v. Fenwick, io3 Mo.
2o (3890); Braun v. Ochs, 77 App. Div. (N. Y.) 20 (1902); Gall v. Gall. 64
Hun6 (N. Y.) 6oo (1892); Walpole v. Orford, 3 Ves. (Eng.) 402, 419 (1797).
Lisk v. Sherman, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 433 (1857).
7Shaw v. Schoonover, 130 Ill. 448 (1889); Cutsinger v. Ballard, 115 Ind. 93
(1888); Rogers v. Wolfe, 3O4 Mo. i (189o); McTague v. Finnegan, 54 N. J. Eq.
454 (1896); Richardson v. Orth, 40 Ore. 252 (19Ol).
'Gall v. Gall, supra, note 5.
ORussell v. Sharp, 192 Mo. 270 (1905); see also Asbury v. Hicklin, 381 Mo. 658

(1904).
'0Purcell v. Miner, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 513 (1866); see also Williams v. Morris,
95 U- S. 444, 456 (1877).
"Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. (Stud. Ed.), sec. 34o9 and its subdivisions.
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since the remedy of specific performance depends upon the absence
or inadequateness of the legal remedy.
Where, however, the services rendered are of such a character and
are performed to such an extent as not to be estimable by any pecuniary standard, some jurisdictions" have considered such acts a
sufficient part performance to take the case out of the statute. This
view is based upon the principle that the statute of frauds should not
be made an instrument of fraud and that where one party has secured
the benefits of an agreement and the other has so far acted that it is
impossible to restore him to his original situation, or adequately compensate him in damages, then to deny specific performance would
be to allow fraud to lurk under a statute designed to protect against
it.
Other jurisdictions,13 following the prevailing English 14 and New
York 5 doctrines, demand that the acts of part performance be
unequivocally referrable to some such contract as that alleged and
decree that, where the acts are capable of explanation without inferring the existence of a contract, the equitable remedy will be refused.
These courts consider that rendition of services does not point exclusively to a contract, and require in addition thereto delivery of
possession or possession with part payment. It is said that title to
realty should not be made to depend upon parol contracts, and that
no hardship is involved in compelling the parties to reduce their agreements to writing.
It would seem that, since the promise is not to be enforced until
after the death of the party making it, that the opportunity for fraud
upon the promisor would be much greater than upon the beneficiary,
and that the statute should not be frittered away merely because in
certain cases a hardship would be thrust upon the beneficiary.
It is also established that the contract must be mutual and founded
upon adequate consideration. 16 But, where one who has the obligation
of performing the services has fully performed them, there is no lack
of mutality 17, and the remedy will be applied if the other principles
established in the particular jurisdiction are complied with. Mutuality would seem to have been lacking in the principal case, since Smith
could not have compelled the complainant to continue her services.
In this connection it may be said that the consideration of securing a
divorce from her husband was of no greater force than the agreement
"Owens v. McNally, supra, note 5; Harman v. Harman, 7o Fed. 894 (1895);
Schoonover v. Schoonover, 86 Kan. 487 (1912); Richardson v. Richardson, 114
Minn. 12 (T911); Robertsonv. Corcoran, 125 Minn. n18 (1914); Teatsv. Flanders, 118 Mo. 660, 669 (1893); Best v. Gralapp, 69 Neb. 811 (i903); Teske v.
Dittberner, supra, note i; Johnson v. Hubbell, supra, note i.

"Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530 (1893); Mills v. Joiner, 2o Fla. 479 (1884);
Pond v. Sheehan, 132 Il. 312 (189o); Renz. v. Drury, 57 Kan. 84 (1896); Ham v
Goodrich, 33 N. H. 32 (1856); Shahan v. Swan, 48 0. St. 25 (189i); Ellis v.
Cary, 74 Wis. 176 (1889). See also Van Horn v. Demarest, 76 N. J. Eq. 386
(1909).
4

"15Maddison v. Alderson, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 467 (1883).
Russell v. Briggs, 165 N. Y. 5oo (IgoI).
6
Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. (Stud. Ed.), see. I4O9 and its subdivisions; Gall v. Gall,

supra, note 5.

"7Howe v. Watson, supra, note i; Teske v. Dittberner, supra, note

12.
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to abstain from marriage in Maddison v. Alderson.18 Throughout the
whole discussion it must also be borne in mind that the remedy is one
not to be demanded as a matter of right, but one to be exercised in the
discretion of the court and that where it would operate unjustly upon
innocent third persons, not parties to the contract, or be contrary to
public policy, relief will be denied. 19
That such an agreement is not a violation of the Statute of Wills has
20
been decided by the Court of Appeals in the case of Winne v. Winne.
It was there laid down that it was "not a contract in the nature of
testamentary disposition of the decedent's property." But Jarman2 '
says in effect that an instrument, by which a person makes a disposition of his property to take effect after his death, is a testamentary
disposition. The instrument in question would seem to fall within
that definition and, therefore, to be against public policy in not having
complied with the formalities prescribed by the Statute of Wills.
Whether so patent a violation of the Statute of Wills should be permitted is doubted by some cases in the lower New York coWrts2, but
they go on to say that the rule is established otherwise.
According to the foregoing principles, the principal case appears
to have been correctly decided. Not only were the acts explicable
without assuming any contract, but they were capable of being compensated adequately in an action based upon quantum meruit. In
fact the testator had indirectly compensated the plaintiff during his
life by contributing to the support of, if not altogether maintaining,
her children. Finally, the complainant was guilty of such a breach
of the agreement in leaving him as to render enforcement of the contract, supposing one were sufficiently proved, a fraud upon the decedent.
Leonard G. Aierstok, '17.
The Federal Income Tax Law of 19z3: Construction of the Sixteenth Anendment.-In the case of Brushaberv. The Union P. R. Co.,
36 Sup. Ct. 236 (r916), a very curious interpretation of the sixteenth
amendment was urged. The appellant, a stockholder of the defendant corporation, filed his bill to enjoin the said defendant from
complying with the income tax provisions of the act of 19x3,1 on
' 8L. R. 8 App. Cas. 467 (1883).
9Owens v. McNally, supra, note 5; Johnson v. Hubbell, supra, note I.
20166 N. Y. 263 (19o1).
'Jarman on Wills, sec. II.

12 Gall v. Gall, supra, note 5; Shakespeare v. Markham, io Hun (N. Y.) 311
(1877).
I38"Stat. at L. I66. This act, sec. 2, chap. 16 of the Statutes of 1913, in general
provides for a tax of one per centum on net incomes from individuals and corporations. This is called the normal tax. There is another tax, progressive
in its nature, on incomes exceeding $20,ooo. This is called the additional tax.
The act contains provisos exempting incomes not exceeding $3ooo, or $4000
if the individuals receiving them ar married, and also certain classes of corporations, such as labor and agricultural associations, mutual savings banks not having
a capital stock represented by shares; fraternal beneficiary societies, and other
several organizations, religious, charitable, educational or commercial in their
objects not operated for profit Wnd no part of whose net income should inure
to the benefit of any stockholder.
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the ground that the tax provided for in this statute was unconstitutional.
The contention of the appellant was as follows:
(x) The sixteenth amendment 2 provided for a new kind of a
direct tax, a tax on incomes "from whatever source derived." This
phrase, the appellant contended, implied that there were to be no
exemptions and that there must be intrinsic uniformity. This kind
of a tax, falling equally upon all corporations and individuals, irrespective of the fact that their incomes did not exceed $3000, or,
in the case of corporations, that their purposes were agricultural,
labor, etc.; and, falling equally on every dollar, i.e., with no
progressive feature, was alone exempted from the general requisite
of apportionment as
to direct taxes, extablished by art. I, sec. 2,
3
of the constitution.
(2)
The act of 1913 exempted certain classes of corporations,
such as labor, agricultural societies and others, and also individuals
whose incomes did not exceed $3ooo, or $4000 if married, besides

providing for a progressive tax on incomes exceeding

$20,000.

(3) Therefore, the tax being direct and not coming within the
class authorized by the amendment, alone exempted from apportionment according to the appellant, is unconstitutional because said
requisite has not been complied with.
The court through Chief Justice White held that the tax was
constitutional. The major proposition of the appellant's argument
is not true. Hence, the conclusion does not follow. The sixteenth
amendment does not permit a new class of a direct tax, (in fact, as
it will be later shown, the court does not think that the amendment
treated the tax as a direct tax at all), carrying with it the distinguishing characteristic of a hitherto unrecognized uniformity,4 both as
to the property subjected to the tax and the persons to be affected
thereby, that is to say, requiring the tax to be absolutely uniform on
every dollar of income and on every person, thus denying the recognized power of Congress to lay a progressive tax and to make reasonable exemptions from the operation of this or any other law.
The words "from whatever source derived" were not put in the
sixteenth amendment to support this interpretation. They were
put into render nugatory the celebrated case of Pollock v. The Farmer's Loan and Trust Co.5 This case held that a tax, under the act
of 1894,6 on incomes derived from real and personal7 property was
2
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states,
and3 without regard to any census or enumeration."
"Representatives and Direct .Taxes shall be apportioned among the several

states which may be included in this Union, according to their respective numbers."
4
The only recognized uniformity in federal taxation is that established by
art. i, sec. 8, "all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States," and this has only been held to mean geographical uniformity.
See Knowlton v. Moore, note 12, post.
6157 U. S. 429 (1895).
628 Stat. at L. 509.
7
The court in 157 U. S. 429 was equally divided as to whether a tax on the
income from personal property was a direct tax, but on a rehearing, 158 U. S.

6or, 637, the court held that a tax on the income from personal property was
likewise direct and unconstitutional if not apportioned.
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unconstitutional because it should be considered as a direct tax and
subject to the requisite of apportionment. This requisite, the court
said through Fuller, C. J., was one of the great compromises at
the Federal Constitutional Convention. Its purpose was to protect the mofe wealthy states from being unjustly taxed by a less
wealthy majority. For this reason representatives to the national
Congress, or the power to dispose of the revenues derived from taxation, and direct taxes were to be apportioned among the several
states according to their respectve numbers. The court concluded that to tax the incomes from realty was to tax the realty
itself, which together with a capitation tax was the only kind of
direct taxation well recognized as such by the framers of the constitution, 8 and therefore, unless apportioned would be in violation of
this fundamental compromise. To quote from the opinion of the
court: 9 "an annual tax updn the annual value or annual uses of
real estate, appears to us in substance (italics are mine) as an annual
tax on the real estate, which would be paid out of the rent or income."
Chief Justice White, who delivered a dissenting opinion in
the Pollock case, interprets this holding to mean that an income
tax is not by nature a direct tax. He says that the Pollock case
"recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature an excise
entitled to be enforced as such unless and until it was concluded
that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing the result which
the requirement of apportionment of direct taxation was adopted
to prevent."
On this interpretation, he bases his argument against another
contention of the appellant, namely, that the sixteenth amendment
provides for a tax, subject neither to the requirement of uniformity,
since the tax there provided is treated as a direct tax, nor subject
to the requirement of apportionment since it is expressly relieved
from it by the words.of the amendment. 10
8
There was a great deal of uncertainty at the Constitutional Convention as
to what "direct taxes" meant. "Mr. King asked what was the precise meaning
of direct taxation? No one answered." (Madison's Journal of the Constitutional
Convention. Aug. 20, 1787). But it is certain that it was generally understood
by the framers that a tax on real property and a capitation tax belonged to the
class of direct taxes. This idea was prevalent too in the early history of Congress. In 1794, Congress levied a tax on carriages "for the conveyance of persons
which shall be kept by or for any person for his or her own use, or to be held out
for hire, or for conveying of passengers." Madison opposed it on the ground
that it was a direct tax and that unless apportioned, would be unconstitutional.
Yet the tax was levied. Patterson, J., himself a member of the Convention,
said in the case of Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (1794), which considered
the constitutionality of this tax, "I never entertained a doubt that the principal,
I will not say the only, objects that the Framers of the Constitution contemplated
as falling within the rule of apportionment were a capitation tax and a tax on
land. There are numerous statements in the records of the Convention to the
effect that the only certainty in the mind of the Framers concerning the word
direct
taxes was that a tax on land and a capitation tax was included in them."
9
At p. 581.
'MThis argument is also presented in Mr. Dwight W. Morrow's article "The
Income Tax Amendment," io Columbia Law Review 379, 412. "The Pollock
case," he says, "holds distinctly that a tax from income from real and personal
property is not 'an excise duty or impost' but a direct tax." The Sixteenth
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The amendment, the court said, judged by the purpose for which
it was passed, does not treat income taxes as direct taxes but simply
removes the ground which led to their being considered as such in
the Pollock case, namely, the source of the income. Therefore,
they are again to be classified in the class of indirect taxes to which
they by nature belong. To quote again from the opinion: "That
the contention that the amendment treats a tax on income as a direct
tax although it is relieved from apportionment and is necessarily
therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity as such rule only applies to taxes which are not direct, thus destroying the two great
classifications which have been recognized and enforced from the
beginning, is also wholly without foundation since the command of
the amendment that all income taxes shall not be subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the taxed
income may be derived forbids the application to such taxes of the
rule applied in the Pollock case by which alone such taxes were
removed from the great class of excises, duties and imports subject
to the rule of uniformity, and were placed under the other or direct
class. This must be unless it can be said that although the Constitution, as a result of the amendment, in express terms excludes the
criterion of source of income, that criterion yet remains for the
purpose of destroying the classification of the Constitution by taking
an excise out of the class in which it belongs and transferring it to
a class in which it cannot be placed consistently with the requirements of the Constitution."
Summarizing: In the first place, the words "from whatever
source derived" were put in the amendment to do away with the
ruling of the Pollock case, in so far as it held that a tax on the income
derived from real or personal property was a direct tax which would
be unconstitutional if not apportioned, and not to create a new kind
of a direct tax clothed with a hitherto unrecognized uniformity
both as to the property and persons to be affected thereby, which
tax alone was to be exempted from apportionment. Secondly,
the result of the sixteenth amendment was not to create a tax free
from the requirements of uniformity and apportionment but to
render without effect the decision of the Pollock case and place taxes
on incomes from real and personal property in the classification
to which they by nature belong, namely, that of indirect taxes, and
hence, subject to the rule of uniformity. This should allay all fear
of injustices which would have been rendered possible if the contention urged by the appellant had been upheld.
Amendment substantially provides that even though a direct tax it shall not be
subject to the rule of apportionment. There is not the slightest suggestion in
the amendment that it is the intention of -the people to make such a tax subject
.
. Congress may in one year lay a tax upon the
to the rule of uniformity .
incomes of the citizens of New York from real and personal property because
the crops in the West have been bad; the next year they may lay such a tax
upon the citizens of Nevada because the mining business has been unusually
good." Chief Justice White, however, thinks that the Pollock case did not
declare income taxes on real and personal property to be direct by nature, but
only in so far as it was necessary for the court to regard them as such in order
to prevent a violation of the spirit of the Constitution.
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The appellant further contends that the Act of 1913 is unconstitutional because of several of its provisions which are claimed to want
in due process and to be in violation of the uniformity clause."
For the purposes of illustration, some of these objections which are
typical of the rest, follow:
i. The progressive tax feature and the exempted incomes,those not exceeding $3000, or $4ooo if the person receiving the income is married-, are based on wealth alone and, therefore, repugnant to the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
2. The duty of collecting the tax at the source which is cast
upon corporations, because of the expense to be incurred thereby, is
repugnant to due process of law, being the taking of property without compensation.
3. The law discriminates against bondholders, in favor of individuals not having their investments in bonds, since it is depriving
said bondholders of the use of their money during the interval between the deducting and paying of the tax by the corporations.
4. Bondholders are further discriminated against in that they
must include the incomes from these bonds, whose tax already has
been deducted by the corporations, in making a return of all income.
This results in double taxation, in the consequent labor and expense
in applying for a refund, and further, in a deprivation of the use of
the money in the interval.
5. Corporations are discriminated against in favor of individuals,
in that the amount of interest paid which can be leducted from the
taxable income of corporations is limited to interest on indebtedness
nbt exceeding one-half of the sum of bonded indebtedness and paidup capital stock.
6. Corporations are further discriminated against, in that they
are not allowed to deduct from their taxable incomes dividends
from stock of other corporations whose incomes have already been
taxed, whereas individuals are given that privilege.
7. Discrimination, for the purpose of ascertaining exempted
incomes, between single and married persons, and between the
exempted incomes of husband and wife living together and those who
are not.
The court held that these numerous and minute, "not to say in
many respects hypercritical," contentions do not violate, in the first
place, the uniformity clause, for it is well settled that this clause
only exacts geographical uniformity. This court in the leading case
of Knowlton v. MooreP held "that the words 'uniform throughout the
United States' do not relate to the inherent character of the tax
as respects its operation on individuals, but simply requires that
whatever plan or method (italics are mine) Congress adopts for carrying
"There is no question that as to taxes on incomes from the professions or
business the rule of uniformity must be complied with since these taxes were not
held to be direct by the case of Pollock v. The Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.,
supra, note 5.
1I 7 8 U. S. 4r, 84 (igoo). Also see in accord: Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S.
6o8, 622 (I9o2); Flint v.Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, I58 (x91i); Billings v.
United States, 232 U. S. 261, 282 (1914).
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the tax in question, the same plan and the same method must be
made operative throughout the United States; that is to say, wherever a subject is taxed anywhere the same must be taxed everywhere throughout the United States, and at the same rate."
In the second place, the above provisions do not violate the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, because it is equally well
settled that such clause is not a limitation upon the taxing powers
of Congress.'; This doctrine, however, the court further stated, is
limited. Congress cannot under a seemingly exercise of the taxing
power pass an act which should be "so arbitrary as to constrain
to the conclusion that it was not the exertion of taxation, but a
confiscation of property; that is, a taking of the same in violation
of the fifth amendment; or, what is equivalent thereto, was so
wanting in basis for classification as to produce such a gross and
patent inequality as to inevitably lead to the same conclusion."' 4
No such case, however, is presented here.
The court further held that a progressive tax does not transcend
the conception of all taxation and is not a mere arbitrary abuse of
power which was wanting in due process. That such has always
been the manner in which they have been regarded is shown by
the fact that progressive taxes were passed early in the history of
Congress and in nearly all of the income taxes passed prior to the
act of 1894. Moreover, the court said, the "absolute want of
foundation in reason" of this contention "was plainly pointed out in
Knowlton v. Moore," supra, "and the right to urge it was necessarily
foreclosed by the ruling in that case made." It is doubtful, however,
whether as to the general power15 of Congress to lay a progressive tax
this last statement was correct.

Ramon Siaca, '6.
"Treat v. White, I81 U. S. 264, 269 (19Ol); Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 6o8,
McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 61 (1904); Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, I58 (1911); Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261,
621 (1902);
282 (1914).

14It is interesting to note that this limitation is expressed also by Chief
Justice White in similar language in McCray v. United States, at p. 64, supra,
note1 13.

5See Mr. Frank Warren Hackett's article on "The Constitutionality of the
Graduated Income Tax Law," 25 Yale Law Journal 427 (Apr. 1916). In the
case of Knowlton v. Moore, supra, it was stated that the question was disposed
of in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 293 (1898). In
this case we find that the basis of the decision is the power of the state to attach
any condition it pleases to a grant of the right to inherit or receive property by
devise. The Knowlton case, of course, which is a case of a federal inheritance
tax, does not rest upon exactly the same proposition. Yet all that we find in
this case on this proposition is the following statement by Mr. Justice White:
"some authoritative thinkers, and a number of economic writers, contend that
a progressive tax is more just and equal than a proportional one, In the absence
of constitutional limitation, the question whether it is or is not is legislative and
not judicial. The grave consequences which it is asserted must arise in the future
if the right to levy a progressive tax be recognized involves in its ultimate aspect
the mere assertion that free and representative government is a failure, and that
the grossest abuses of power are foreshadowed unless the court usurps a purely
legislative function." But this seems to be nothing more than obiter dictum.
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Insurance: Life Insurance: New York InsuranceLaw, Section 58.
Construed by the Court of Appeals.-The case of Archer v. Equitable
Li Assurance Society of the United Statest was unanimously affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, April 18th, 19162. The decision below was
commented upon and criticised at some length in the CORNELL LAw
QUARTERLY, Vol. I, p. i io. The Court of Appeals holds that section
58 is susceptible of but one of two constructions, eithdr that, "all the
statements made by the defendant, as purported or sh6wn by the
face of the policy, shall in the absence of fraud be deemed representations and not warranties;" or that, "all statements made by the
defendant are shown by the face of the policy and shall in the absence
of fraud be deemed representations and not warranties." The court
adopts this latter construction. Of the results of adopting the first
construction the court says that "the insurers by abandoning warranties may avail themselves of all the representations although not
incorporated in the policy; they may also incorporate in the policy
such of the statements as they select and withhold the statements
remaining. Those effects might, within reason, mislead and create
an erroneous sense of security on the part of the insured and their
beneficiaries. An unreasonable and unjust result was, presumptively,
not intended by the legislature and will be avoided through legitimate
construction. (Matter of Meyer, 2o9 N. Y. 386.) The conditions
which induced the legislature to require that all stipulations and
terms of the contract should appear within the policy would naturally
have induced it to require that the conditions which are the basis of
the contract and upon which its validity depends shoiild, likewise,
appear upon the face of the policy. The evils and pitfalls before the
insured through his ignorance and the inaccessibility of terms of contract are, in part at least, those which are before him through his
ignorance and the inaccessibility of the representations made by him.
Under the entire language of the section and the conditions existing
at its enactment, the first construction constricts its purpose and
effects too narrowly and unreasonably. The second expresses the
legislative intent."
Leon A. Plumb, '16.
Landlord and Tenant: Partial Eviction by the Landlord.-In the
recent case of Cohen v. Newman, 91 Misc. (N. Y.) 561 (1i5), a

landlord brought an action for the recovery of the possession of real
property for non-payment of rent. The defense set up by the tenant
was an actual eviction from a portion of the demised premises and,
therefore, a suspension of the rent until restorationof his original
possession. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court which
dismissed the action on the ground that a partial eviction of the
tenant caused by the wrongful act of the landlord suspended the
liability of the tenant to pay rent until he was restored to his original
1169 App. Div. (N. Y.) 43 (915).

N.Y. -.
At the time of going to the press this decision had not been
officially reported.
2217
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situation. The tenant's duty to pay rent, it held, had its correlative
in the landlord's duty to protect the possession.
This decision is in accord with a wealth of decided cases on the
subject. All the jurisdictions in this country, with the exception of
Alabama, have consistently held that a tenant who has been wrongfully evicted by the landlordfrom a portion of the premises is relieved
from the whole rent, so long as he is kept out of such part, in the same
way as if he had been kept out of the whole premises'; and this
although he remains in possession of the remainder of the premises
during the full term of the lease2 . Nor can the landlord dispossess
the tenant for non-payment of rent, since the right to rent ceases with
the eviction3 . He is also prevented from recovering for use and occupation of the remainder of the premises. 4 In Alabama alone the
tenant is liable for a proportionate share of the rent.5 He must
relinquish possession of the entire premises, if he wants to be relieved
of the entire liability. But a recent decision in Alabama seems to be
in accord with the rule in other jurisdictions, holding that "a partial
eviction is as effective a defense to an action for rent as an entire
eviction." 6
The theory on which this rule is based is that the landlord should
not be allowed, by his wrongful act in dispossessing the tenant of part
of the premises, to change the contract made between himself and the
tenant which contemplated the payment of rent for the premises as a
whole only. 7 Other reasons given are that the law will not apportion
the rent in favor of the wrongdoer," and also that the obligation to pay
rent ceases because his obligation is based upon the consideration that
he is to have quiet enjoyment of the premises. 9
The rule is otherwise, however, if the tenant is partially evicted
under a title paramountto that of his landlord. Here it would seem that,
if the tenant continues in possessiolt of the remaining part, using and
enjoying it, there is no suspension of the entire rent subsequently due,
and the tenant is liable to his landlord in an action for use and occupa101de v. Person, 23 App. D. C. 170 (1904); Wade v. Halligan, 6 Peck (Ill.)
507 (1855); Smith v. Wise, 58 Ill. 141 (1871); Haynerv. Smith, 63 111.430 (1872);
Shumway v. Collins, 6 Gray (Mass.) 227 (1856); Leishman v. White, I Allen
(Mass.) 489 (1861); Royce v. Guggenheim, lo6 Mass. 201 (1870); Watts v.
Coffin, ix Johns. (N. Y.) 495 (1814); Pendleton v. Dyett, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 581
(1825); Lewis and Lewis v. Payn, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 423 (183o); Ogilvie v. Hull,
5 Hill (N. Y.) 52 (1843); Vermilya v. Austin, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 203, (1853);
Christopher v. Austin, i Kern (N. Y.) 216 (1854); Peck v. Hiler, 14 How. Pr.
(N. Y.) 155 (x856); Edgerton v. Page, 2o N. Y. 281 (1859); Johnson v. Oppenhem, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.)449 (1872); Sirey v. Braems, 65 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 472 (1901); Morris v. Kettle, 28 Vroom (N. J. L.) 218 (1894); Tunis v.
Grandy,
22 Gratt. (Va.) 309 (1872).
2
Hayner v. Smith, supra, note i; Campbell v. Shields, ii How. Pr. (N. Y.)
565 3(1855).
People v. Gedney, IO Hun (N. Y.) 151 (1877).

'Christopher v. Austin, supra,note i; Morris v. Kettle, supra, note x.
5Warren v. Wagner, 75 Ala. 188 (x883); Crossthwaite v. Caldwell, io6 Ala.
295 (3894); Anderson v. Winton, 336 Ala. 422 (1903).
6
Ro11 v. Howell, 62 So. (Ala.) 463 (1913).
71 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, page 116o.
8
Carter v. Burr, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 59 (1862); Johnson v. Oppenheim, supra,
note i; Skaggs v. Emerson, 5o Cal. 3 (3875).
'Leopold v. Judson, 75 Ill. 536 (1874).
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tion for such portion of the rent as the part retained should reasonably
bear.10 It is only where he elects to remain in possession of the unaffected part of the premises that he is liable for the rent." And the
reason for this rule is that the court considers the landlord not so far
in fault as that it should deprive him of a return for the part remaining. Where the tenant has been partially evicted by paramount title
he may, in his discretion, abandon the possession of the other part and
in that event he is absolved from payment of the entire rent."
In the case of Duhain v. Mermod, Jaccard & King Jewelry Co.,"
a landlord, under compulsion of the city, removed a part of
the demised premises which encroached on the sidewalk, but
so altered the premises that the change was really beneficial to the
tenant. The court held that such partial eviction was not a defense
in an action to recover the entire rent, although the court was of
opinion that an abatement of rent might be allowed, if loss resulted
and that fact was pleaded. This case can be reconciled with the rest
of the decided cases where the tenant is partially evicted by title
paramount and appears to contain a just and practical solution of the
matter.
Where there has been a constructive eviction from a part of the
premises the courts have taken a different attitude. In order to make
a constructive eviction from part of the leased property available as a
defense in an action for rent, there must be an abandonment of the
entire premises.' 4 And this seems only fair and just, because, f the
tenant were allowed to plead constructive eviction from part as a
defense for the entire rent, he could enjoy the premises to practically
the same extent as before and this would work hardship on the landlord, especially since the courts are so liberal in interpreting what constitutes constructive eviction.
It is scarcely necessary to discuss the effects of total eviction on the
tenant's liability for rent. Total eviction, whether by landlord or a
third party
under paramount title, is a complete defense to an action
5
for rent.
Harvey I. Tutchings, 'z8.
"Seabrook v. Moyer,
88 Pa. 417 (1879).
"Wells v. Mason, 5 Ill. 84 (1842); Home Life Insurance Co. of Brooklyn v.
Sherman, 46 N. Y. 370 (1871).
"See cases cited in note ii.
123i N. Y. 364 (1914).
"Boreel v. Lawton, go N. Y. 293 (I882); Bradley v. Goicouria, 67 How.
Prac. (N. Y.) 76 (1884); Duff v. Hart, i6 N. Y. Supp. 163 (i89i); ThomsonHouston. Electric Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144 N. Y. 34 (1894).
"Wade v. Halligan, supra, note i; Smith v. Shepard, i5 Pick. (Mass.) X47
(1833); Pendleton v. Dyett, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 581 (1825); Moffat v. Strong, 22
N.Y. Super. Ct. (9 Bosw.) 57 (i86i); Home Life Ins. Co. of Brooklyn v. Sherman,
46 N. Y. 370 (187); Johnson v. Oppenheim, 12 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 449
(1872); Crown Mfg. Co. v. Gay, 13 Wkly. Law Bul. (Ohio) 188 (1885); Bauders
v. Fletcher, Ii Serg. & R. (Pa.) 419 (1824); Bennet v. Bittle, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 339
(1834).
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Master and Servant: Independent Contractors: Non-Delegable
Duties of Owner of Building.-In an opinion recently handed down in
the case of Goodwin v. Mason, 155 N. W. (Iowa) 966 (z96), the Iowa
Supreme Court took the position that the owner of land who er(ects a
building thereon, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care for the
safety of the public, and that he is answerable for injuries to a member
of the public resulting from any defects in its stability or construction,
and further that it is no defence to show that reasonable care was
exercised in securing a capable contractor.
The point thus raised is an interesting one, and not all courts are
agreed as to the duty in respect to third persons which devolves upon
an owner of real estate for whom a building is being erected or repaired
by an independent contractor. The basis for the duty seems to be
the old legal maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non ladas, and the liability
is predicated upon the doctrine of respondeat superior; but it is to be
observed, however, that the owner of real property is not liable
under this rule for all the acts of an independent contractor for which
he would be liable if the act was done by himself. He is not liable
for the negligent acts of the contractor, broadly speaking, nor is he
liable, when the work is lawful, because his premises become a nuisance through the inadvertence of the contractor.' The owner is
liable to third parties, however, when the damage results directly
from the acts of the contractor which the owner has expressly authorized or which are necessary to the performance of the contract ;2 but
not when the injury results from acts purely collateral to the contract.3
If the work then, is of a dangerous character, or if it will necessarily
result in a nuisance if it is not cautiously pursued, a duty is thrown4
upon the owner which he cannot shift to an independent contractor.
There is some authority for saying that an employer is liable for the
negligent acts of an independent contractor where he has not used
1
Louthan v. Hewes, 138 Cal. 116 (1902); Ridgeway v. Downing Co., 1O9 Ga.
591 (1900); City of Logansport v. Dick, 70 Ind. 65 (188o); Robinsonv. Webb, 74
Ky. 464 (1875); Jackson v. Butler, 249 Mo. 342 (1913); Hexamer v. Webb, 'ol
N. Y. 377 (x886); Schulhofer v. Mulhare, 50 Misc. (N. Y.) 658 (igo6); McNulty
v. Ludwig Co. 125 App. Div. (N. Y.) 291 (19o8).
2McNamee v. Hunt, 87 Fed. 298 (1898); Weinman v. de Palma, 232 U. S. 571
(1914); Montgomery Street Ry. Co. v. Smith, 146 Ala. 316 (igo5); Starr v.
Standard Milling Co., 183 Ill. App. 454 (1913); Nahm & Friedman v. Register
Newspaper Co., 120 Ky. 485 (1905); Peerless Mfg. Co. v. Bagley, 126 Mich. 225
(19oI); Omaha Bridge and Terminal Co. v. Hargadine, 98 N. W. (Neb.) 1071
(1904).
3Hexamer v. Webb, supra,note I; McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil & P. M. R.
Co., 61 N.Y. 178 (1874); Boss v. Jarmulowsky, 81 App. Div. (N. Y.) 577 (1903),
appeal
dismissed
in 184 N.2 Y.
597 (U.
(19o6).
4
Chicago
v. R~obbins,
Black
S.) 418 (1862); Ann v. Herter, 79 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 6 (1903); Murphy v. Pelstein, 73 App. Div. (N. Y.) 256 (1902). Especialy is it proper that the defendant should be held responsible where the hazardous
conditions were created by himself before the place where they existed was transferred to the control of the contractor. Hawver v. Whalen, 49 Ohio St. 69 (t892);
but see Vanderpool v. Husson, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 196 (1858), where it was held
error to charge that the owner of premises, who was erecting a building thereon was
not required to build a barricade around a derrick, which necessarily extended over
a busy thoroughfare, and which was necessary in connection with the work.
Considering the extent to which employers are now held for the acts of independent contractors, the ruling in this case seems to be of rather dubious correctness.

3o8

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

reasonable care in the selection of such contractor;5 but this has been
squarely repudiated in New York.'
Thus far we have considered the extent of the liability of an owner
of p~emises for damages resulting from the acts of an independent
contractor in the course of constructing the building; but how far is
the owner liable for injuries to the public resulting from the inherent
nature of the building itself? All courts agree that the law imposes
upon the owner of real estate, when he exercises his lawful right of
erecting a building on the street, a duty towards the general public to
so erect the building as to render it reasonably safe and sufficiently
strong to withstand all weather and storms which are likely to arise in
that locality;7 but the courts do not agree upon the manner in which
the owner may discharge this duty.
The prevailing view seems to be that in order to relieve the owner
from liability for damages resulting from defective plans, he must
fairly commit the subject matter to an architect, and it must appear
that the defect in the design did not proceed from the owner's direction. 8 No duty rests upon the landowner to employ an architect to
supervise the work of the contractor;9 but he must use due care in
selecting a competent architect, and the fact that the building plans
were approved by the building department of the city is not sufficient
to establish the competency of the architect.' 0 Thus in New York
and other jurisdictions in whichthis rule is recognized, an owner may
shift his liability for damages resulting from defective plans or construction by delegating the work of drawing the plans to a competent
architect, and refraining from further interference.
Some states hold the employer to a stricter accountability for
damages resulting from defects in the plans of the original construction work, stating that his duty is absolute, and that the employer is
excused only for acts of God and the public enemy." In writing for
the court in Cork v. Blossom et al,'2 Morton, J., cited MUullen v. St.
John, 57 N. Y. 567, as authority for his holding that there was an
absolute duty resting upon an owner of real estate erecting a building
thereon, for damages resulting from defects in the construction. However, no independent contractor was involved in this case, and the
court merely stated that there was a duty to exercise reasonable care
in constructing a building; but they did not go the length of saying
that this duty could not be shifted. That case is still law in New York
but it has no application to the state of facts in Cork v. Blossom.
In those jurisdictions in which the duty upon the employer is held
to be absolute, and one which he may not shift, it is urged that the
defective building is a trap and a dangerous nuisance. The courts say
that an employer may not shift his liability when the work which he
contracts for will, as completed, constitute a nuisance. 13 However,
5

Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 586 (1873).
OBerg v. Parsons, i56 N. Y. io9 (1898).
7Wilkinson v. Detroit Steel Works, 73 Mich. 405 (1889).
sBurke v. Ireland, 166 N. Y. 305 (I9O1); Uggla v. Brokaw, 77 App. Div.
(N. 9Y.) 31o (1902); White v. Green, 82 S. W. (Tex.) 329 (1904).
Hawke v. Brown, 28 App. Div. (N. Y.) 37 (1898).
"OFox v. Ireland, 46 App. Div. (N. Y.) 541 (1900).
"Wilkinson v. Detroit Steel Works, supra,note 7; Cork v. Blossom, 162 Mass.
330 2(1894).
1 Cork v. Blossom, supra, note ii.
I'Wilkinson v. Detroit Steel Works, supra, note 7.
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they make the mistake of declaring that the employer is the party who
creates the nuisance, when, in fact, it is the contractor or acrhitect
who drafts the defective plans, who cretaes the nuisance by their own
positive act. As the New York courts consistently point out, the
employer must fairly commit the work to the architect, and then
refrain from further interference in order to be excused. They realize
that, if he does this, he is not the creator of the nuisance. It is the
architect who draws the plans who is the one who causes the precise
act to be done which occasions the injury. The employer is not
competent to draw the plans for the construction, so it is his duty to
delegate the work to persons possessing sufficient knowledge and skill
to accomplish the result intended. 4 Accordingly, he employs a
competent architect to draw the plans and specifications. If he does
this, it is unreasonable to hold him responsible for the nuisance, if one
results. He contracted for a lawful safe building, and if he gets a
nuisance instead, and injury results, he ought not to be responsible.
Geo. W. Dunn, 'i8.
Practice:Service of Summons on Officer of Foreign Corporation:?The president of the Savannah Supply Company, which owned no
property in New York State and had no office there for the transaction of business, was served with a summons while within that state.
The company protested against the validity of such service on the
ground that the president was not within the state on any business
connected with the company, and in Magnolia Metal Co. v.
Savannah Supply Co., 157 N. Y. Supp. 355 (rp95), the court held
the service defective on the authority of Riverside and Dan River
Cotton Mills v. Menefee.'
This case is obviously an attempt to change the well-known New
York rule that service on an officer of a foreign corporation which
does not transact business within the state is good, though such an
officer is within the state on unofficial and purely private business.
This rule was laid down in Hiller v. B.&M. R. R. Co., 2 and has.
been established by subsequent decisions. 3 It goes on the theory
that an officer so served will naturally bring the fact.to the attention
of the corporation. Hence such service may reasonably be expected
to give the corporation notice of the proceedings against it. 4 But
'Burke v. Ireland, supra, note 8.
la2Since the writing of this article the New York Court of Appeals has indicated by a strong dictum in Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Co., i in N. E.
(N. Y.) 1075 (1916) that it intends to follow the Federal rule.
'237 U. S. 189 (1915).
27o N. Y. 223 (877).
3Pope v. Terre Haute Car Co., 87 N. Y. 137 (188i); Johnston v. Mutual Life
Co., 104 App. Div. (N. Y.) 55o(19o5); Sadlerv. Boston Rubber Co., 14o App. Div.
(N. Y.) 367 (191o), afflied 202 N. Y. 547 (i91i); Chambers v. Bacon, 153 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 194 (1912); Smith v. Western Pacific Ry., 154 App. Div. (N. Y.)
130 (1912).

4
"The object of service is to give notice to the party proceeded against, and
any service which reasonably accomplishes that end answers the requirements of
natural justice and fundamental law." Pope v. Terre Haute Car. Co., supra,
note 3.
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iunder such a theory, service personally without the state would be
good service, since it certainly gives the defendant notice of the proceedings against him. Yet such service is notoriously defective. As
to whether a judgment obtained under such service is violative of the
United States Constitution, if defective, the view seems to have been
that mere rendering of such judgment was not a deprivation of property, since the corporation, not doing business in the state, owned
no property there. The federal question arose only when an attempt
was made to enforce the judgment in 'another state. But a corporation may own property in a state without doing business there, or may
commence doing business in the state after the judgment is rendered.
In such a case there is clearly a deprivation of property. The federal rule, on the other hand, is that such serviceis invalid.5 Thisruleis
seemingly based on the theory that a corporation is a fictitious being
created for certain definite purposes, and that this being leaves its
domicile only when its agents or officers leave the state of its creation
to carry out such purposes. When they go without the state for any
other reason, they do not carry this fictitious being with them. Hence
service on an officer or agent of a foreign corporation which does not
do business within the state is not service on the corporation, unless
the person served is upon official business.6 This obviates the possibility of a corporation, doing business in, one part of the country, being forced to go to another merely to defend a suit, without'preventing suits in the jurisdictions in which they will naturally arise, i. e.,
the states in which it is doing business.
The Cotton Mills v. Menefee case declares that a judgment rendered upon service upon an officer of such a corporation casually
within the state is a violation of the "due process clause" of the 14th
amendment of the Constitution of the United States even though
there is no attempt to enforce the judgment without the state in
which it was obtained. In view of this decision the court in the
principal case felt that a federal question was involved, and that
it was bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.7 A similar attempt to change the New York rule had been
5
St. Clair v. Cox, 1o6 U. S. 350 (1882); Fitzgerald Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98 (i89o); Goldey v. Morning News Co., 156 U. S. 518 (1895);
Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100 (897); Conley v. Mathieson

Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406 (i9o3); Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, i9o U. S.
428 (1903); Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker, z96 U. S. 432 (i9o5); Remington v.
Central Pacific R. R. Co., 198 U. S.95 (1905); Kendall v. American Automatic

Loom Co., 198 U. S. 477 (i9o5). These cases were decided under the "full faith
and6 credit clause" of the United States Constitution.
This apparently was the early New York view also. Hulbert v. Hope Mutual
Ins.7 Co., 4 How. Pt. (N. Y.) 275, (185o), affirmed 4id. 415 (185o).
"The doctrine of the cases in our courts is not reconcilable with the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States. There is no room for distinction, and
it being a federal question, it is our duty to follow the Supreme Court of the United
States." Sibley v. Sibley, 76 App. Div. (N. Y.) 132 (1902). Accord, Hicks v.
Hotchkiss, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 296 (1823); Hintermeister v. Bank of Chittenango, 64 N. Y. 212 (1876); Duncomb v. N. Y. H. & N. R. R. Co., 84 N. Y. Igo
(i88I); Johnston v. Mutual Life Co., 43 Misc. (N. Y.) 251 (9o4);
at. Soc. of
U. S. Daughters of 1812 v. Am. Surety Co., 56 Misc. (N. Y.) 627 (1907); Davenport v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 87 Misc. (N. Y.) 3o3 (i914); Curtis v. Davidson, 164
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made in Grant v. CananeaConsolidatedCopper Co., also upon the
theory that a federal question was involved. The Court of Appeals,
however, held that the service was good "even under the federal
rule," 9 and refused to take a definite stand on the question raised by
the lower court. The future attitude of that court on this matter is,
therefore, a mere matter of conjecture, but, in light of the position
taken by the Supreme Court of the United States, it would seem
difficult for New York to avoid adopting the federal rule.
L. I. Shelley, '"7.
Quasi-Contracts: Recovery against Municipal Corporations for
Benefits Received under Ultra Vires Contracts.-It is safe to say that
as a general rule one who deals with a municipal corporation does so
at his peril. He must take notice of the powers conferred by statute
upon such municipality and its officers, and the limitations imposed
on the exercise of such powers. It is advisable that he ascertain
before executing his contract that the public officers have complied
with the requirements of the law. This is very well illustrated in
the recent case of Reams v. Cooley, 152 Pac. (Cal.) 293 (z195). In
this case the plaintiff had fully performed a contract made with the
board of trustees of a school district, calling for the plastering of the
exterior of a high school. The contract was declared void because
not awarded as a result of competitive bidding, as required by law,
and recovery was not only denied on the contract itself, but also in
quasi contract for the reasonable value of the labor and materials
furnished. In the words of the court," the decided weight of authority is to the effect that, when by statute the power of the board or
municipality to make a contract is limited to a certain prescribed
method of doing so, and any other method of doing it is expressly
or impliedly prohibited, no implied liability can arise for benefits
received under a contract made in violation of the particularly
prescribed statutory mode." The result is in harmony with the
preponderance of authority. The case is a hard one for the contractor, but his plea is answered by a pertinent remark in Zottman v.
San Francisco:' "but it should be remembered that he, no less
than the officers of the corporation, when he deals in a matter expressly provided for in the charter, is bound to see to it that the
charter is complied with."
This question of whether one who has performed a void contract
made with a municipality may recover in quasi contract presents a
problem, and has apparently caused the courts of all jurisdictions
App. Div. (N. Y.) 597 (1914); Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 215 N.Y. 514 (1915).
But this only applies when a federal question is involved. Towle v. Forney, 14
N. Y. 423 (1856); Mynard v. Syracuse, B. &. N. Y. Rd. Co., 7 Hun (N. Y.) 399
(1876); Dunham v. Hastings Pavement Co., 118 App. Div. (N. Y.) 127 (1907);
People v. Willcox, 194 N. Y. 383 (1909); Platt v. Bonsall, 136 App. Div. (N. Y.)
397 (1910); contra, Stoddard v. Long Island R. Co., 7 N. Y. Super. Ct. (5 Sand.)
ino (1851); Yorkv. Conde, 147 N. Y. 486 (1895).
8117 App. Div. (N. Y.) 576 (1907).

12o Cal. 97 (1862).

9189 N. Y. 241 (1907).
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considerable trouble and perplexity. As one court has expressed
it, "Indeed, upon the general subject of the extent of the liability of
a municipal corporation, the authorities are a tangled web of contradictions, and it is difficult to assert any proposition with respect2
to the same for which adjudications on both sides may not be cited."1
Although the position of one who has performed a void contract with
a municipality is not particularly hopeful, yet one should not -be unduly discouraged by the law as presented in the principal case, and
conclude that recovery is denied in all cases. Under certain circumstances, which will be outlined presently, the courts have
frequently allowed a recovery in quasi contract.
The question most frequently arises in actions for money had and
received, and for labor and materials fuh-nished.
I. Liabilityfor Money Had and Received.
In Agawam National Bank v. South Hadley,3 the defendant town,
in violation of a statute which provided that no debts should be incurred by the town for borrowed money except on a vote of twothirds of the electors at a town meeting, borrowed of the plaintiff
bank $2000 and applied the same to pay debts due from the town.
Recovery was denied both in contract and quasi contract. In Dill
v. Wareham,4 the defendant, a municipal corporation, entered into a
contract by which it transferred to the plaintiff the right of taking
oysters within its limits, receiving therefor the money in advance.
This contract it had no authority to make, and the plaintiff was allowed to recover back the money in an action for money had and received by the defendant to the plaintiff's use. It seems that in general, recovery will be denied if, in this class of cases, reimbursement
would increase or vary the prescribed burden upon the tax-payers,
but will be allowed if to do so would be merely the restitution of what
the corporation has received. This distinction' goes far toward reconciling the decisions in those cases which 6fall within this class, and
which would otherwise appear conflicting.
I. Liabilityfor Labor and MaterialsFurnished.
It is necessary in considering this class of cases to distinguish between those where the municipal corporation had no power at all to
contract for the particular benefit, and those where it had the power
to contract for the particular benefit, but only in a certain prescribed
manner. It seems that, according to the weight of authority, there
can be no recovery in those cases which fall within the former subField, C. J., in Argenti v. City of San Francisco, I6 Cal. 256 (186o).
'128 Mass. 503 (188o).
47 Metc. (Mass.) 438 (1844).

'Made in 4 C. L. R. 67. See also cases cited therein.
For a fuller discussion of this particular class, see 9 Mich. L. R. 672. See
particularly Luther v. Wheeler, 73 S. C. 83 (1905); Wells v. Salina, is9 N. Y.
280 (I89O); and also Newburgh Say. Bank v. Town of Woodbury, 173 N. Y. 55
(1903).
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division.7 Those cases which fall within the latter subdivision present a question upon which the authorities differ.
The cases where the contract is not made in conformity with the
requirements prescribed by statute will now be considered. The
majority of the cases within this group, it is submitted, fall within
one or the other of the two classes, namely, where the defect is technical or a mere irregularity, and where it is substantial, recovery
being allowed in the former, and denied in the latter.
Much depends upon the attitude and point of view of the court.8
It seems that recovery has generally been allowed where to do so does
not contravene the purpose of the statute, that is, where the irregularity was of a character not prejudicial to the municipality, and
merely technical. 9 In Ward v. Kropf'0 , the contract in question called
for the construction of a sewerage system, and was held void because
the .proposition as submitted to the electors was fatally defective for
failure to state the maximum and minimum cost of the contemplated
improvement as required by the General Village Law. The proposition was later correctly subihitted to the electors, and the court
sustained a judgment indirectly allowing recovery by permitting
whoever might be the new contractor to use that part which the original contractor had constructed by paying him the reasonable value
therefor. In upholding the proposition that a quasi contractual obligation rested upon the municipality, the court contended that the
title to the part constructed had not vested in the municipality, and
emphasized the fact that the defect was technical. In Moore v.
Mayor," the court in answer to the objection that the contract was
void because the resolution authorizing the improvement was not
published in all the newspapers required by law, declared that "While
courts have been vigilant in their scrutiny of corporate action, and
have zealously striven to keep corporations and their agents within
the limits of granted powers, they have not favored defenses to hon' '12
est demands, based upon mere irregularities and informalities.
14
In McCormick Lumber Co. v. School District, recovery was allowed
for the reasonable value of labor and materials furnished under a
contract void because of the failure to post notices of the election
meeting.
7Burrill v. Boston, Fed. Cas. No. 2,198 (1867); Salt Creek Twp. v. King Iron
& etc. Co., 51 Kan. 52o (1893); Hovey v. Wyandotte County, 56 Kan. 577 (1896);
Hodges v. City of Buffalo, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 1o (1846); Bloomsburg Land Co. v.
Bloomsburg, 215 Pa. St. 452 (I9O6); but see contra, Argenti v. City of San
Francisco, 16 Cal. 256 (I86O). The court, however, reasoned very strongly for
the 8validity of the contract as made within the implied authority of the city.
See McDonald v. The Mayor, 68 N. Y. 23 (1876), as an illustration.
9
McCormich Lumber Co. v. School Dist., 26 Cal. App. 641 (1915); Watkins v.
School Dist., 85 Kan. 76o (1911); Carey v. Saginaw, 79 Mich. 73 (1889); Statev.
Clark, II6 Minn. 500 (1912); Laird Norton Yards v. Rochester, 117 Minn. 114
(1912); Lincoln Land Co. v. Village of Grant, 57 Neb. 70 (1898); Wentink v.
Board of Freeholders, 66 N. J. L. 65 (19O1); Moore v. Mayor, 73 N. Y. 238
(1878); Mixer v. Adam, 66 Misc. (N. Y.) 238 (1910); Ward v. Kropf, 207 N. Y.
467 (1913); Pocasset Ice Co. v. Burton, 35 R. I. 57 (1912).
lSupra, note 9.
nSupra, note 9.
2Recovery apparently allowed on the contract on the ground of estoppel.
14Supra, note 9.
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On the other hand, recovery has generally been denied where the
defect was substantial, that is, where to disregard the non-compliance would deprive the corporation and the public of the protection
of a safeguard against maladministration. 15 In City of Colo. Springs
v. Coray,16 the contract being void because not let to the lowest bidder after advertisement, the court denied recovery in quasi contract,
stating that "While in this case to apply the strict letter of the law
may work a hardship upon the plaintiff, it is far better that one man
should suffer the pecuniary loss than that a rule should be adopted
destructive of statutory safeguards, the necessity of which, for the
protection of the public, was never greater than at the present time."
Again in LaFranceEngine Co. v. City of Syracuse,"7 where the contract was made in violation of a similar statute calling for competitive bidding, the court held, "There can be no implied promise to
pay the value of goods received where there is no power to contract
or to purchase, except in the manner and with the safeguards prescribed by statute."
The distinction has been well stated as follows: "Much depends,
it is submitted, upon the purpose of the requirement and the extent
to which it is disregarded. If the irregularity is such as to deprive
the municipality of the protection of a safeguard against the extravagance or corruption of its officers-as a substantial failure to comply with a requirement that contracts shall be let to the lowest bidder after due publication of notice-recovery should be denied. But
if the irregularity is of a character that does not prejudice or endanger the interests of the municipality-as a failure to renew in writing,
as required by law, a contract for gas supply-recovery should be
allowed."' 8
The broad distinction thus stated runs through the cases and is
sufficiently elastic to allow the courts to work out, on the whole, substantial justice. The equities of a particular case may be allowed to
control the decision in that case, through a determination as to
whether the defect is substantial, or on the other hand is of a minor
and technical character. There may also be on occasion deflections
from this principle of distinction, as the court may be at one time
over impressed with the danger of 'allowing a muncipal corporation
to be made the victim of collusive or corrupt bargaining; and at
another time be moved by the plight of an honest contractor. The
curious restriction in the conclusion of the opinion in McDonald v.
Mayor' is suggestive of such influences: "This opinion goes no fur15
Zottman v. San Francisco, supra, note I; Reams v. Cooley, 152 Pac. (Cal.)
293 (ioi5), the principal case; City of Colo. Springs v. Coray, 25 Colo. App. 460
(1914' Reichard v. Warren County, 31 Ia. 381 (1871); Brady v. City of New
York, 2o N. Y. 312 (1859); Bonesteel v. City of New York, 22 N. Y. 162 (186o);
McDonald v. Mayor, supra, note 8; Dickinson v. City of Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y.
65 (1878); People v. Gleason, 121 N. Y. 631 (189o); La France Engine Co. v.
City of Syracuse, 33 Misc. (N. Y.) 516 (i9oo); Keane v. City of New York, 88
App. Div. (N. Y.) 542 (1903); Cawker v. Central Co., 140 Wis. 25 (i909); see 27
L. R. A. (n. s.) 1120, for a further list of authority denying recovery.
"08Supra, note 15. 1TSupra,note 15.
' Woodward on Quasi-Contracts, p. 261.
lHaSupra, note 8.
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ther than to hold that where a person makes a contract with the city
of New York for supplies to it, without the requirements of the charter
being observed, he may not recover the value thereof upon an inplied liability."
There are several cases which are rather diffcult of classification,
some of which appear to run counter to the conclusions above set
forth, in allowing arecovery even where the defect is morethan technical. 19 In Peterson v. City of Ionia and in City of Providence v. Electric Light Co. 20 recovery in quasi contract was granted for work
performed under a contract void because of failure to advertise for
bids. Both these cases, however, were subsequently ov¢erruled. 21 In
Nelson v. The Mayor22 , where a contract was void for lack of a prior
appropriation covering the contemplated expense as required by
statute, the qourt indicated its approval of allowing a remedy in
quasi contract. The effect of this, however, has been materially
lessened by the fact that it was unnecessary to the decision, as the
contract itself was sustained because subsequently validated by an
act of legislature, and because it had been confined to cases where
an assessment has been collected.3 The court in O'Rourke Eng.
Const. Co. v. City of New York4 granted a recovery for extra and
necessary work not called for by the original contract but performed
under a supplemental contract made without a public letting.
A novel remedy in those cases where recovery is denied by the
courts is disclosed in an interesting New York case. 2 The plaintiff
was denied recovery in court below, but instead of appealing he had
recourse to the legislature, where an act was passed legalizing the
proceedings, and empowering the plaintiff to maintain an action at
law in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover a fair and reasonable compensation for the work and materials. The action was
accordingly brought, the act was held constitutional, and recovery
2
allowed.
Those cases where an immediate necessity or emergency for the
article to be procured or the services to be rendered has arisen seem
to present an exception to the strict rule denying recovery for failure
to comply with the statutory requirements. Thus, where a municipality failed to renew a contract which it had with the plain19City of Des Moines v. Welsbach Co., 188 Fed. 9o6 (1911); Westbrook v.
Middlecoff, 99 Ill. App. 327 (I9OI); Boyd v. Black School Twp., 123 Ind. I (1889);
Helms v. The State, 19 Ind. App. 360 (x897); City of Providence v. Electric
Light Co., 122 Ky. 237 (z9o6); Peterson v. City of Ionia, 152 Mich. 678 (19o8);
Nelson v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 535 (1876); Messenger v. City of Buffalo, 21 N.Y. 196
(186o); O'Rourke Eng. Const. Co. v. City of New York, 14o App. Div. (N. Y.)
498 (91o); Nebraska Bitulithic Co. v. Omaha, 84 Neb. 375 (I9og)2 Supra,note
19. 22Supra, note 29.
nMcCurdy v. Shiawassee County, 154 Mich. 550 (I9o8); Worrell Mfg. Co. v.
City of Ashland, 159 -Ky. 656 (1914).

nSee McDonald v. Mayor, supra, note 8. USupra, note 29.
2W.
I. B. Co., v. Town of Attica, 119 N. Y. 204 (1890).
"8 See also Erskine v. Steele County, 87 Fed. 630 (1898), aff'd 98 Fed. 215
(1899); Town of Guilford v. Cornell, x8 Barb. (N. Y.) 615 (1854), aff'd 13 N. Y.
143

1 855).
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tiff for the lighting of the city, and the plaintiff threatened to
cut off the supply, the plaintiff was allowed to recover for that
which it had furnished at the request of a certain official, even though
the contract as required by statute had not been made.27 As expressed by another court, "contingencies may arise when services,
materials, and property, above the prescribed value, may be immediately needed, and where competitive offers and written contracts
would be unserviceable or impossible. In such a case the statutes
would not apply because such application could not have been intended." 8
Selby G. Smith, 'z6.
Sales: Retailers, Implied Warranty of Wholesomeness on the Sale
of Food.- It is not often that a judge dissents from his own opinion,
but such is the situation found in the case of Ranaldi v. Mohican Co.,
157 N. Y. Supp. 561 (1916), where the defendant, a retailer, was
held liable for injury sustained by the plaintiff, as a result of eating
certain pork, which was infected with a parasite known as trichina
and which was purchased from the defendant. There was no charge
against the defendant of any negligence whatever. The liability was
based upon the common law doctrine of implied warranty of fitness
for purpose in the sale of food for human consumption.'
In reaching its conclusion the learned court said, "Were this question being presented to this court for the first time, I should rebel
vigorously against following, in this instance, the common law rule of
implied warranty proclaimed as far back as the days of Blacksfone
and adhered to in this state, and quite generally in all the states of
the Union. The rule that there is an implied warranty on the part
of the vendor of foodstuffs, that goods sold for immediate consumption are fit and wholesome, is a doctrine no longer suitable to modem conditi6ns. Personally I approve of the doctrine there propounded (Bigelow v. Maine Central Ry. Co.,2 which held that the
common law doctrine was not applicable to canned asparagus served
to a person on a dining car). This court, however, having recently
taken a contrary position on the subject, 3 it would be better, to
allow the Court of Appeals to dispose of the question * * *."
2

1N. River Elect. Co. v. New York, 48 App. Div. (N. Y.) I4 (1900).
Harlem Gas Co., v. New York, 33 N. Y. 3o9 (1865); see also Sheehan v. City
of New York, 37 Misc. (N. Y.) 432 (1902); Staten Island Water Co., v. New York,
144 App. Div. (N. Y.) 318 (1911); Nebraska Bitulithic Co. v. Omaha, supra,
note 19.
'Blackstone, 3 Comm. 165; Burnby v. Bollett, 16 M. & W. 644 (1847);
Wiedman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93 (1898), and cases cited therein; Winsor v. Lombard
I8 Pick. (Mass.) 57 (1836); Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 467 (1815).
21 1o Me. 105, (1912); This case, however, distinguishes between a sale of provisions, which are open to inspection and a sale of food products which are packed
under inspection and calculated to be used without further inspection, thus infer;
ing that even this court would imply a warranty in the sale of such a commodity as
meat. The holding can also be accounted for by the fact that the defendant was
not a retailer or dealer, but was acting in the capacity of the proprietor of a hotel
or a restaurant, since the asparagus causing the injury was served at a meal on a
dining
3 car.
Leahy v. Essex Co., 164 App. Div. (N. Y.) 9o3 (1914); Race v. Krum, x62
App. Div. (N. Y.) 9II (1914).
28
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What is the justificati6n for therebellion by the learned court inthis
case? There is no doubt that a legal wrong is committed against the
party who is sold a piece of meat which is diseased and which causes
injury in the manner above indicated. The consumer has been guilty
of no negligence. Through the carelessness of someone meat unfit
for food has been exposed for sale. But from whom is the consumer
to seek his remedy? Ordinarily there are only three parties to whom
the responsibility for the injury could be traced, namely; (i) the
grower of the animal from which the infected meat came; (2) the
packer or wholesaler who slaughtered and prepared the meat in its
final form and who sold the same to the retailers; (3) the retailer
who sold the meat to the plaintiff. The liability for the injury to
this plaintiff must rest upon one or all of these three parties. But
to which of them does the law declare that the plaintiff should go for
his relief and why?
According to thewell settled rule of the common law a grower of animals intended for human consumption in the form of meat is not liable
upon any theory of implied warranty of fitness for use as food to a
retailer, to whom the animals, slaughtered or unslaughtered, are sold
for the purpose of resale. 4 And in some cases the same rule has been
applied where the grower sold directly to the consumer, the theory
being that a farmer ordinarily would be in no better position to discover a latent defect than the purchaser.' It is clear that if the retailer would have no right as against the grower on the doctrine of
implied warranty, the consumer would have none, since there would
be lacking any privity of contract. 6 It would seem that the remedy
against the grower by a consumer for the sale of defective meat or
a defective animal would be one in tort, where actual negligence could
be proved. Negligence would be extremely difficult to prove. And
in the case of a disease like trichina, it cannot ordinarily be detected
in the live animal, and so this possible remedy to the consumer would
be of slight importance.
The next party to whom the plaintiff might look for remedy is the
wholesaler or manufacturer. With respect to his liability to the
consumer, where the, meat has passed through the hands of a retailer, the law as laid down in recent decisions seems favorable. In
Ketterer v. Armour &' Co.,7 where, as in the principal case, a consumer
purchased from a retailer a piece of pork, which had been prepared
by the defendant and was infected with trichina, it was held that
the defendant owed the consumer a direct duty to 'inspect the pork
4
Howard v. Emerson, iso Mass. 320 (1872); Wart v. Hoose, 65 Misc. (N. Y.)
462 (1909), (Sale of cow to butcher); Cotton v. Reed, 25 Misc. (N. Y.) 380 (1898);
Moses
v. Mead, i Denio (N. Y.) 378 (1845).
5
Giroux v. Stedman, 145 Mass. 439 (888).
Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352 (i9o5), "As a warranty in a sale

of personal property does not run with the property, as there is no privity of contract between a vendor of one sale and the vendees of the same property in subsequent sales,each vendee as a general rule, can resort only to his immediate vendor."
Pater v. Campbell, 11o Ky. 23 (1oi); Tomlinson v. Armour, 74 N. J. L. 274
(1907); Bordwell v. Collie, 45 N. Y. 494 (1871).
72oo Fed (So. Dist. of N. Y.) 322 (1912); Boyd v. Bottling Works, 132 Tenn.
23 (914).
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and to ascertain whether it was infected with any disease injurious
to health. In the course of the opinion the court said, "The remedies of the injured consumer ought not to be made to depend upon
the intricacies of the law of sales. The obligation of the manufacturer should not be based alone upon privity of contract. It
should rest upon the demands of sound social justice." It would
seem further that the wholesaler would be liable to the consumer
under the doctrine expounded in a late New York case, Macpherson
v. Buick Motor Co.,8 where the court said, " If to the element of danger
there is added the knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of the thing of danger is
under duty to make it carefully. There must be knowledge of a
danger, not merely possible but probable. Whether a thing is
dangerous may sometimes be a question for the court and sometimes for the jury. There must be knowledge that, in the usual
course of events, the danger will be shared by others than the buyer.
Such knowledge may often be inferred from the nature of the transaction. We are dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer
of the finished product, who puts it on the market to be used without
inspection by his customers. If he is negligent where danger is to be
foreseen liability will follow." It seems reasonably certain that had
the plaintiff in the principal case sued the wholesaler, who sold the
meat in question, recovery might have been had under the doctrines
as set forth in the above-mentioned cases.
But is this remedy generally practicable for the consumer? In
theory it would seem to work without a hitch, but in practice there
are grave obstacles. Suppose a retailer deals with more than one
wholesaler, besides doing business with farmers, as is often the case.
How is the consumer to know which wholesaler to proceed against?
In the absence of the retailer's liability, he no doubt would not be
anxious to employ diligence in determining the responsible wholesaler for the benefit of a consumer. But, even if he were willing to
determine the guilty party, the task would be a difficult one, in view
of the fact, that he would employ many clerks and meat cutters,
who would be unable to say with any degree of certainity from which
quarter a certain piece of meat, sold days and perhaps weeks before,
came. Furthermore, it might be the only piece of meat in that particular quarter of pork or beef infected and so a subsequent inspection
would prove little. But, assuming that the responsible defendant
were determined, the plaintiff would meet with inconvenience in case
the wholesaler proved to be a non-resident of the state. And upon
what principle of justice should the consumer be compelled to turn
to the wholesaler for his remedy, when he never had any dealings
with him, perhaps did not know that such a person existed, and surely
did not rely on his skill or care? The consumer has relied solely on
the skill and judgment of the retailer with whom he dealt. Therefore,
although a right may exist in favor of the injured consumer as against
the wholesaler responsible for such injury, it is submitted that such
8N. Y. L. J., Mar. 27, 1916.
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a remedy is inadequate, since the responsible wholesaler cannot
always be definitely determined in the case of a commodity like meat,
and since there is no justice in making an injured person sue someone
other than the one with whom he had contractual relations and upon
whom he relied to get wholesome food. Such a remedy should not
be forced upon the consumer, but it should stand as an alternative in
the case of an emergency.
Since there is no remedy against the grower, except possibly for
actual negligence, and since his remedy against the wholesaler or
manufacturer is inadequate, there is but one other who could be
liable to him and that is the retailer with whom he contracted. But
why the retailer, says the learned court in its rebellion in the principal
case? He has not been negligent, either in the selection of his wholesaler or in the maintenance of his business. True, indeed, but the
consumer has not been negligent and the fact is that he was injured
by the meat purchased from this non-negligent retailer. Is he the
one to suffer for the innocent mistake of the retailer in the choice of
a wholesaler? Certainly it will not be denied that the wholesaler is
in a better pqsition to know the quality of his goods than the consumer to whom they are delivered by the retailer. But the learned
court in the principal case says that the doctrine of implied warranty
as.applied to the liability of retailers is "no longer suitable to modern
conditions." Now what are the conditions that have so changed?
Surely the demands of public policy and the need of protection for
the public health are as great today as they were in the days of Blackstone. It may be assumed that the public policy of protecting human
health, upon which is based the common law rule of implied warranty in the sale of foodstuffs by retailers, has remained the same.
Has the position of the retailer with respect to the consumer changed?
It must be admitted that the retailer in the days of Blackstone was
in a position to have much greater knowledge of the quality of his
goods than the retailer of today, since'in the former case, the retailer
was generally manufacturer, preparer and retailer all combined;
while today, the ordinary retailer is not much more than an intermediary between the wholesaler and the consumer. However, it
cannot be denied that the relative position of the retailer with respect to the consumer has not changed. As in former days, the. retailer still has the opportunity to have knowledge superior to that of
the consumer with reference to the quality of his goods; and this
is especially true in the case of provisions open to inspection, such as
meat. It was due to the fact of the existence of this inequality of
position between retailer and consumer that the common law rule
of implied warranty in the sale of provisions was made to apply
to the retailer. Therefore, since the reason for the rule still exists,
although not to such a great degree, it should be applied where it
does exist.
Why should it not be applied? The retailer is the man with
whom the public generally must deal, and in order to insure the
people that he will use due diligence in the selection of a reliable wholesaler; that he will be as free from negligence as possible in the con-
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duct of his own business and that he will be ready to use all available
means to determine the. wholesaler responsible for a given injury
at the request of a customer, liability for injuries resulting from
defects in articles of food, such as meat, milk and groceries should
be placed upon the retailer.
In the first place the safety of the
public health demands it. Secondly, the retailer is the one with
whom the consumer contracts and upon whose skill and judgment
he relies for wholesome food. Thirdly, he is in a position superior to
that of the consumer to know the quality of the goods which he has
for sale. Fourthly, there is no injustice in holding him liable, since,
if the defect causing the injury is due to the negligence or breach of
warranty on the part of the wholesaler, he can recover from such
wholesaler for all the damages he has sustained due to such defect. 9
But even assuming that the above reasons for the common law
rule do not exist so as to make the rule "suitable to modern conditions," it is respectfully suggested that it would not be practical
for the Court of Appeals to change this rule, when there is and has
been in effect in the State of New York since September i, igii such
a statute as the Sales Act. The court may change the common law,
but it is for the legislature to change the Sales Act, if conditions
demand it. The special common law rule with respect to the sale of
provisions is contained in the general rule relating to warranty of
fitness for purpose as laid down in subsection i of section 96 of the
Personal Property Law. This subdivision provides; "Where the
buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears
that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he
be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose." Bogert
in his book, "The Sale of Goods in New York," states:10 "It
is believed that this special rule regarding provisions has been abolished by the Sales Act because of the failure of section 96 to make
mention of it and because the section purports to exclude all warranties not mentioned. The effect of such an abolition of the special
common law rule, however, would be merely to throw the sales of
provisions under the same rules as to the sales of all other goods,
namely under the rule of subsection i of section 96. If the buyer of
the provisions stated the purpose for which he bought them, which
he would impliedly do in practically all cases, and relied on the skill
or judgment of the seller of the provisions, there would be an inaplied warrantly of fitness for the particular purpose, which would
ordinarily be consumption as food."
Would the plaintiff in the principal case have a right to recover
against the defendant retailer under this section of the Sales Act?
This question can best be answered by reference to the construction
given the English Sale of Goods Act, since section 96 of the New
York Personal Property Law is practically identical with section
9
Cointat v. Myham &Son,
butcher).
'OP.79.

2

K. B.
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14 of the English Act."
The English courts have several times
construed the Sale of Goods Act with reference to the sale of provisions and under it have implied, against the retailer, warranties
of fitness for use as food. In Jackson v. WatsonL where canned
salmon was sold by a grocer for use as food, it was held that there was
an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption, which was
breached when the salmon was poisonous and caused the death of
the one who ate it. In Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co., 3 where a dealer in milk supplied a householder with milk for family use and in
an account book used in their dealings stated that elaborate precautions had been taken to insure purity, it was held that there was
an implied warranty that the milk was reasonably fit for consumption as human food under the Sale of Goods Act and that the warranty
was breached when a member of the family contracted typhoid fever
from drinking the milk and died thereof. In W4allis v. Russell,"
where a woman stated that she wanted "two nice fresh crabs * * *
for her tea," and the seller, as fishmonger, stated that those he had
were fresh, and the buyer took two which were poisonous and caused
illness to those who ate them, it was held that there was a breach of
implied warranty of fitness for purpose, namely fitness for consumption as human food. Inview of such a construction of the English Act,
it would seem clear that had the principal case arisen inEngland, the
plaintiff would have recovered damages under the Sale of Goods Act.
The English Sale of Goods Act is supposed to be based upon the
same public policy and upon the same theory of protection for the
public health, as was the rule of common law with reference to the
sale of provisions for human consumption. 5 Since the demands
of public policy are as great in America as they.are in England;
since section 96 of the New York Personal Property Law is derived
from and is practically identical with the corresponding section of
the English Sale of Goods Act, with reference to an implied warranty
in the sale of goods for a particular purpose; and since the mother
act has been frequently construed to apply to cases involving the
s6le of provisions for immediate human consumption, there would
seem to be no other reasonable inference than that the legislatures
which have adopted the American Sales Act intended that sections
practically identical with the act from which they were derived
would be construed as have been the original sections. Therefore
it would seem that there is little room in the Sales Act states
in America1 6 for judicial legislation with reference to implied warranties in the sale of provisions for human consumption. Even
if modem conditions do warrant a change in the rule of the common
law with respect to such warranties, which is of course a matter of
opinion, it is respectfully submitted that in Sales Act states it is
not for the courts, but for the legislatures to make the change.
J. Emmett O'Brien, '17.

uSee sec. 14, Eng. Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57 Vict., C 71 (1893); Bogert, Sale
of Goods in New York, p. 70.
22. K. B. 193 (1909).
131 K. B. 6o8 (19o5).
142 Ir. R. 585 (1902).
5

See Williston on Sales, p. 335.

16Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,

Ohio, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin.
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Sales: Necessity of Notice of Intent to Resell Goods upon Buyer's
Refusal tdAccept.-Someone has remarked that, in opposition to
the civil law, which was moulded upon a rigid outline, with every
rule harmonious and exact, the English common law is, to its glory,
above all else practical, based upon common sense and business
necessity, and regardless of symmetrical, or even logical, development.
As a precise statement of the fact this is questionable when, as at the
present day, we see half a hundred jurisdictions, each wedded to
the common law, following almost half a hundred rules upon the
same legal problem. It would seem that "common sense and business necessity" would dictate the same regulations to govern the
same interests and the same enterprises, yet an examination of the
law of the forty-eight American states shows how widely courts may
differ in their conception of the needs and rights of individuals
living under identical conditions.
A case illustrating this point is Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. v.
Walsh, iio N. E. (Ind.) 96 (9zp6), which discusses at considerable length the various remedies which accrue to the vendor when the
vendee has refused to accept goods tendered tinder a contract to
sell or a sale; and among others lays down the rule that if the vendor
chooses to resell, as agent of the vendee, and hold the vendee for
damages equal to the contract price, less the net price realized by the
resale, he must give the vendee notice of his intent to resell.
It is a well settled rule that where a vendee to whom title has
passed fails to accept goods tendered under the contract, or where
the goods are withheld because of the buyer's insolvency, the vendor
has the choice of one of three remedies. He may (i) retain the goods
for the vendee and sue for the entire contract price, or (2) resell as
quasi-agent for the vendee, applying the proceeds to the debt, and
suing the vendee for the balance, or (3) keep the goods himself and
sue for the difference between the contract and market prices.' As
we shall see later, most jurisdictions give the second and third remedies in case of an executory contract where title has not passed to
the vendee.
In case the vendor elects the second remedy, there arises the
question as to whether he must notify the vendee of his intent to
resell. Care should be taken to distinguish notice of intent to resell from notice of the time and place of resale, for the latter is generally held unnecessary. 2 We should also note that, if the goods
are of a perishable nature, so that notice is impracticable, or if there
is an express clause in the contract allowing resale upon default,
notice of intent to resell is unnecessary. 3
'Magnes v. Seed Co., 14 Col. App. 219, 225 (1900); Van Brocklen v. Smeallie
14o N. Y. 70 (1893); Woldert v. Arledge, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 692 (1893); 2 Mechem
on Sales, sec. i618.
2Magnes v. Seed Co., supra, note i; Woodward v. Tyng, 123 Md. 98, 113
(1914); Pollen v. LeRoy, 3o N. Y. 549 (1863); Gaskell v. Morris, 7 W. & S. (Pa.)
32 (1844); Winslow v. Harriman Co., 42 S. W. (Tenn. Ch.) 698, 706 (1897).
Contra, that notice of time and place must be given, Hickock v. Hoyt, 33 Conn.
553 (866); Ballv. Campbell, 30 Kan. 177 (1883). But these are both dicta, and
seem never to have been followed.
32 Mechem on Sales, see. 1634.
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The conflict is, then, over the question, must notice of intent to
resell non-perishable goods, refused by the vendee, or retained
by the vendor because of the vendee's insolvency, be given to the
vendee in order to hold him for any loss remaining to the vendor after
resale? The cases upon the point are said to be "irreconcilable",
but that word is too weak to adequately describe the confusion, for
it is literally true that no two American jurisdictions had the same
common law rule, and the few which now agree do so only by virtue of
the Uniform Sales Act.
The extreme common law view is that notice of intent to resell
must be given, else the resale shows an intention upon the part of
the vendor to rescind the contract and forego any right to damages
which he may have possessed.4 Or it may be that the giving of
the notice is necessary to show the election of the remedy of
resale, 5 or that failure to give notice will show election of the remedy to keep the goods as the vendor's own. 6 A more general rule is
that notice must be given to the vendee if the price received upon the
resale is to be "binding" or" conclusive" 7; but though in the majority of these cases the statement of the rule is unqualified, and though
the idea beneath the rule is that by notice the vendee is warned to
watch the sale and see that it is fair, it seems doubtful if the courts
would actually hold the price received upon resale as binding, in
the presence of fraud or even negligence upon the part of the vendor.
Another class of cases appears to hold that if there is no notice the8
market price determines the amount of damages due the vendor,
and apparently the price received upon resale is not even evidence of
the market price. But the broadest view, and the one that seems in
accord with justice and reason, is that no notice is required, but that
the price received upon resale is merely evidence of the market
price, which in turn is deducted from the contract price to determine
the damages. 9
Under this rule, if the sale is not fair, it is not
4
Redmond v. Stock, 28 Ind. 365 (1867); Fancher v. Goodman, 29 Barb.
(N. Y.) 315 (1859); Babcock v. Bonnell, 8o N. Y. 244 (188o).
6Ridgeley v. Mooney, I6 Ind. App.
362, 370 (1896); Rosenbaums v. Weeden,
18 Gratt.
(Va.) 785, 793 (I868). 6 Green v. Ansley, 92 Ga. 647, 650 (1893).
7
H-ayes v. Nashville, 8o Fed. 641, 65o (1897); Penn & Montgomery v. Smith,
98 Ala. 56o, 564 (1892); Davis Sulphur Co. v. Atlanta Co., io9 Ga. 607 (1899);
McDonald Cotton Co. v. Mayo, 38 So. (Miss.) 382 (I9O5); Nelson v. Hirsch,
102 Mo. App. 498, 515 (i9o3); Haines v. Tucker, 5o N. H. 307, 313 (1870);
Pollen v. LeRoy, supra, note 2; Winslow v. Harriman Co., supra,note 2; Woldert
v. Arledge, supra,note i; Leonardv. Portier, I5 S. W. (Tex.) 414 (1890); Prattv.
Freeman, 115 Wis. 648, 656 (1902).
OCherry Valley Iron Works v. Florence Iron River Co., 64 Fed. 569 (1894);
Haines v. Tucker, supra, note 7; Woldert v. Arledge, supra, note i. See also
Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. St. 148 (1869), where market price at the time of the
breach is said to determine the damage&s; and Rickey v. Tenbrceck, 63 Mo. 563,
(1876) which is in accord, except that the price received upon resale is considered
to be evidence of market value at time of breach.
"The following cases do not all announce the rule in the words used above, but
seem to support it Ullman v. Kent, 6o Ill. 271 (1871); Wrigley v. Cornelius,
162 Ill. 92 (i89 6); Clore v. Robinson, 100 Ky. 402 (1897); Kellogg v. Frolich,
139 Mich. 612 (I9o5); Habicht v. Braun, 172 Mich. 328 (1912); McDonald
Cotton Co. v. Mayo, supra, note 7; Ingram v. Matthien, 3 Mo. X17 (1833);
Nelson v. Hirsch, supra, note 7; Carriage Co. v. Gilmore, 123 Mo. App. 19
(I906); Pratt v. Freeman, supra, note 7.
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binding even if notice has been given; while on the other hand,
if notice has inadvertently or necessarily been omitted, the price
received upon the resale is evidence, which is all that it should ever be.
But there arises the question, what is sufficient notice? Is it
enough that the vendee announce that the vendor may do what he
wishes with the goods'0 , or refuse absolutely to deal with them?'
Or that the vendee have notice of the facts giving the vendor a
right to resell?12
Or must the goods be tendered and refused? 3
Or if there is actual notice, what degree is required? 4
A further distinction is attempted between breaches of executory
and executed sales. Some authorities demand notice in executed
sales and not in executory contracts to sell; 5 others, in executory contracts to sell and not in executed sales;"6 while the majority of cases
ignore the distinction entirely.
Upon principle the question does net seem difficult. If title to
the goods has passed, the purpose of the resale should be two-fold,
to satisfy in part the loss to the vendor resulting from the breach of
the contract, and to afford evidence of the remaining damages. If
the contract is still executory, the purpose of the resale should be
merely to afford evidence of the damages. Why should any distinction be made? As to the necessity of notice, the only effect which it
has is to give the vendee a chance to re-assume his contract obligation,
but surely there is no great injustice in requiring a buyer who has defaulted on his contract, to abide by the natural results of his breach.
It seems that the Uniform Sales Act, in sec. 6o (N. Y. Personal
Property Law, sec. 141), subdivision 3, has embodied these legal
principles. No notice of. intent to resell is required, but the giving
of such notice is evidence of a fair sale. At present (i916) the Sales
Act has been adopted in fourteen States, and to that extent has clarified the great confusion upon this point.
Just why the confusion arose is uncertain. Text writers had an
-unusual influence -upon the development of the subject, as will be
seen by reference to the earlier cases. The text writers could not
agree among themselves, 7 and the courts, as they were confronted
"0 Wrigley v. Cornelius, supra, note 9, holds that this is notice.
""Do not under any circumstances ship us any more," held sufficient. Habicht
v. Braun, supra, note 9.
u2Such notice held sufficient in Magnes v. Seed Co., supra, note i; Ingram v.

Wackernagel, 83 Ia.

82 (1891);

Waples v. Overaker, 77 Tex. 7, 12

(1890).

"3McCord
v. Laidley, 87 Ga. 221 (i89I), holds this proper.
4
1n Hayes v. Nashville, supra,note 7, the court merely observes that defendant actually knew of the in-cent to resell, afid finds that enough. But in Winslow
v. Harriman Co., supra, note 2, the plaintiffs wrote, "If necessary, we will sell for
your account, and charge you with the difference or loss we may sustain," and the
court
finds such notice insufficient. This seems too extreme.
"5Cherry Valley Iron Works v. Florence Co., supra, note 8; Hayes v. Nashville,
supra, note 7; Wallace v. Coons,
48 Ind. App. 511 (1911); Leeper v. Schrceder,
6
24 Colo. App. 164 (1913).
McLean v. Richardson, 127 Mass. 339, 345 (1879).
"As an example of this disagreement, compare 2 Mechem on Sales, secs. 1634
and z645, with Williston on Sales, secs. 546 and 548, and with Burdick on Sales
(2d ed.), sec. 42.
It is believed that Mechem, who favors the requirement of
notice, peipetuates the views of the older text writers, whereas Williston and
Burdick represent the views of the judges who early disagreed with the authorities.
Sec. 6o of the Sales Act is the logical outcome of this change in opinion.
1
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by the varying states of fact, still further disagreed. The difficulty
was that so many technical variations of the fundamental question
were invented that it was hopeless to expect forty-eight jurisdictions
to distinguish and answer each in exactly the same way. Yet so
simple is the matter, stripped of its technicalities, that the matter is
completely regulated by a few lines in the Sales Act. But because
ot the many jurisdictions which still follow the common law, it has
seemed best to append a classification of the law upon the subject,
by states.1 8

Kenneth Dayton, '17.
18
It is not pretended that this list is exhaustive, but as many cases as could
be found in the leading authorities have been examined, and their decisions
tabulated. Where the rule in a given state seems definite, and the cases are very
numerous, not all the cases from that state have been cited.
ENGLAND: notice must be given; Sale of Goods Act (56 & 57 Vict., c. 7 1), sec.
48. FEDERAL: in the case of executory contracts notice is not important, for the

market price at the time of delivery determines damages, and apparently the
price received upon a resale is not evidence of this. Cherry Valley Iron Works v.
Florence Iron River Co., 64 Fed. 569 (1894). In the case of executed contracts
there must be notice of intent to resell, to exercise that remedy. Hayes v. Nashville, 8o Fed. 641, 65o (1897).
ALABAMA: dicta that notice is to be given, and the price received upon resale
will show the damage. Penn & Montgomery v. Smith, 98 Ala. 56o (1892).
ALASKA: Sales Act, Session Laws, 1913, c. 66.
ARIZONA: Sales Act, Laws of 1907, c: 99.
COLORADO: no notice is necessary m an executory contract. Leeper v.
Schroeder, 24 Colo. App. 164 (1913). Nor where the vendee knows of the facts
giving the vendor the right to resell. Magnes v. Seed Co., 14 Col. App. 219,
227 (1900).
CONNECTICUT: Sales Act, Acts of 1907, c. 212.
GEORGIA: notice must be given if the vendor is to be conclusively bound by
the price obtained upon resale. Davis Co. v. Atlanta Co., lO9 Ga. 607 (899).
If no notice is given, resale shows an election by the vendor to treat the goods as
his own. Green v. Ansley, 92 Ga. 647 (1893). Tender of the goods and refusal by
the vendee to accept is sufficient notice. McCord v. Laidley, 87 Ga. 221 (189i).
there appear to be dicta to the effect that notice of the time and
KANSAS:
place of resale is also necessary, but this is in a single unsupported case. Ball v.
Ca %NT;CY:
hell, 3o 'Kns.no notice
177 (1883)..is required where the price obtained on resale is fair
and reasonable. Clore v. Robinson, 1oo KY. 402 (1897).
IOWA: if notice is required, it is sufficient for the vendor to state that he will
take the steps authorized by law. Ingram v. Wackernael, 83 Ia. 82 (1891).
ILLINOIS: Sales Act, Laws of 1915, p. 6o4. No notice was required at common law. Wrigley v. Cornelius, 162 Il. 92 (1896). But the rule is otherwise as
to realty. Maulding v. Steele, 1O5 Ill. 644 (1883).
INDIANA: In the case of executory contracts, no notice is necessary. Wallace
v. Coons, 48 Ind. App. 511 (1911). But .(as to executed contracts) failure to give
notice before resale shows rescission. Redmond v. Smock, 29 Ind. 365 (1867).
Ridgley v.
Notice is necessary to show the election of the remedy of resale.
Mooney, 16 Ind. App. 362,370 (1896). The rule seems well set led.
MAnE: necessity of notice is not mentioned in Atwood v. Lucas, 53 Maine
508 (I866).
MARYLAND: Sales Act., Laws of 191o, c. 346.
MASSACHUSETTS: Sales Act, Acts of 1908, C. 237.
MICmGAN: Sales Act, Public Acts, 1913, No. ioo. "Do not under any circumstances ship any more" goods, held reasonable notice. Habicht v. Braun,
172 Mich. 328 (1912).
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Sales: Breach of Warranty in Conditional Sale.-The case of
Shimel v. Williams Oven Manufacturing Co., 93 Misc. (N. Y.) 174
(1916), presents a new question in the law of warranties. There had
been a conditional sale agreement whereby the buyer agreed to have
several ovens constructed by the seller. Before all the ovens were
completed and before the price had been fully paid, the buyer brought
this action for the payments he had already made, on the ground of
rescission of the contract for breach of warranty as to the quality of
the ovens. The question was thus squarely presented whether in
such case there may be rescission for breach of warranty where the
sale is incomplete, the title remaining still in the seller. The court
upheld the plaintiff in his contention and allowed rescission.
At common law it seems clear that the action could not have been
maintained in New York. A conditional sale is an executory contract
of sale to be completed by the simultaneous or concurrent acts of the
seller and buyer.' "A warranty is an incident only of consummated
or completed sales, and has no place as a contract, having present
vitality and force in an executory agreement of sale."'2 Again in Levis
v. Pope Motor Car Co.,3 the rule is stated: "A rule of law is that there
cannot be the incident of a warranty unless there is a complete sale."
Other decisions and authorities support this doctrine and so the only
question to be decided is whether this rule of the common law has
been so modified by statute as to destroy it.
In this connection certain sections of the New York Personal
Property Law, the American Uniform Sales Act, must be examined.
Mississippi: if express notice is given, the price received upon a fair resale
is binding; if no notice is given, the market price determines damages. McDonald
Cotton Co. v. Mayo, 38 So. 372 (1905).

MissouRi: no notice is necessary, but the receipts of a fair resale determine
damages. Nelson v. Hirsch, io2 Mo. App. 498 (19o3), and cases cited.
NEVADA: Sales Act, Laws of 1915, c. 159.
NEW HAmPSHIRE: if notice is not given, the market price determines damages,
but the price received upon a resale seems to be no evidence thereof. Haines v.
o
Tucker, 5 N. H. 307 (1870); Tripp v. Co., 69 N. H. 233 (1897).
NEw JERSEY: Sales Act, Laws of 1907, c. 132.
NEWYORK: SalesAct, Laws of 1911, C.571; now secs. 82-158 of the Personal

Property Law.
OHIO:

Sales Act, Laws of 1908, c. 413.

Sales Act, Laws of 1915, No. 241.
PENNSYLVANIA:
RHODE ISLAND: Sales Act, Laws of 19o8, c. 1548.
TENNESSEE: notice is necessary in order to sell at the buyer's risk. Granberry v. Frierson, 2 Baxt. 326 (1872). But Tennessee is extreme in its declaration
of what notice is unreasonable, for Winslow v. Harriman Co., 42 S.W. 698 (1897)

holds that a message, "If necessary we will sell for your account, and charge you
with the difference or loss we may sustain," is not sufficient.
TEXAS: there must be notice in order to bind the vendee by the price realized
Leonard v. Portier, 15 S. W. 414 (1890); Woldert v. Arledge, 4 Tex.
on resale.
Civ. App. 692 (1893). But if the vendee knows of the facts giving the vendor a
right to resell, that is sufficient. Waples v. Overaker, 77 Tex. 7 (189o).
VIRGINIA: notice shows election of the remedy. Rosenbaums v. Weeden, 8
Gratt. 785 (1868). Notice should be given. Amer. Hide Co. v. Chalkley, 11
Va. 458 (19o3).

Sales Act, Laws of 1911, c. 549.
'Osborn v. Gantz, 6o N. Y. 540 (1875).
2Supra, note I.
WISCONSIN:

2o02

N. Y.

402 (1911).

NOTES AND COMMENT
Section 35o of the Personal Property Law,4 in providing for remedies
for breach of warranty says as follows: "Where there is a breach of
warranty by the seller the buyer may at his election, * * * rescind
the contract to sell or sale and refuse to receive the goods, or if the
goods have already been received, return them or offer to return them
to the seller and recover the purchase price or any part thereof that
has been paid. "By section 82 of the same act 5 it is provided that:
"A contract to sell or a sale may be absolute or conditional." If a
contract to sell may be conditional and the contract to sell may be
rescinded for breach of Warranty, does it not follow that a conditional
contract to sell or a conditional sale may be rescinded for breach of
warranty? But it is insisted that this conclusion does not follow
because a warranty is only an incident of a completed sale as stated
above. This contention was no doubt true at common law but if
there may be a breach of warranty in a contract to sell it follows that a
warranty may be an incident of a contract to sell which is not a completed sale. 6 The draftsman of the act in discussing the section calls
attention to the apparent objection to the English statute in not
allowing rejection of the goods for breach of warranty where title has
not passed. His idea of warranty is that it should be regarded as
"any promise in regard to the goods, as well as affirmations fulfilling
the requisites there laid down." It is clear that his intent in drafting
the act was to allow the incident of a warranty and to give a remedy
for a breach thereof before title had passed.
It would seem, furthermore, that the rule is equitable and just.
If the article is not as warranted the buyer may not want it at any
price and if, to get his remedy for the breach, he must wait until the
price has been fully paid it would seem to work a hardship upon him.
This hardship is overcome by the logical construction which the court
gives to the statute.
F. B. Ingersoll, 'x7.
Tort: Contributory Negligence: Liability for Attack by a Dog on
One Enteringa House by Mistake.-In Harrisv. Hoyt, i56 N. W. (Wis.)
842 (i915), the plaintiff, a woman, was invited to visit a friend in an
apartment house. By mistake she opened the door leading into the
defendant's apartment, and, while still standing in the hallway outside, was bitten by the defendant's dog. The court held that the
plaintiff was not a trespasser so as to limit the owner's duty as keeper
of the dog, and that the question of negligence was one for the jury.
It is generally conceded that, if a person is injured on the premises
of another, the mere fact that the injured person was a trespasser at
4Section 150 of the N. Y. Personal Property Law is an adoption of see. 69

of the
American Uniform Sales Act.
5

Sec. 82 of the Personal Property Law corresponds to see. i of the American
Uniform
Sales Act.
6
See see. 82 of the Personal Property Law, subdivs. I and 2.
7Wifliston, Sales, see. 6o5.
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the time the injtiry was inflicted, will not prevent a recovery. 1 The
common law rule that if a person is a trespasser, unintentionally,
involuntarily and by mistake, he is, nevertheless, not without protection against a ferocious dog, was set forth in Woolf v. Chalker2. In
that case, the injured person came upon the premises as a peddler,
believing that permission had been given him to enter. The same
rule was upheld, but with an added proviso that the injured party
comes upon the premises in the daytime, and on some innocent mission, in Sanders v. O'CallaghanP.
Where statutes have been enacted, allowing recovery for injuries
inflicted by dogs, the liability of an owner or keeper of the dog doing.
4
the damage has been extended beyond that existing at common law.
The intention of the statutes is to do away with the necessity of
proving scienter. This was the opinion of the Wisconsin court in
Harrisv. Hoyt, supra, and the same interpretation has been given in
other jurisdictions where similar statutes exist.'
While no case, can be found in which the entry upon premises was
by actual mistake, as in Harrisv. Hoyt, supra, theAlnerican decisions,
in cases in which the trespass was purely technical, that is, involuntary,
allow recovery for injuries inflicted by dogs, horses, and other domestic animals. If a person comes upon the premises to find employment, and is bitten by a dog, no notice of the dog's presence being
given, he may recover damages.
It is unnecessary to obtain permis7
If
sion before going on the premises where a ferocious dog is kept.
the entrance upQn the owner's premises is without invitdtion, the
party entering need not inquire and ascertain whether vicious dogs are
kept there; a failure to do so is not contributory negligence8 . A sign
"Beware the Dog," posted on premises where such an animal is kept,
is not an absolute defense to an action for damages for injuries received from the dog.' A visit from a peddler or a junk-dealer is not
sufficient provocation for an attack by the dog 0 . Where a policeman
pursues a suspicious character through a private alley-way, he is
there under such circunistances that, receiving an injury from a dog
chained in the alley-way, he is entitled to recover damages". The
fact that the injury done to one innocently upon the premises is the
'Carroll v. Marcoux, 98 Me. 259 (1903); Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44 (1878);
Riley v. Harris, 177 Mass. 163 (i9oo); Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. (N. Y.)
496 (x837); Pierret v. Moller, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 574 (1854); Leonorovitz v.
Ott, 40 Misc. (N. Y.) 551 (1903).
On the question of damages, though, such trespassing may be material.
Pierret v. Moller, supra, note r.
23 Conn. 121 (1862).
3I11 Iowa 575 (i90), atp. 579.
'Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121 (1862).
5Sanders v. O'Callaghan, supra, note 3; Hussey v. King, 83 Me. 568 (X891).
6
Conway v. Grant, 88 Ga. 40 (1891).
7Woolf v. Chalker, supra, note 4; Shulz v. Griffith, io3 Iowa I5O (1897);
Carroll v. Marcoux, supra,note i.
sSanders v. O'Callaghan, supra,note 5.
$Spellman v. Dyer, i86 Mass. 176 (1904).
"Woolf v. Chalker, supra, note 2; Carroll v.Marcoux, supra, note I; Spellman v. Dyer, supra,note 9; Kelly v. Tilton, 3 Keyes (N. Y.) 263 (i866).
UMelsheimer v. Sullivan, i Colo. App. 22 (1891).
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first actually inflicted by the dog, does not excuse the keeper of the
dog from liability. 12 Where a license to use a part of the premises
may be shown, the owner is liable for injuries or for death caused by
vicious animals kept on the premises." These statements represent
the view of American courts in cases in which a person is innocently
upon the premises of another, and is injured by a dog or other domestic animal.
The English courts, in cases where a party attacked by a dog was
an involuntary trespasser, have established the essential inquiry to
be, by what right was the injured person on the premises when
attacked by the dog14. The leading English case in which this
principle is set forth is Deane v. Clayton.5
There the court said:
"The true test, by which to try whether such an action .......
be maintainable or not, is to ask, whether the man or animal that
suffered the injury, had or had not a right to be where he was when he
received the hurt."' 6 Such a test was suggested in igio in Lowery v.
Walker.17 In that case the plaintiff was crossing the defendant's
field on a path which had been used by the public, and was injured by
the defendant's horse in the field. The court held that the defendant
was not liable, and that while it is impossible, in such cases, to lay
down any hard and fast rule, the defendant's knowledge that the
public habitually trespassed upon thefield imposed no duty upon him
to take care for their protection. It is significant that this represents
the extreme case, that of a licensee upon the premises. Therefore, it
is apparent that the English courts limit the liability for injuries
received by an innocent trespasser more narrowly than do the American courts.

In this country there is a difference of opinion as to the nature of
the liability of the owner of a dog for injuries inflicte I by it upon one
coming, upon the owner's premises. In one group of cases", it has
been held that contributory negligence on the part of the injured person will prevent recovery, while in another group 19 the owner of the
vicious animal is not relieved from liability by slight negligence or
want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured.
The courts in the first group of cases have taken as their standard,
in determining liability, the conduct of a reasonably prudent person.
In a leading Massachusetts case,20 in which the plaintiff's intestate
was killed by a stag, while trespassing in the defendant's field, it was
held that the action could be maintained, if, at the time of the injury,
'2 Rider v. White, 65 N. Y. 54. (1875).
"~Glidden v. Moore, 14, Neb. 84 (1883).
2Balnnv. Simmons, 3 C. & P. (Eng.) x38 (1827); Brock v. Copeland,
i Esp. (Eng.) 203 (1794); Sarah v. Blackburn, 4 C. & P. (Eng.) 297 (1830).
'57
Taunt, C. P. (E-ng.) 489 (1817).
' 6This same test is expressed in the dissenting opinion in Harris v. Hoyt,
infra.
17(19io) I IC. B. (Eng.) 173.
18Decided in Ind., Ill.,
Mass., N. H., Pa. and Tex. See cases cited in footnotes 20 to 23, inclusive.

19Decided in Conn., Ia., N. Y. and Neb.
29, inclusive.

2"Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44 (1878).

See cases cited in footnotes
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the plaintiff's intestate was in the exercise of due care. The court
there said: "The test is, whether the plaintiff's intestate, in entering
the pasture, exercised that degree of care which reasonable and pruddent men use under the circumstances." This question is, of course,
one for the jury to decide. The same test was applied in igoo where
the person injured by a dog came upon the owner's premises at the
invitation of the latter's servant.2' It has also been held a proper
case for the jury if a real estate broker, having charge of the land on
which the owner of a dog is a tenant, comes upon the premises to post
a notice of sale, and is injured by the dog." The cases in this group
favor the rule that the owner of a ferocious dog is primafacie liable
for injuries by it to persons coming on the premises, but he is not
liable if the negligence of the party injured in any way contributed to
the injury."
The second group of cases establish the doctrine of absolute liability
for injuries received from a vicious animal on the owner's premises.
Here it is held that the rule: "That if the negligence of the plaintiff
essentially contributed to the injury he can not recover" is not
applicable to an injury inflicted by a dog on an innocent trespasser.24
The argument in such cases is that an owner of a dog is as much liable
for the dog's injuries if he keeps it on his own premises, and suffers
it to be loose, as if the dog were at the time in the highway.2 In one
case the test of the English courts has been rejected entirely, and it is
held that one who puts a dangerous animal upon his own premises, in
a place where he knows that others are in the habit of going, is liable
for injuries inflicted by such animal, whether such others have a right
to go there or not.28 A leading New York case, Muller v. McKesson,"
does not relieve the owner of a dog from liability on account of slight
negligence or want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured.
To constitute a defense in this group of cases, acts must be proved,
with notice of the character of the animal, which would establish
that the injured person voluntarily brought the injury upon himself.28
The keeper of a vicious dog in these cases keeps it at peril, and
negligence by the injured party, whether of omission or commission,
does not exempt the owner of the dog
from liability, unless that
29
negligence amounts to an unlawful act.
Of these two groups of cases, Harris v. Hoyt, supra, seems to fall
within the first, since the Wisconsin court held that the keeper of a
dog owes a duty to protect against attack a person coming upon his
premises by mistake, and allowed the jury to find ihat the injured
person was not guilty of contributory negligence. This case, therefore, may be classed with those cases holding that the owner of a
2"Riley v. Harris, supra, note I.

nSylvester v. Maag, 55 Pa. St. 225 (1893).
"3Williams v. Moray, 74 Ind. 25 (1881); Dockerty v. Hutson, 125 Ind. 102
(I89o); Mareau v. Vanatta, 88 Mi1.132 (2878); Owinby v. Woodbury, 63 N. H.
370 (1885); Chickering v. Lord, 67 N. H. 555 (893); Earhart v. Youngblood,
27 Pa. St. 331 (1856); Badali v. Smith, 37 S. W. (Tex.) 642 (1896).
UWoolf v. Chalker, supra, note 2.
nPierret v. Moller, supra, note 1.
6Glidden v. Moore, supra, note 13. -73 N. Y. 295 (1878).
28Lynch v. McNally, 73 N. Y. 347 (1878). 29Shulz v. Griffith, supra, note 2.
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vicious dog is only primafacieliable for injuries inflicted by the dog to
persons on the keeper's premises, and that the owner may be relieved
from liability by the want of ordinary care on the part of the person

injured.
H. R. Lamb, 'r8.
Torts: ContractualAssumption of Risk a Defense Under the Workmen's CompensationAct.-In the case of Ashton v. Boston andM.R. Co.,
xo9 N. F. (Mass.) 820 ('pi5) the court held that contractual assumption of risk was a defense though the case came under the clause of the
Workmen's Compensation Act which provides that it shall not be a
defense that the employee had assumed the risks of injury.' This
clause was intended to take from the employer the defense that the
plaintiff had contractually assumed the risk of injury. So on its face
the holding of the court seems wrong. As the holding was right it is
necessary to explain the meaning of the term "contractual assumption
of risk" asused by the court, also its use of the term "voluntary assumption of risk."
The plaintiff's intestate was an experienced foreman of an emergency crew and was in charge of the repairs of the electric zone of the
defendant's road. He was killed while making repairs in the line of
his duty. There was no negligence on the defendant's part. The
defendant was not a subscriber under the compensation act.
The court held in susbstance: the plaintiff could not recover
because the risks growing out of the work were assumed by the
deceased by his contract of employment. There is another class of
cases where the risks grow out of the negligence of the employer. If
the employee assumes these risks, it is called voluntary assumption of
risk, and if injury results the defendant must at common law plead
assumption of risk. But if injury results from those risks which are
contractually assumed there is no liability and the defendant may
enter a general denial. So the statute did not apply to cases of contractual assumption of risk.
In the law of torts the term "assumption of risk"has been loosely
used to include both the assumption of the necessary risks of an
employment and the risks growing out of the negligence of the
employer.2 When the employee was injured at common law without
fault of the master, he could not recover because he had assumed the
risks of the employment. When he was injured because of negligence
of his employer, which he had consented to, he could not recover,
because he had thereby assumed the risks of injury. Because of the
essential difference in the two kinds of assumption of risk, different
rules of pleading were applied. If the employee had been injured by
the necessary risks, the defendant need not plead assumption of risk,
but could enter a general denial of liability.3 But where the injury
'Massachusetts St. 1911 c. 751.
2
Burdick, Torts (3d ed.), pp. i98, 201; 2 Jaggard, Torts, pp. ioi4, OI9;
Bigelow, Torts (8th ed.), pp. 168, 170, 173; Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201
N. Y. 271 (i91).
$26 Cyc. 1403 and cases cited; Woodworth v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. i49 N. W.
(Ia.) 522 (1914).
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had grown out of the negligence of the employer, to which the
employee had consented, the employer must affirmatively plead the
assumption of risk.4 Thus it appears that by "contractual assuinption
of risks" the court meant simply the assumption of those risks which
are necessary to the employment. By "voluntary assumption of
risks" it meant the assumption of the risks which grow out of the
employer's negligence.
The Massachusetts Compensation Act only does away with the
defense of voluntary assumption of risk. At common law absence of
fault is always a defense to the employer.5 Then, if contractual
assumption of risk is always the assumption of the necessary risks,
there is no room for negligence on the employer's part, and it is always
a defense. The more drastic acts, the compulsory acts, such as the
New York act, impose an absolute liability.
H. Mason Olney, '18.
Trade Name: Use of Personal Name in Business.-It is well
established by a long line of decisions that the right to the use of a
personal name in business is not exclusive. This fact is strongly
brought out in the case of Schinasi v. Schinasi, 169 App. Div. (N. Y.)
887 (1915), where an injunction was sought to restrain the defendants from using their name. The plaintiffs, Schinasi Bros., were
well known cigarette manufacturers. The defendants also engaged
in the manufacturer of cigarettes.
Their name was Schinasi and,
being brothers, they carried on the business under the firm name
of "Schinasi Bros." The cigarettes were put up in boxes entirely
different from those used by the plaintiffs and each box had printed
upon it "Notice. We have no connection with Schinasi Bros. manufacturers of the Natural and Egyptian Pretiest Cigarette."
The
court held that it would not issue an injunction merely because of the
similarity of name, although the plaintiffs were damaged by this use.
It is a prevailing idea that a person has the absolute right to use
his own name without any restriction. While this may be so, yet
the courts have limited this use to a certain extent; that is, the
courts have required the use to be such as would not defraud or
deceive the public. The courts do not prohibit the use of the name,
but the manner in which the name is used. This limitation applies
only to the use of a personal name in business; therefore it follows,
that every person not engaged in business has the absolute right to
the use of his bwn name.
The view taken by the court in Schinasi v. Schinasi is in accord
with the leading cases in this country.
The authorities are well agreed that a person has the absolute
right to use his own name in his individual business,' subject to the
'26 Cyc. 1403 and 'cases cited; Duffey v. Consolidated Block Coal Co., 147
Iowa 225 (1910).
5Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., supra, note 2.
'Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. (Eng.) 84 (1843); Holloway v. Holloway, x3 Beav.

(Eng.)

209

(x85o).

NOTES AND COMMENT
restriction that the use must not be for the purpose of misleading
or deceiving the public;2 but the fact that such use does actually
interfere with the business of one who has the same name does not
prevent the use of the name by the possessor,3 in the absence of unfair competition.
The law is the same in regard to the use of a personal name in a
partnership and in an individual business, and the courts do not
attempt to draw a distinction. In the well known case of Meely v.
Menely action was brought to restrain the defendants from using
the name "Meneely". The plaintiffs were bell manufacturers in
West Troy. The defendants formed the partnership of Meneely
and Kimberly at Troy and they began the manufacture of bells.
The plaintiffs cast upon their bells "Meneely's, West Troy, N. Y."
The defendants cast upon their bells "Meneely's, Troy, N.Y." It was
held that"the manner of using the name is all. that would be enjoined,
not the simple use of it; for every -manhas the absolute right to use
his own name in his own business even though he may therefore
interfere with or injure the business of another person bearing the
same name, provided he does not resort to any artifice or contrivance
for the purpose of producing the impression that the establishments
are identical, or do anything calculated to mislead. Where the only
confusion created is that which results from the simnilarity of the
names the courts will not interfere. A person cannot make a trade
mark of his own name, and thus obtain a monopoly of it which will
debar all other persons bf the same name from using their own names
in their own business."
The adjudicated cases on the question as to whether a corporation
may use a personal name as part of its corporate name are numerous',
all holding that a corporation may employ as part of its corporate
name the name of someone connected with it, although the name is
used by others of the same trade.7 Of course, the situation would
be otherwise where the name to be used had been contracted away.8
The courts scrutinize this use more than they do use in a partnership or individual business. It must clearly appear that the appropriation of such name was not for the purpose of deceiving tht
public and diverting the trade of another. If the use was intended
to be deceptive, the corporation may be restrained from using the
name as part of its corporate title. 9
-'McLeanv. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (1877); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. R. T.
Royal, 122 Fed. 337 (19o3); Faber v: Faber, 49 Barb. (N.Y.) 357 (1867); World's
D. M. Assn. v. Pierce, 2o3 N. Y. 419 (191).
3Supra, note i.
4
Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 540 (x891).
562
N. Y.A7 (1875).
6
Herring-H-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., 208 U. S. 554 (1908); Chas.
S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462 (1895); Merritt Burial &

Cremation Co. v. Merritt Co., 155 App. Div. (N. Y.) 565 (x913); Kurtzmann
& Co.
v. Kurtzmann, 84 Misc. 478 (1914).
7
R. W. Rogers Co. v. William Rogers Mfg. Co., 70 Fed. 1017 (1895); Garrett

v. T. H. Garrett & Co., 78 Fed. 472 (1896); International Silver Co. v. William
H. Rogers Corporation, 67 N. J. Eq. 646 (i9o5).

8Merritt Burial & Cremation Co. v. Merrett Co., supra, note 6.
9Clark Thread Co. v. Armitage, 74 Fed. 936 (1896); Garrett v. T. H. Garrett

& Co., supra, note 7.
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In Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff" the court said "but if every man
has the right to use his name reasonably and honestly, in every way,
we cannot perceive any practical distinction between the use of the
name in a firn and its use in a corporation. It is dishonesty in the
use that is condemned, whether in a partnership or corporate name,
and not the use itself. One corporation is not entitled to restrain
another from using in its corporate title, a name to which others have
a common right."
All the cases seem to regard a man's name as his own property and
to hold that he has a right to use it just as he has a right to use any
other property that belongs to him." The only restriction imposed
is that the use should be a fair and honest one.2 The fact that there
is a similarity or identity of name which results in confusion and even
injury, does not show that the use was unfair; in order to be an unfair use, the name must be so used as to produce a greater confusion
than would otherwise result from the mere similarity or identity of
name. 8 The courts look upon the use of a family name as a natural
right, and the simple fact of priority of use by another of the same
name will not deprive a person of his right. In brief, a person may
use his own name in business, as an individual or in a partnership
or corporation title, subject to the rules of unfair competition.
Herman B. Lermer, '17.
10198 U. S. 118 (x9o5).

"Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, supra, note 4; McLean v. Fleming, supra,
note 2.
"Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. v. Hall's Safe Co., supra,note 6.
"International Silver Co. v. Rogers Corporation, supra, note 7.

